Gnecchi v. State
| Decision Date | 17 August 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 35674,35674 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph GNECCHI, Plaintiff, v. STATE of Washington, Louise S. Taylor, as Director of Licenses, Defendant and Relator, the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, Edward E. Henry, Judge, Respondent. |
John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen.,
Robert J. Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for relator.
Moschetto & Alfieri, Seattle, for respondent.
By writ of certiorari, Louise S. Taylor, the defendant director of licenses of the state of Washington, seeks review of an order of the trial court permanently enjoining her from suspending plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license.
On May 17, 1960, the defendant (who will be referred to hereafter as the director) entered an order suspending plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license for a period of sixty days commencing May 19, 1960, pursuant to RCW 46.20.290. Proper notification of the suspension was thereupon made to plaintiff.
On May 26, 1960, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the superior court for King county from the order of suspension according to RCW 46.20.340. Plaintiff further filed a motion for and obtained, exparte, a temporary restraining order pendente lite, and an order directing the director to appear at an appointed time and show cause why a restraining order should not be entered permanently enjoining the director from enforcing the order suspending the operator's license of the plaintiff.
On May 31, 1960, the director filed a motion to quash the temporary restraining order, which was continued until June 20, 1960. At the hearing thereon, it was admitted that the suspension of plaintiff's license by the director was without a hearing. Plaintiff contended, and the court so held, that the provisions of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, RCW Title 34, apply to the actions of the director in suspending a motor vehicle operator's license, pursuant to the provisions of RCW 46.20.290 through RCW 46.20.410, with which the director had not complied. Subsequently, on July 15, 1960, the trial judge permanently enjoined the director from suspending plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license.
The director filed an application to this court for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the trial court. Application was granted and the order is now before us for review on the writ.
The only issue raised necessary to the determination of this review is whether the Washington Administrative Procedure Act afforded the plaintiff an administrative hearing prior to the suspension of his license by the director under RCW 46.20.290. The statute provides in part:
'The director may in his sound discretion immediately suspend the vehicle operator's license of any person whenever he has reason to believe: * * *
'(4) That such person is a habitually reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle or has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state. * * *'
The Washington Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 34.04.090(1), provides in part:
'In any contested case all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice. * * *'
RCW 34.04.010(3) defines a 'contested case' as
'* * * a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.' (Italics ours.)
It is not disputed that the act applies to the department of licenses of this state, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing if the suspension of his operator's license by the director under RCW 46.20.290 constituted a 'contested case' as defined by RCW 34.04.010(3). This raises two questions in applying the definition to the instant case: Is a hearing required (1) by law, or (2) by reason of the constitutional right of due process under Art. I, § 3, of the Washington state constitution, or the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution?
In answer to the first question, we find no statute requiring a hearing prior to the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license by the director under RCW 46.20.290. The pertinent statutes, RCW 46.20.290 through RCW 46.20.340, do not provide for a hearing but do provide for a de novo review of the director's order of suspension by appeal to the superior court.
In answer to the second question, we find no constitutional right, either from Art. I, § 3, of our state constitution, or the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, which requires a hearing prior to the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license under RCW 46.20.290. The legislature may, in the reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of public safety, authorize a state agency to act summarily, provided the party aggrieved has an opportunity to present his case on its merits sometime before the action becomes final. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 1908, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 L.Ed. 195. In In re Hendrickson, 1942, 12 Wash.2d 600, 123 P.2d 322, 325, this court said:
'* * * as a general rule, a law which provides that the decision of an administrative board shall be subject to appeal to the courts, where a full [sic] de novo hearing is afforded, satisfies the requirements of due process. * * *'
Preventing '* * * a habitually reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle * * *' (RCW 46.20.290(4)) from driving on public highways is a reasonable exercise of the police power. Rawson v. Department of Licenses, 1942, 15 Wash.2d 364, 130 P.2d 876. Persons aggrieved by a license suspension under RCW 46.20.290 may obtain a fully de novo review in superior court under RCW 46.20.340. The requirements of due process were therefore satisfied, and the plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing by reason of any constitutional right prior to the suspension of his license by the director.
Respondent's counsel argues the Washington Administrative Procedure Act requires that rules should have been filed by the director defining what constitutes habitually reckless or negligent driving; that the director's failure to comply with this requirement would prevent her from acting under RCW 46.20.290 in suspending the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license. We disagree. We find no language in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act requiring the adoption of such rules. Whether it is desirable that such action should be taken by the director for a better understanding by the user of the highway as to what constitutes, in the director's discretion, habitually reckless or negligent driving, is a legislative question and is not within the province of this court.
Respondent's counsel contends, however, that the director has adopted a point system for the purpose of determining when a person's motor vehicle operator's license should be suspended under RCW 46.20.290; and that the failure of the director to file the rules of such system is in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Counsel for the director admitted in open court the use of such a system in some respects; however, there is nothing before us as to its mode or extent of operation or how the system is constituted. We may not speculate upon the existence of facts that do not appear in the record. The question is therefore not properly before this court for review.
Respondent's counsel further urges in his brief that RCW 46.20.290 is unconstitutional, in that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency contrary to the seventh amendment to the state constitution. We find nothing in the record which indicates that this issue was presented to or considered by the trial court, and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to have it considered here. Johnson v. City of Seattle, 1957, 50 Wash.2d 543, 313 P.2d 676; State ex rel. York v. Board of County Commissioners, 1947, 28 Wash.2d 891, 184 P.2d 577, 172 A.L.R. 1001.
The order of the trial court permanently enjoining the director from suspending the license of the plaintiff is reversed and the case remanded for review on the merits, in accordance with RCW 46.20.340.
I have signed the majority opinion because the legal principles emphasized therein appear to be in accord with the letter of the law and, therefore, seem to me to be most persuasive, if not compelling. On the other hand, the views expressed in dissent by Judge ROSELLINI, in spirit if not law, are certainly consistent with current procedural due process notions of right, fairness, and justice. Although not required to do so by the letter of the law, emphasized under the majority opinion, I am convinced and do not hesitate to say that it would be eminently fair and highly desirable for the director of licenses to conform the procedure epitomized in this case with the views expressed in the dissent by Judge ROSELLINI.
The majority concedes that the relator in open court admitted that it did use a point system for the purpose of determining when an operator's motor vehicle license should be suspended, under RCW 46.20.290, but holds that the court cannot inquire into the existence of facts that do not appear in the record.
It is the function and inherent power of the court (whether it be trial or appellate) to take judicial notice of facts outside the record, provided they meet certain standards. In several cases courts have taken judicial notice of various records in the offices of state government. Waldum v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer R. Co., 1919, 169 Wis. 137, 170 N.W. 729; State, on Complaint of Ryan v. Roden, 1935, 219 Wis. 132, 262 N.W. 629.
The letters, reports, and records of a department of state are documents and official records which can be judicially noticed. Carolene...
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