Goff v. Bil-Mar Foods, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 6-7,BIL-MAR,Docket Nos. 102865,103634,s. 6-7 |
| Citation | 454 Mich. 507,563 N.W.2d 214 |
| Parties | Grant S. GOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.FOODS, INC., Defendant-Appellee. (After Remand) George DUDLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORRISON INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT COMPANY and John Deere Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
In these combined cases, we must decide whether the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission acted within the proper scope of its reviewing power in concluding that the magistrates' findings supporting the grant of benefits were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In both cases, the WCAC reversed the magistrates' awards and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm in Goff and reverse in Dudley.
The questions presented concern the proper interpretation and scope of the "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record" standard that the administrative tribunals are required by statute to apply in evaluating these cases. Because these determinations are often difficult and will have serious implications for future appeals, it is worthwhile to restate the concepts that form the basis of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act and provide the background for our discussion today.
The WDCA was enacted to be workers' exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. 1 M.C.L. § 418.131(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(131)(1). The act defines a work-related injury as a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. An ordinary disease of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment is not compensable. Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. [M.C.L. § 418.401(2)(b); M.S.A. § 17.237(401)(2)(b).]
A finding that an injury has been significantly caused or aggravated by employment will depend on the "totality of all the occupational factors...." Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 442 Mich. 201, 217, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). These factors include the claimant's health circumstances and various nonoccupational factors. 2
When a work-related injury is established, the employer may automatically pay an award of benefits. In exchange, the worker refrains from pursuing traditional tort or negligence remedies. Weems v. Chrysler Corp., 448 Mich. 679, 707-708, 533 N.W.2d 287 (1995) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) Finally, the WDCA, intended as a remedial measure, must be "liberally construed to grant rather than deny benefits." Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp., 447 Mich. 1, 20, n. 18, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994) (Boyle, J., lead opinion.)
As the cases reveal, establishing a work-related injury is not always an easy task. A finding that an injury is work related only begins the inquiry. Each case turns on its own facts and involves credibility determinations made in the first instance by the presiding magistrate that turn on both lay and expert testimony. Because the findings of the magistrate are conclusive when supported by substantial, competent, and material evidence, it is critical that each reviewing tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, knows both how to apply the standard and its proper role in the process. The question we are faced with on judicial appellate review in each case is "whether the WCAC acted in a manner consistent with the concept of administrative appellate review that is less than de novo review in finding that the magistrate's decision was or was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." Holden v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 257, 267-268, 484 N.W.2d 227 (1992).
Our analysis necessarily begins with art. 6, § 28 of the Michigan Constitution, which provides in part, "[f]indings of fact in workmen's compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law." Accordingly, in 1985, the Legislature enacted the latest amendments of the WDCA to provide that
findings of fact made by a worker's compensation magistrate shall be considered conclusive by the commission if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. As used in this subsection, "substantial evidence" means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. [M.C.L. § 418.861a(3); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(3).][ 3
The 1985 amendments eliminated de novo review by the commission. However, this less than de novo review by the WCAC still includes "both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review." M.C.L. § 418.861a(13); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(13). The whole record means everything: all the evidence both for and against a certain determination. M.C.L. § 418.861a(4); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(4). Finally, factual determinations of the commission, if acting within the scope of its powers, shall be conclusive, absent any fraud. The Court of Appeals and this Court may only review questions of law involved with the WCAC's final orders on application. M.C.L. § 418.861a(14); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(14). 4
In Holden, we stated that Id. at 268-269, 484 N.W.2d 227. However, where a party claims that the WCAC has exceeded its power by reversing the magistrate, meaningful review must begin with the magistrate's decision, because if competent, material, and substantial evidence based on the whole record supports the magistrate's decision, the WCAC need go no further. If it does, the WCAC is exceeding its authority.
Application of this standard often results in confusion because it is difficult to define. In the statute, "substantial evidence" is defined as "evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion." M.C.L. § 418.861a(3); M.S.A. § 17.237(861a)(3). But it is quite possible that a reasonably minded magistrate could interpret a record differently than a reasonably minded WCAC. However, if the magistrate's conclusion is derived from competent, material, and substantial evidence, then the WCAC may not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate notwithstanding either the reasonableness or the adequacy of the commission's conclusion. 5
In sharpening our understanding of the competent, material, and substantial evidence standard, we are guided by the principles that govern the Michigan Employment Relations Commission that were articulated in MERC v. Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 393 Mich. 116, 124, 223 N.W.2d 283 (1974), and highlighted in Holden. The statutory standards of administrative and judicial appellate review applicable to the MERC are codified in the labor mediation act and parallel those prescribed for the WCAC. M.C.L. § 423.23(e); M.S.A. § 17.454(25)(e). 6 Detroit Symphony, supra at 121, 223 N.W.2d 283. In that case we also evaluated the scope of review and the differences between administrative and judicial review. We noted:
The cross-fire of debate at the Constitutional Convention imports meaning to the "substantial evidence" standard in Michigan jurisprudence. What the drafters of the Constitution intended was a thorough judicial review of administrative decision, a review which considers the whole record---that is, both sides of the record---not just those portions of the record supporting the findings of the administrative agency. Although such a review does not attain the status of de novo review, it necessarily entails a degree of qualitative and quantitative evaluation of evidence considered by an agency. Such review must be undertaken with considerable sensitivity in order that the courts accord due deference to administrative expertise and not invade the province of exclusive administrative fact-finding by displacing an agency's choice between two reasonably differing views. Cognizant of these concerns, the courts must walk the tightrope of duty which requires judges to provide the prescribed meaningful review. [Id. at 124, 223 N.W.2d 283.]
In Holden, we recognized that when the Legislature amended the WDCA, it did not incorporate this language into the substantial evidence standard: that "review by the WCAC is to be 'undertaken with considerable sensitivity[,]' ... [accord] 'due deference to administrative expertise[,]' and to avoid displacing a choice 'between two reasonably differing views.' " Holden at 267, 484 N.W.2d 227, quoting Detroit Symphony, supra at 124, 223 N.W.2d 283. Nevertheless, still persuaded by the wisdom and reasoning inDetroit Symphony, we held in Holden that "[d]ue deference should be given to the administrative expertise of the WCAC, as well as to the administrative expertise of the magistrate." Id. at 268, 484 N.W.2d 227. We also noted that the WCAC must have some latitude...
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