Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co.

• Decision Date: 24 June 1975
• Citation: 341 A.2d 184,234 Pa.Super. 441
• Parties: FREEZER STORAGE, INC., Appellant, v. ARMSTRONG CORK CO., and Acands, Inc.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 184

341 A.2d 184

234 Pa.Super. 441

FREEZER STORAGE, INC., Appellant, v. ARMSTRONG CORK CO., and Acands, Inc.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

June 24, 1975.

Application for Allocatur Granted Sept. 16, 1975.

John E. Evans, Jr., Evans, Ivory & Evans, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Ronald W. Frank, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle & Buerger, Robert J. Pfaff, Egler & Reinstadtler, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

JACOBS, Judge:

In December of 1965 Pennsylvania joined a growing number of jurisdictions when its legislature passed a statute limiting the liability of persons furnishing the design or construction of improvements to real property. The Pennsylvania statute ¹ provides that no action shall be brought against such persons more than 12 years after the completion of any such improvement. ² In this case we are squarely presented with a three-pronged attack upon the constitutionality of the statute as violating first, the Pennsylvania constitutional proscription against special legislation; ³ second, the correlative equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, ⁴ and last, the due process clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. ⁵

The facts of the case reveal that the appellee, Armstrong Cork Co., undertook in 1956 to design, plan and install a low room temperature warehouse in a plant owned by the appellant, Freezer Storage, Inc. Appellant's complaint alleges that Armstrong was negligent in the designing, planning and installation of insulation material and that the appellant did not and could not reasonably have had knowledge of that negligence before 1970 when defects in the workmanship became apparent. Armstrong filed preliminary objections to the complaint alleging that the 1965 Act 'destroyed' the appellant's right of action. ⁶ These preliminary objections were sustained by the court and, as to the appellee, the complaint was dismissed. ⁷

The Act in question provides in pertinent part that

'(n)o action . . . to recover damages:

(1) (f)or any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property, (or)

(2) (f)or injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such dificiency shall be brought against any person lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of such improvement more than twelve years after completion of such an improvement.'

Reviewing the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly we are guided by well established principles. An Act is cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973), and 'will not be declared unconstitutional unless it Clearly, palpably and Plainly violates the Constitution.' Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963) (emphasis original). The burden of proof is on the party attacking the constitutionality of the statute, and all doubt must be resolved in favor of sustaining the legislation. Milk Control Comm'n v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 198 A.2d 840 (1964). Upon review we must conclude that the appellant's challenge simply does not meet this rigorous test.

I

Appellant initially asserts that the Act in question is special legislation standing in violation of article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. ⁸ It is, of course, 'a fundamental principle of our constitutional form of government that the legislative power ought to be exercised in a general and impartial manner and that new law ought not be made in the individual case.' ⁹ Article III, section 32 was adopted 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes . . ..' Haverford Township v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 6, 28 A.2d 786, 788 (1942).

Classification Per se, however, is not inherently unconstitutional. 'A classification in and of itself is not prohibited . . . as long as the classification is reasonable and founded upon a genuine distinction.' Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 133, 179 A.2d 439, 442 (1962). 'Legislation for a class distinguished from a general subject is not special, but general; and classification is a legislative question, subject to judicial revision only so far as to see that it is founded on real distinctions in the subjects classified, and not on artifical or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of evading constitutional prohibition.' Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 313, 56 A.2d 675, 677 (1948). It is not for the courts to substitute their judgments for that of the legislature.

'The test is, not wisdom, but good faith in the classification.' Seabolt v. Comm'rs, 187 Pa. 318, 323, 41 A. 22, 23 (1898). The duty of the courts is to consider only whether the legislature had any reasonable basis for making the classification.

The class protected by the Act in question includes 'any person lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction' of improvements to real property. This is a broad class and no distinctions are made within it. '(A) statute which relates to persons or things as a class, is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special, and comes within the constitutional prohibition.' Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338, 348 (1875). See State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pa., 441 Pa. 293, 272 A.2d 478 (1971). The Washington Supreme Court upheld its similar statute against a special legislation challenge in Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1973). The court found persuasive the fact that 'the scope of the Washington provision is not limited as to vocation. The subject statute bars actions against Any person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property.' Id. at 532, 503 P.2d at 111 (emphasis original); See also Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972). We cannot conclude that the 1965 Act is a special law coming within the constitutional proscription. See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; Contra, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (holding the Illinois statute unconstitutional as violating a special legislation proscription).

II

Similarly, we find no violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¹⁰

'(T)he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425--26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 'the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons, in different ways.' Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 562, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). We do not find an arbitrary classification in the present statute. All potential plaintiffs who may be injured by deficiencies in improvements to real property are treated alike, as are all members of the class participating in the construction of those improvements. See Harris v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1969), Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005, 90 S.Ct. 558, 24 L.Ed.2d 497 (1970); See also Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929).

Neither can we say that the classification is not rationally related to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose such as the prevention of stale or fraudulent claims or the encouragement of periodic and reasonable inspections by owners or persons in possession. Therefore, we must reject appellant's claim that the Act violates the equal protection clause. See, Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 870, 38 L.Ed.2d 755 (1974); But see Fujioka v. Kam, Haw., 514 P.2d 568 (1973) (holding that a similar Hawaii statute violates equal protection).

III

Appellant also challenges the Act as a violation of the due process clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, section 11, which prohibits the denial of redress to injured parties. Derived from Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta, section 11 states:

'(a) all courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.'

The Act challenged clearly eliminates the right to bring an action against a person who improves real property if a 12 year period has elapsed from the date of the completion of the improvement. However, '(n)o one has a vested right in a statute of limitations or other procedural matters. . . . So long as there is no omission of a remedy for the enforcement of a right for which a remedy existed when the right accrued, a want of due process is in no way involved.' Agostin v. Pittsburgh Steel Foundry Corp., 354 Pa. 543, 549, 47 A.2d 680, 683 (1946). As a general principle '(i)t...