Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Trust

• Decision Date: 23 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-42.,04-42.
• Citation: 2005 WY 21,106 P.3d 858
• Parties: Lora GILSTRAP; Criss Corallino; Carole Corallino; DAVE Gilstrap; Iris Hehn; and Jeanarae Booth, f/k/a Jeanarae Shannon Herbert, Appellants (Plantiffs), v. JUNE EISELE WARREN TRUST; Jean Earl Eisele; William Eisele Family Mineral Trust; Marion Scott; Mary Scott; James Scott; Patty Scott; Donald Scott; Vonona Scott; Marilyn Storms; and Douglas Scott, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

106 P.3d 858

2005 WY 21

Lora GILSTRAP; Criss Corallino; Carole Corallino; DAVE Gilstrap; Iris Hehn; and Jeanarae Booth, f/k/a Jeanarae Shannon Herbert, Appellants (Plantiffs), v. JUNE EISELE WARREN TRUST; Jean Earl Eisele; William Eisele Family Mineral Trust; Marion Scott; Mary Scott; James Scott; Patty Scott; Donald Scott; Vonona Scott; Marilyn Storms; and Douglas Scott, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 04-42.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

February 23, 2005.

Representing Appellants: Thomas E. Lubnau, II and Nathan S. McLeland of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees June Eisele Warren Trust, Jean Earl Eisele, William Eisele Family Mineral Trust, Marion Scott and Mary Scott: Randall T. Cox, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees James Scott, Patty Scott, Donald Scott, Vonona Scott, Marilyn Storms and Douglas Scott: James L. Edwards and Kurt A. Infanger of Stevens, Edwards, Hallock & Carpenter, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., Ret.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] After their mother died in 1938, each of three siblings, Ray E. Gilstrap (Ray), William P. Gilstrap (William) and Daisy Pearl Williams (Daisy), received an undivided one-third interest in a 680-acre ranch with a 320-acre mineral estate pursuant to her will. However, the siblings agreed to an alternative distribution of the estate: Ray received the entire surface estate, Ray and William each received one-half of the mineral estate, and Daisy received other assets. William and Daisy subsequently executed a warranty deed purporting to convey the entire 680-acre ranch to Ray, and reserving to each of them a one-third interest in the mineral estate. In 2003, William and Daisy's heirs (appellants) initiated a quiet title action claiming an interest in the minerals. The district court granted Ray's successors' (appellees) motion for summary judgment finding the appellants had no interest in the mineral estate.¹ We reverse.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The appellants raise the following issues on appeal:

A. Did the District Court misapply the Duhig doctrine as stated in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940), and adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Body v. McDonald, 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959), when it purported to enforce the warranty so as to grant to Ray E. Gilstrap more than was necessary to make him whole?

B. Did the District Court err by not examining the objective knowledge of the parties at the time the deed was executed, based on the documents of record, as a specific fact and circumstance to discern the objective intent of the parties?

The Eisele appellees state the issues as:

1. What is the meaning of an attempt to reserve all of the grantor's estate, or more than he owns, in the same instrument by which he conveys and warrants such estate?

2. May the Appellants assert a new theory of the case after entry of judgment, asking this appellate body to reform the deed, when the Appellants did not petition for, nor prove, reformation in the trial court?

The Scott appellees present a single issue:

Were the appellees entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Mrs. Sigel Gilstrap died in August of 1938. In her will, she left a 680-acre surface estate with a 320-acre mineral estate to her three children, Ray, William and Daisy. The siblings agreed, however, to divide the property differently than their mother decreed in her will. In 1939, pursuant to the siblings' agreement, the district court entered a decree of distribution. The decree ordered that Ray receive the entire 680-acre surface estate and one-half of the 320-acre mineral estate, William receive the other one-half of the mineral estate and other assets, and Daisy receive other assets, but no real property.

[¶ 4] In November of 1940, William, Daisy and their spouses executed a warranty deed purporting to convey the entire property, both surface and minerals, to Ray, as grantee, for $1,500 consideration. However, the deed also provided as follows:

Excepting and reserving however to Daisy Pearl Williams, formerly Daisy Pearl Rose, Gridley, Butte County, California, an undivided one-third interest, and to William Preston Gilstrap of Gillette, Campbell County, Wyoming, an undivided one-third interest, in and to all oil, gas and other mineral rights in said lands not heretofore reserved by the United States.

[¶ 5] In February 2003, William and Daisy's heirs brought a quiet title action claiming an interest in the mineral estate. They alleged the parties to the deed intended to vest a one-third mineral interest in each sibling. However, they conceded that because Ray did not join as a grantor to the warranty deed, his one-half interest remained unaffected. Ray's successors counterclaimed and asked that the title to all of the mineral interest be quieted in their favor. They claimed the warranty deed conveyed the entire mineral estate to Ray because Daisy's attempt to reserve an interest she did not own should be attributed to William, causing his reservation to exceed the one-half interest he owned. Thus, they claimed they were entitled to the entire mineral estate pursuant to the rule established in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). Both parties moved for summary judgment.

[¶ 6] The district court granted the defendants' motions and denied the plaintiffs', ruling that, pursuant to the Duhig rule, Ray's successors own the entire mineral estate. William and Daisy's heirs appeal the order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7] The district court resolved this case by granting and denying cross motions for summary judgment. Generally, a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order. Wolter v. Equitable Resources Energy Co., 979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo.1999). However, as we stated in Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 356 (Wyo.2000), there are exceptions to this rule. When the district court grants one party's motion for summary judgment and denies the opposing party's motion for summary judgment and the district court's decision completely resolves the case, both the grant and the denial of the motions for summary judgment are subject to appeal. Id. The district court disposed of the entire case in a single order by denying the appellant's motion and granting the appellees' motions. We will, therefore, review the entire matter. [¶ 8] Our standard for reviewing summary judgments is well settled:

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the parties have asserted. We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. We do not accord any deference to the district court's decision on issues of law.

Bixler v. Oro Mgmt., L.L.C., 2004 WY 29, ¶ 10, 86 P.3d 843, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2004) (citations omitted). Neither party disputes the relevant facts of this case, and thus, this Court must only determine whether summary judgment was proper as a matter of law. Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 146 (Wyo.1992).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] The ultimate issue to be decided in this appeal is what portion of the mineral estate the 1940 warranty deed conveyed to Ray. The district court concluded that because Daisy owned no interest in the mineral estate, her reservation of one-third failed and was attributed to William, thus causing William to reserve two-thirds when he only owned one-half. On the basis of that conclusion, the district court applied the rule that where a grantor conveys and reserves an interest in minerals in the same instrument, and there is a prior outstanding interest which is not excepted from the operation of the deed so that effect may not be given to both the grant and the reservation, the attempted reservation fails because the conveyance is necessary to make the grantee whole. R. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas, p. 92 (3d ed.1991).

[¶ 10] The appellants argue the deed's language is unambiguous and evidences William and Daisy's intent that they each reserved one-third of the minerals and only granted Ray a one-third interest. They argue that to give effect to the plain language of the deed we must look at both Daisy's and William's attempted reservation. In addition, appellants claim the objective evidence of Ray's knowledge of his own outstanding interest should prevent him from receiving all of the minerals as a result of this deed because the parties could not have intended that result. However, the appellants then offer two possible interpretations of what the parties might have intended. Appellants suggest the parties to the deed could have intended that William reserved a full one-third interest or they could have intended that he reserved only one-third of his one-half interest. In the latter case, they suggest the parties could have intended that Daisy also reserved one-third of one-half, although they do not explain out of whose interest that would have been carved. In addition, they point out that it does not matter what interest Daisy may have acquired, because she left her estate to William.

[¶ 11] The appellees agree with the district court's ruling. Further, they argue the appellants are essentially claiming the deed should be reformed, a claim that was not made to the...