Gibson v. Western New York & P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1894
• Docket Number: 227
• Citation: 30 A. 308,164 Pa. 142
• Parties: George J. Gibson v. Western New York & Pennsylvania R.R., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

30 A. 308

164 Pa. 142

George J. Gibson v. Western New York & Pennsylvania R.R., Appellant

No. 227

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 1, 1894

May 2 1893, Argued;

Appeal, No. 227, Jan. T, 1893, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Warren Co., Sept. T., 1891, No. 19, on verdict for plaintiff. Reversed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before NOYES, P.J.

The material facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court below.

Plaintiff's points were among others as follows:

"2. The defendant in this case having admitted its liability for the injury received by the plaintiff, there are but three questions left for the determination of the jury in this case; the first being whether or not the plaintiff knew he signed the release or satisfaction, or if he knew the character of the transaction when he did sign the same? Second, if he did not know he had signed it, or the nature or character of the transaction, then the further question arises for the consideration of the jury: Did the plaintiff afterwards, learning from the defendant or its agents that he had signed said release and been paid a consideration therefor by the defendant, ratify and confirm the same? If the jury determines both of these questions in favor of the plaintiff, then there is the further question of the amount of damages which the plaintiff sustained for the jury to determine." Affirmed. [5]

"5. If the jury find in favor of the plaintiff they should deduct from the amount which he is entitled to recover the sum of two hundred forty dollars which he has already received from the defendant, with interest from the 24th of December, A.D 1890; provided that the jury find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover more than the said sum and interest. Answer: Affirmed." [6]

Defendant's points were in part as follows:

"2. There is no evidence that Mr. Hancock and Wilmoth, or either at the time they negotiated a settlement with the plaintiff and paid him the $240, and took his release of all claim for damages, had any reason to believe, or even suspect, that plaintiff was in any way incapacitated to make a settlement and deliver a valid release of his claim for damages. Answer: Affirmed. There is no direct evidence, and none at all in the case except that you may consider what flows from the testimony of the plaintiff that he was actually unconscious of what took place." [1]

"3. The undisputed testimony being that the release was executed by the plaintiff under his hand and seal, and for the sum of $240 paid as therein acknowledged; the plaintiff, assailing the validity of the release on the ground of his unconsciousness and mental incapacity at the time of its execution, must establish such unconsciousness and incapacity by evidence so clear, precise and convincing as to satisfy the court sitting as a chancellor of such incapacity. Answer: This point is refused." [2]

"4. That the release given in evidence by defendant must be regarded as a final settlement and adjustment by plaintiff of all claim for damages, unless the mental incapacity of the plaintiff to execute the same is shown by at least two witnesses, or else by one witness and such corroborative evidence as is tantamount to proof of such incapacity; and the court is requested to charge that the evidence on part of the plaintiff falls short of this requirement. Answer: This point is refused." [3]

"6. That if the plaintiff was unconscious at the time he executed the release in question, but afterwards, and when restored to consciousness, knew, or had reason to believe and did believe, that the $240 was money left with him by the officials of the railroad and as compensation for his injuries, and, knowing or believing this, he made no offer to return the money, but retained and still retains it, such retention is an acquiescence in and ratification of the release. Answer: This point is affirmed, if you find the further fact that he knew or believed that he had executed a release, or agreed to, at least." [4]

7. Request for binding instruction. Refused. [7]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $5,134.08. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were (1-7) the above instructions, quoting them.

The defendant was entitled to an unqualified affirmation of its sixth and seventh points; therefore the judgment is reversed at costs of appellee.

William D. Brown and Eugene Mullin, for the appellant. -- Fraud is a serious accusation and is not lightly to be inferred: Mead v. Conroe, 113 Pa. 220; R.R. v. Shay, 82 Pa. 198.

Plaintiff in assailing such an instrument, whether on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or mental incapacity, however occasioned, occupies the position of a plaintiff in a bill in equity asking that defendant be enjoined from using a release in an action at law, or bill to set aside a deed obtained from plaintiff while in a state of intoxication and similar cases, and the measure of proof must be such as satisfies not only the conscience, but the intellect of the chancellor; failing which, the case should not be submitted to the jury: R.R. v. Shay, 82 Pa. 198; Dean v. Fuller, 40 Pa. 474; Graham v. Pancoast, 30 Pa. 89; Nace v. Boyer, 30 Pa. 99; Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536; English's Ap., 119 Pa. 533; Elcessor v. Elcessor, 146 Pa. 359.

The seventh assignment covers the preceding ones and more. The retention by plaintiff of the $240 paid him was admitted. There was no evidence of fraud or notice of mental unconsciousness when the release was executed, and if the plaintiff was unconscious, as claimed, it should not avail him. The executed contract of a lunatic is not void: Lancaster Co. Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. 407. When an insane person gets the benefit of a contract without fraud of the other party and without knowledge of the insanity, the contract will not be set aside: Moore v. Hershey, 90 Pa. 196; Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. 48.

In the case on review defendant may with great propriety ask this court to pass on the insufficiency of the whole testimony, for while jurors are judges of the credibility of the witnesses, they have not, without restraint, the privilege to accept the uncorroborated assertions of the interested party, and to disregard, without reason, the opposing and concurring testimony of many equally credible disinterested witnesses with equal opportunities of observation and knowledge: Mead v. Conroe, 113 Pa. 220.

Geo. H. Higgins, O.C. & W. H. Allen with him, for appellee. -- Undue influence is any improper or wrongful constraint, machination, or urgency, or persuasion, whereby the will of a person is overpowered and he is induced to do or forbear an act which he would not do if left to act freely: 8 A. & E. Ency. L. 649, 650, note I.

The case stands the same as if plaintiff, when the alleged release was submitted, had pronounced it a forgery, and set up against it that his name was forged. Surely in such a case the court would have to submit to the jury, even upon plaintiff's unsupported testimony, the question of the genuineness of plaintiff's signature: Ettinger v. Jones, 139 Pa. 218; George v. R.R., 1. A. & E.R.R. Cas. 294; Dixon v. R.R., 100 N.Y. 179.

Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL, DEAN and FELL, JJ., on reargument.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DEAN:

The plaintiff, a farmer by occupation, on December 23, 1890 while a passenger on defendant's railroad, was injured in a wreck near Bradford; his left shoulder was dislocated and broken, and his injury, if not permanent, for a long time will seriously disable him in the performance of hard manual labor. The wreck occurred about noon, and the same day the railroad company had him removed to the Riddell House, in the town of Bradford. He received some attention the same evening, and the next morning, when about to leave for his home, was visited by Mr. Wilmoth, the agent of the railroad company, and Dr. Benninghoff, the company's surgeon, who persuaded him to stay and be treated by the company's surgeons. About eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the same day, Dr. Benninghoff, accompanied by Drs. James and Stewart, two other surgeons, again visited him to make an examination of his injuries, and apply such remedy as was demanded. Anaesthetics, chloroform and ether, to the extent of bringing about insensibility to pain and unconsciousness, were administered; the examination was made, and the shoulder given such treatment as the nature of the injury called for. He was insensible from the anaesthetics for from twenty-five to thirty minutes, and in this time the surgeon's work was finished; consciousness returned, in five to ten minutes after; he then talked rationally; told the surgeons they would find some of his clothing in his satchel, then in the room, and seemed, if not entirely restored, to be rapidly regaining a normal condition. The surgeons then left. In about three quarters of an hour Dr. Stewart returned to the room, and remained from five to ten minutes; inquired as to his condition, and he replied he was feeling well, except some pain in his shoulder; he seemed then to have completely recovered. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, J. D. Hancock, Esq., solicitor, and B. J. Wilmoth, agent of the company, called upon him for the purpose of settling and obtaining a release of any claim he had for damages against the company because of his injury. They informed him of their object, and talked with him about his injury, and the basis of computation for payment. He thought he ought to have his wages while unable to work, at the rate of $1.50 per day, and possibly the cost of caring for him while getting well. He named $150 as a reasonable sum, covering his loss of earnings; Mr. Hancock thought this was not enough, considering the probable loss of time...