Giles v. State

• Decision Date: 14 March 2019
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13-17-00238-CR
• Parties: CORLES ANDRE GILES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

CORLES ANDRE GILES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

NUMBER 13-17-00238-CR

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

March 14, 2019

On appeal from the 24th District Court of Jackson County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Hinojosa

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

Appellant Corles Andre Giles appeals his conviction for possession of more than four but less than 400 grams of synthetic marijuana with intent to deliver, a first-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.103, 481.113(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). By seven issues, which we rearrange into five main issues, appellant argues that: (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated, (2) the trial court erred when it denied him a continuance, (3) the evidence was insufficient, (4) he did not waive his right to a jury, and (5) his guilty plea was not entered intelligently and voluntarily. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2015, appellant was a passenger in a car when he was arrested for possession of synthetic marijuana with intent to deliver. See id. §§ 481.103, 481.113(d). Appellant was indicted on September 26, 2015, and the indictment included three enhancement paragraphs.¹ On June 30, 2016, appellant filed a motion to dismiss and argued, among other things, that the charge should be dismissed because his right to a speedy trial was violated. The trial court held a hearing on July 7, 2016, denied appellant's motion, and set the trial date for August 8, 2016.

On March 23, 2017, appellant signed a written waiver of his right to a jury in open court. On the day trial was scheduled to begin, he moved for a continuance to subpoena the other passengers in the vehicle, but the trial court denied his motion. Trial proceedings began the next day on March 28, 2017.² Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense and true to all three enhancement allegations. The trial court subsequently heard testimony from multiple witnesses and officers, found appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at fifty years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By his third issue, which we address first, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the intent to deliver element of the offense, and therefore he was guilty of only possession. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's guilty plea. We agree with the State.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Once a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, the State is no longer constitutionally required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Yet, no trial court is authorized to render a conviction in a felony case based upon a plea of guilty without sufficient evidence to support the same. Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.)). We will affirm the trial court's judgment if the State introduced evidence that embraces every essential element of the offense charged and that is sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Chindaphone v. State, 241 S.W.3d 217, 219-20 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd).

B. Analysis

Here, appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the intent to deliver element. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.113(a).

Intent to deliver is a question of fact that may be inferred from the acts, words, or conduct of the accused. Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Parramore v. State, 853 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet.ref'd). Intent to deliver may also be inferred from the quantity of drugs possessed and the manner of packaging. Branch v. State, 599 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 831; Guy v. State, 160 S.W.3d 606, 613 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd).

At trial, Officer Bryan Martin of Jackson County Sheriff's Department testified that he responded to a call about a vehicle at a McDonald's. Appellant was a passenger in the vehicle. As Officer Martin approached the car, he noticed a black bag that contained packages of synthetic marijuana between appellant's legs. Appellant subsequently admitted to Officer Martin that the black bag and its contents belonged to him. The bag contained seventeen individually wrapped packets of synthetic marijuana, each with a weight of ten grams. Officer Martin testified that the amount he found was not what he would expect someone to have for personal use. Jackson County Sheriff's Deputy Gary Smejkal testified each packet could be used to make twenty to thirty cigarettes and that, at that time, synthetic marijuana was not being sold openly in Jackson County stores. Officer Stacey Cavasos of the Edna Police Department testified that appellant possessed a large amount of synthetic marijuana. This testimony supported appellant's guilty plea to the intent to deliver element of the offense. See Branch, 599 S.W.2d at 325; Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 219-20; Guy, 160 S.W.3d at 613. The evidence is sufficient.

We overrule appellant's third issue.

III. SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM

By his first main issue, appellant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Appellant also argues that the trial court should have held a hearing on his motion to dismiss and that the court should have dismissed the case.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

A criminal defendant has the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.); Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (noting that the right to a speedy trial is triggered by formal indictment or arrest). "This ensures that the defendant is protected from oppressive pretrial incarceration, mitigates the anxiety and concern accompanying public accusations, and ensures that the defendant can mount a defense." Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)).

We analyze speedy trial claims "on an ad hoc basis," weighing and balancing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the accused. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. "While the State has the burden of justifying the length of delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. "The defendant's burden of proof on the latter two factors 'varies inversely' with the State's degree of culpability for the delay." Id.

We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a speedy trial claim. Id. at 282. We review the factual components for an abuse of discretion, while wereview the legal components de novo. Id. Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves factual determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is "a purely legal question." Id. With regard to the trial court's resolution of factual issues, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ultimate ruling. Id.

B. Analysis

Here, appellant's motion to dismiss was denied after a hearing on July 7, 2016. Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument that the trial court failed to hold a hearing on his motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, appellant argues that the trial court should have dismissed the case because his right to a speedy trial was violated. In turn, we analyze the four speedy trial factors. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.

1. The First Factor: Length of Delay

The length of the delay between an initial charge and the defendant's demand for speedy trial acts as a triggering mechanism. See Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc); State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc). Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, courts need not examine the other three factors. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648. Thus, any speedy trial analysis depends first upon whether the delay is more than "ordinary"; if so, the longer the delay beyond that which is ordinary, the more prejudicial that delay is to the defendant. Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 809; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649.

Here, the delay of thirteen months between appellant's arrest and the denial of his motion for speedy trial is presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger a Barker analysis. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 (1992) (noting that a one-year delay is presumptively prejudicial); Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 888-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (same). Because the delay of thirteen months triggers judicial examination of the claim, this factor weighs against the State. See Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 809; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649.

2. The Second Factor: Reason for Delay

Once the length of time is found to be presumptively prejudicial, the burden of justifying the delay falls on the State. Smith v. State, 436 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (citing Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280); see Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. Unjustifiable reasons for the delay count towards the "length of delay," while justifiable reasons for delay do not. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 810; see Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822 ("A valid reason for the delay should not be weighed against the government at all"). For example,

[a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more

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