Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2001
• Citation: 768 A.2d 950,61 Conn.App. 806
• Parties: (Conn.App. 2001) HARSHAD GOHEL ET AL. V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. AC 19337
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

768 A.2d 950 (Conn.App. 2001)

HARSHAD GOHEL ET AL.

V.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.

AC 19337

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued February 23, 2000

February 20, 2001

James K. Smith, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

David J. McDonald, for the appellee (named defendant).

Lavery, C. J., and Spear and Dupont, Js.

Lavery, C. J.

OPINION

The plaintiffs, Harshad Gohel, Anil Gohel and Ketan Patel, appeal from the trial court's granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).¹ On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that their claims were barred by the operation of Public Acts 1993, No. 93-77, §§ 2 (e) (P.A. 93-77), codified as General Statutes §§ 38a-336 (g) (1).² We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On August 1, 1993, the plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident with the defendant Brian Zullo on Main Street in Danbury. Each of the plaintiffs sustained physical injuries in the accident.

At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were covered by a contract of automobile insurance issued by Allstate to Hasmukhrai Gohel on February 23, 1993, for the period of March 13, 1993, through September 13, 1993. The contract provided in relevant part: "Any legal action against Allstate must be brought within two years from the date of the accident."

The plaintiffs settled their claims against Zullo and exhausted the limits of his liability coverage, $40,000, on April 8, 1994. On July 8, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a written claim with Allstate for benefits under the underinsured motorists coverage section of their contract. The plaintiffs then claimed such benefits in an action they brought against Allstate on December 3, 1997.

On April 13, 1998, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs' claims were barred "by the statute of limitation as set out in Public Act 93-77 and codified as... General Statutes [§§] 38a-336 (g)." On February 8, 1999, the court, without a written memorandum of decision, rendered summary judgment in favor of Allstate, ruling in its order, "There is no issue of material fact that the [plaintiffs'] claim is time barred by operation of [§§ 38a-336 (g)]." This appeal followed.

I.

The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that their claim was barred by operation of §§ 38a-336 (g). We agree.

"Our standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 402, 528 A.2d 805 (1987). Practice Book §§ [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case. See Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990). The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. See Plouffe v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 160 Conn. 482, 489, 280 A.2d 359 (1971). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980). The party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.... Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246-47, 571 A.2d 116 (1990). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact. Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 543, 494 A.2d 555 (1985)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lunn v. Cummings & Lockwood, 56 Conn. App. 363, 369-70, 743 A.2d 653 (2000); Beebe v. East Hartford, 48 Conn. App. 60, 64, 708 A.2d 231 (1998).

"Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary.... Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 165, 738 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928, 742 A.2d 363 (1999). The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lunn v. Cummings & Lockwood, supra, 56 Conn. App. 371; see also United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

Public Act 93-77 was approved on May 20, 1993, to take effect on its passage. The legislative history of P.A. 93-77 indicates that it was enacted with the express purpose of repairing a perceived flaw in the legislative scheme concerning the timing for filing claims for uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist coverage. That flaw had been exposed by the Supreme Court in its decision in McGlinchey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 224 Conn. 133, 617 A.2d 445 (1992).

In McGlinchey, the plaintiff exhausted the limits of the tortfeasor's liability insurance more than two years after the date of the accident. Id., 134, 135 n.3. The plaintiff thereafter filed a claim with her insurer for benefits under the uninsured motorists coverage section of her policy. The plaintiff claimed that she had waited until she had exhausted the tortfeasor's insurance before filing the claim with her insurer because of the Supreme Court's holding in Continental Ins. Co. v. Cebe-Habersky, 214 Conn. 209, 212-13, 571 A.2d 104 (1990). McGlinchey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 138-39. In Continental Ins. Co., the Supreme Court held that "General Statutes §§ 38-175c (b) (1) [now §§ 38a-336 (b)] obligates insurance companies to pay on a policy's uninsured motorist coverage only after the limits of liability under all bodily injury bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements...." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Continental Ins. Co. v. Cebe-Habersky, supra, 212.

The court in McGlinchey, while agreeing that Continental Ins. Co. required the plaintiff to liquidate her claim against the tortfeasor before claiming under her uninsured motorist coverage, disagreed with the plaintiff's contention that this requirement permitted her to wait until she had liquidated her claim against the tortfeasor before bringing her claim for arbitration under the insurance contract, notwithstanding the contract provision that all legal action be brought within two years from the date of the accident. McGlinchey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 224 Conn. 138-40.

The practical effect of the McGlinchey decision was that, if it took longer than two years from the date of the accident for a claimant to exhaust the tortfeasor's insurance, the claimant no longer had access to his or her uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. Indeed, one might speculate that such a rule created a financial incentive for insurance companies to delay the settlement of claims against the tortfeasor's liability coverage as long as possible to reduce the likelihood of a subsequent successful claim against an insured's uninsured motorist coverage. That type of behavior, taken to its logical conclusion, could render worthless an automobile owner's uninsured motorist coverage. It was that perceived inequity in the statutory scheme that the legislature sought to remedy by the passage of P.A. 93-77.

The fact that the legislature had the McGlinchey holding in mind as it considered P.A. 93-77 is demonstrated both by the text of the statute and the legislature's debates on the act. Answering another legislator's query, Representative Cameron C. Staples, the proponent of that provision of P.A. 93-77, explained: "Currently, under law, there is a two year limitation within which a claim may be brought. That corresponds to the statute of limitations period for bringing claims that allege a personal injury.

"The problem arises that with a statute of limitations and permissible period of time for bringing a claim... both expiring... within the same period of time, you may not know at the time that you have to bring [the] claim... that you are in fact in a situation where there's underinsured motorist coverage [that] needs to be claimed.

"So this extends beyond the time period within which the suit may be brought, the time period that you may bring a claim under your underinsured or uninsured motorist provisions. It's intended to prevent a situation where you are required to bring two actions at the same time by claiming on your underinsured motorist coverage before you know whether in fact you need to do that, before you've exhausted the limits of other liability coverage." 36 H.R. Proc. Pt. 8, 1993 Sess., pp. 2751-52.

Representative Staples went on to summarize the new limitation on the time for bringing claims under P.A. 93-77: "[T]hree years after the date of the accident,...