Godbold v. State

Decision Date28 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 97-KA-00848-SCT.,97-KA-00848-SCT.
PartiesCornelius Charles GODBOLD v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Raymond Osborn Boutwell, Jr., Brookhaven, Attorney for Appellant.

Office of the Attorney General By Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Attorney for Appellee.

BEFORE PITTMAN, P.J., SMITH AND MILLS, JJ.

PITTMAN, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 1. Cornelius Charles Godbold (hereinafter Godbold), appeals from the circuit court of Lincoln County where he was indicted in a multi-count indictment with kidnaping, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, simple assault on law enforcement officer (two counts) and possession of stolen property in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § § 97-3-53, XX-XX-XXX, 97-37-1, and 97-17-70. Judge Keith Starrett presided at the jury trial where Godbold was found guilty of unlawful possession of cocaine and guilty of possession of stolen property. The trial court sentenced Godbold to serve a term of three years for possession of cocaine and five years for possession of stolen property to run consecutively, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The last two years to be served on post release supervision. After denial of post-trial motions, the instant appeal was timely noticed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

¶ 2. On October 1, 1996, Robert Thaddison spoke with Officer Frank Leggett (hereinafter Officer Leggett) concerning an alleged kidnaping and aggravated assault which was allegedly perpetrated upon him by Godbold on or about September 30, 1996. Mr. Thaddison signed an affidavit concerning these matters on October 1, 1996. Following this interview with Mr. Thaddison and his signing an affidavit to that effect, an arrest warrant was issued on October 1, 1996, for the arrest of Godbold.

¶ 3. On October 4, 1996, Godbold called the Sheriff's Office to inquire about any charges pending against him concerning this matter. Officer Leggett advised Godbold that he needed to speak with Godbold in person. Godbold came to the Sheriff's Office and spoke with Officer Leggett concerning this incident involving Mr. Thaddison. Officer Leggett did not advise Godbold of the arrest warrant which had already been issued for his arrest. Instead, Officer Leggett informed Godbold of the charges alleged against him by Mr. Thaddison and then read Godbold his Miranda rights and obtained a signed waiver of those rights before beginning discussions with Godbold.

¶ 4. During these discussions, Godbold admitted owning a .45 caliber pistol. Based on the information received during this conversation with Godbold and the interview with Mr. Thaddison, Officer Leggett made out an affidavit in pursuit of a search warrant. Judge B.J. Price then issued a search warrant for Godbold's mobile home, surrounding appurtenances, and two motor vehicles.

¶ 5. During the execution of this search warrant, Godbold ran to the bathroom of his mobile home and attempted to flush crack cocaine down the commode. Officer Leggett and various other officers who were there stopped Godbold from flushing the cocaine and seized it. In addition to the seized cocaine, the policemen seized various other items from Godbold's residence —none of which were listed on the search warrant. Among these other items that were seized, three items were found to be stolen: a Coleman generator, a Sunbeam grill, and a Murray lawn mower.

¶ 6. Godbold was convicted at the trial court of possession of cocaine and sentenced to three years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and was convicted of possession of stolen property and sentenced to five years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the sentences to run consecutively. The last two years were to be served under post release supervision. Godbold appeals on the following issues which will be addressed in turn:

I. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF STOLEN MERCHANDISE SEIZED AS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO MAKE A CASE OF RECEIVING STOLEN MERCHANDISE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON IMPROPER COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE BASED ON THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRODUCE ACTUAL PROOF OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE STOLEN MERCHANDISE.

¶ 7. Issues one, two and three will be addressed together.

I. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING PHYSICAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF STOLEN MERCHANDISE SEIZED AS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO MAKE A CASE OF RECEIVING STOLEN MERCHANDISE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

¶ 8. In addressing these issues collectively, the first step in the analysis goes to whether there was a valid search warrant. Godbold testified at the trial that he made the first contact with the Sheriff's Department. According to Godbold's testimony, Officer Leggett stated that he needed to talk with Godbold and Godbold complied by voluntarily going to the Sheriff's Office to speak with Officer Leggett (the Officer in charge of the investigation). Godbold testified that another officer was present at their meeting and that the statements at that meeting were tape recorded. Godbold testified that Officer Leggett did tell him there was a complaint that had been made against Godbold but did not tell him that an arrest warrant had already been issued for Godbold's arrest.

¶ 9. Officer Leggett testified at the trial that he had been investigating an alleged incident of kidnaping and aggravated assault in which Godbold was the alleged perpetrator. Pursuant to an affidavit made by the alleged victim, a warrant for Godbold's arrest had been obtained on October 1, 1996. Officer Leggett testified that he did talk with Godbold after having obtained the arrest warrant without informing Godbold of that warrant. Upon being asked why he did not arrest Godbold prior to talking with him about the incident, Officer Leggett testified: "I was looking into the case further. We have a lot of cases where people come and say `so and so' done this to me, and these are serious charges. I wanted to be able to corroborate all the charges that was being alleged against Mr. Godbold."

¶ 10. Officer Leggett further testified that before he began discussions with Godbold at this meeting he read Godbold his Miranda rights and obtained a signed waiver from Godbold. At no time during this discussion between Godbold and Officer Leggett did Godbold ever invoke his right to remain silent or his right to the presence of his attorney. Their conversation concluded, according to Godbold's testimony at his trial in this way:

After I got through talking to Mr. Frank Leggett I asked him was I free to go, and he said `yes, you is.' [sic] He asked me to bring in a .45 [caliber pistol]. I said I'll look and see if I have it. By that time I had called my lawyer, [later, not during this questioning] which is you, [Mr. Boutwell] to see what you said, and I went on home and went to look for the .45 [caliber pistol] and it wasn't there. About two days later Mr. Frank Leggett called me on the phone asking me if I was going to bring the gun in and I told him I was looking for it and hadn't found it.

¶ 11. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, persons who are undergoing custodial interrogation have the right to the presence of their attorney if they desire their attorney's presence. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981),Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). If Godbold were to have asked for the presence of his attorney and it had been denied him we would then be forced to determine whether this constituted custodial interrogation. "The test for whether a person is `in custody' is whether a reasonable person would feel that she was in custody. That is whether a reasonable person would feel that she was going to jail—and not just being temporarily detained." Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996) (quoting Compton v. State, 460 So.2d 847, 849 (Miss.1984)). "The officer's subjective intent is irrelevant." Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)).

¶ 12. Hunt lists the factors courts use to determine whether custodial interrogation occurred:

(a) the place of interrogation;
(b) the time of interrogation;
(c) the people present;
(d) the amount of force or physical restraint used by the officers;
(e) the length and form of the questions;
(f) whether the defendant comes to the authorities voluntarily; and
(g) what the defendant is told about the situation.

Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss. 1996).

¶ 13. Applying these factors to the facts of the present case it becomes apparent that Godbold was not undergoing custodial interrogation. The first contact between the parties was made by Godbold, not Officer Leggett. Officer Leggett advised Godbold that he needed to talk with Godbold in person. Godbold was questioned by Officer Leggett in Leggett's office, not in an interrogation room. The record does not specify the exact time of the meeting but Officer Leggett was in his office as were other Sheriff's Office employees so it was during regular office hours. Officer Leggett, one other Sheriff's Office employee, and Godbold were the only people present at the meeting. No force or physical restraint was used to get Godbold to the meeting; he...

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