Goodstein v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. B092372,B092372
• Citation: 42 Cal.App.4th 1635,50 Cal.Rptr.2d 459
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1431, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2363 Wallace GOODSTEIN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of California, Los Angeles County, Respondent. Mary K. PITTMAN, Real Party in Interest.

Page 459

50 Cal.Rptr.2d 459

42 Cal.App.4th 1635, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1431,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2363

Wallace GOODSTEIN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of California, Los Angeles County, Respondent.

Mary K. PITTMAN, Real Party in Interest.

No. B092372.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 29, 1996.

As Modified March 14, 1996.

Tuverson & Hillyard and Patricia Carmichael, Newport Beach, for Petitioner.

No appearance by Respondent.

Lebovits and David and Deborah A. David, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest.

CROSKEY, Associate Justice.

This request for writ of mandamus relief filed by petitioner Wallace Goodstein seeks to reverse the order of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff and real party in interest, Mary K. Pittman, to amend her complaint against Goodstein, a health care provider, to allege claims for punitive damages. This motion was made pursuant to the mandate of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13. ¹ Goodstein objects to the trial court's order granting Pittman's motion because it was filed less than nine months prior to the first assigned trial date and therefore was not timely under section 425.13.

This case presents an example of a plaintiff who may not, due to circumstances beyond her control, be able to comply with the nine-month time limitation set out in section 425.13. As a result, it may be necessary in the interest of fairness and justice for the court to exercise its discretion to relieve the

plaintiff from an impossible or impracticable time limitation. While we hold that a trial court does retain the discretionary flexibility to make such an order, we cannot determine from the record whether this case actually presents sufficient facts to warrant such an exercise of discretion. Because the trial court did not consider or make the necessary factual findings, we will grant the requested writ in part and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pittman filed her original complaint against Goodstein on January 6, 1994. In that pleading she alleged claims for (1) medical malpractice (negligent diagnosis and treatment of Pittman during the period from October 1992 to February 1993), (2) battery (unauthorized and experimental surgery on Pittman), (3) fraud and concealment (with respect to treatment of Pittman and certain proposed surgery), (4) intentional spoliation of evidence (destruction of Pittman's surgical records), (5) negligent spoliation of evidence (same) and (6) strict product liability (design and manufacture by Goodstein of a device known as a surgical cannula which allegedly was used in treating Pittman). This pleading was later amended prior to service on Goodstein to allege a seventh cause of action for the negligent design and manufacture of the aforesaid cannula. Pittman sought punitive damages as to the second, third, fourth and sixth causes of action.

On April 4, 1994, Goodstein filed his answer to the complaint. At the same time he filed a demurrer to all seven causes of action and a motion to strike the punitive damage claims under section 425.13. The demurrer was overruled as to all counts except the sixth (strict product liability). The motion to strike the punitive damage claims was granted as to the battery and fraud counts, but was overruled as to the cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence as that claim did not arise out of the professional negligence of a health care provider. (See Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 187-188, 191-192, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208, 832 P.2d 924.)

On May 27, 1994, Pittman filed a second amended complaint, but Goodstein again successfully challenged the strict liability allegation by demurrer. On August 8, 1994, Pittman filed a third amended complaint attempting to correct the defect in that particular cause of action. This count included a claim for punitive damages. Goodstein again demurred, but this time, on September 19, 1994, the court overruled his objection. Goodstein filed his answer on October 6, 1994. This was the first date that Pittman's complaint was actually fully "at issue," although, on or about June 30, 1994, Pittman had filed a Request For Trial Setting which stated (as a part of the form printed matter): "I hereby represent to the court that this case is at issue and request that it be set for trial." The form was signed by Pittman's counsel.

On July 20, 1994, the court sent out a Notice of Status Conference, which conference was held on August 24. However, it took place before a clerk, not a judge. At that time the clerk stated that she intended to set the case for trial. Counsel for both Pittman and Goodstein pointed out that the case was not then "at issue" as no answer had been filed to the most recent pleading. Indeed, that answer would not be filed until October 6. Nonetheless, the clerk set the trial date for May 10, 1995, a date less than nine months away. Pittman's counsel did not at that time request a different trial date, which would have enabled her to comply with the nine-month rule of section 425.13. ²

On February 14, 1995, Pittman filed her motion to amend her complaint to allege claims for punitive damages as to her second (battery) and third fraud) causes of The motion was heard on March 1, 1995. At that time, the court stated that it had no trouble concluding that Pittman had met her evidentiary burden under section 425.13. However, the court was troubled about the nine month timing issue which was at the core of Goodstein's objection to the motion. After considering the arguments of counsel, the court granted Pittman's motion and, in doing so, appeared to place considerable emphasis on the fact that Pittman had never had a full nine months to bring her motion following the setting of the trial date. ⁴

                action.  This date was less than three months from the first assigned trial date and obviously did not satisfy the nine-month limitation set out in section 425.13.  Pittman justified the tardy filing of her motion by claiming:  (1) she never had a full nine month period to begin with, (2) she could not file her motion relying solely on her pleadings, but had to have some evidence in order to meet the "substantial probability" of success test set out in section 425.13, and (3) such evidence required the completion of the deposition of Goodstein, which Pittman claims was repeatedly delayed by counsel for Goodstein.  Pittman claims she did her best to gather the required evidence and filed her motion as soon as reasonably practical. 3  Goodstein vigorously opposed the motion, arguing that Pittman's punitive damage amendment request was not timely
                

Goodstein then filed a timely petition with this court for a writ of mandamus seeking review of the trial court's order. After issuing a preliminary ruling that our review of the matter indicated the trial court had erred, we issued an alternative writ on August 1, 1995 and set the matter for hearing. ⁵

ISSUE PRESENTED

The single issue presented to us for resolution is whether the trial court has the discretion, under any circumstances, to relieve a party from the nine month time limitation set out in section 425.13.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

We are interpreting and applying a statute to an essentially undisputed factual circumstance. This presents an issue of law which is subject to de novo review. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.)

In making such interpretation it is our burden to first ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to ensure that we effectuate the purpose of the law. (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 484, 208

                Cal.Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272.)   Every statute should be construed and applied "with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect."  (Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gillespie (1990) 50 Cal.3d 82, 100, 266 Cal.Rptr. 117, 785 P.2d 500;  Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal.  (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.)   In doing so, we should seek to avoid absurd or anomalous results.  (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1221, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.)
                

2. The Legislative Purpose of Section 425.13

Section 425.13(a) was enacted amid concern over the routine inclusion of sham punitive damage claims in medical malpractice actions. It apparently seeks to alleviate this problem by shifting to the plaintiff the procedural burden that would otherwise fall on the defendant to remove a "frivolous" or "unsubstantiated" claim early in the suit. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 717, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894.) "Rather than requiring the defendant to defeat the plaintiff's pleading by showing it is legally or factually meritless, the motion [to amend to add punitive damage allegations] requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he possesses a legally sufficient claim which is 'substantiated,' that is, supported by competent, admissible evidence." (Id. at p. 719, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894; italics added.)

We have previously addressed the general issue presented by the instant petition. In Looney v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 521, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 182, we had occasion to consider the Legislature's purpose in imposing the nine-month minimum and two-year maximum time limits which are peculiar to section 425.13. ⁶ "Beyond doubt, the legislative purpose behind section 425.13 was to shelter health care providers from the need to defend against punitive damage claims which have no substance. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the statute contains no explanation for the time limitations which were adopted. However, from the language used in the statute, we can reasonably infer that the Legislature provided the nine months prior to trial...