Goosman v. State

• Decision Date: 17 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-1416.,07-1416.
• Citation: 764 N.W.2d 539
• Parties: Joel GOOSMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

764 N.W.2d 539

Joel GOOSMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 07-1416.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 17, 2009.

Martha M. McMinn, Sioux City, and Gary Dickey, Jr. of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorneys General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Edward Bull of Bull Law Office, PC, Des Moines, for amici curiae Robert Henry, Timothy Palmer, and Dennis Gress, Iowa inmates.

APPEL, Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether federal due process requires our decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006), be applied retroactively to persons whose direct appeals were final prior to the issuance of the Heemstra decision. We conclude that this constitutional provision does not require that the Heemstra decision be applied in such cases.

I. Factual and Procedural History.

In 1992, Joel Goosman was charged with first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Chad Mackey. The State proceeded on two alternate first-degree murder theories, premeditation with malice aforethought and felony murder.

The underlying felony alleged in the trial information was willful injury. The jury was instructed that the State could prove the malice aforethought required for a first-degree murder conviction either by showing that the "defendant acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with the intent to kill," or, in the alternative, by showing that Goosman shot Mackey with the intent to cause a serious injury and that Mackey sustained a serious injury.

The jury convicted Goosman of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals on November 28, 1994.

Almost twelve years after the direct appeal of Goosman's conviction was finalized, this court decided State v. Heemstra on August 25, 2006. In Heemstra, this court reversed a murder conviction holding that because the act causing willful injury was the same act that caused the victim's death, the assault necessarily merged into the murder and thus could not serve as a predicate felony for felony murder purposes. 721 N.W.2d at 558. Because Heemstra had been convicted on a general verdict which could have rested on either a felony-murder theory or on a finding of premeditation with malice aforethought this court vacated his conviction. Id. at 558-59.

The State filed a motion for rehearing. In the rehearing motion, the State urged this court to clarify its ruling by holding that the decision did not apply retroactively to postconviction actions. This court subsequently modified its ruling to state that the holding applied only to cases where the issue was raised and where there was no final disposition on direct appeal. Id. at 558.

On February 23, 2007, Goosman filed this application for postconviction relief. Goosman argued that federal due process requires the Heemstra decision be applied retroactively in postconviction-relief proceedings. Goosman sought to have his conviction vacated and a new trial granted or, in the alternative, to have his conviction reduced to second-degree murder. The district court denied relief. Goosman filed this timely appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

Generally, an appeal from a denial of an application for postconviction relief is reviewed for correction of errors at law. Harpster v. State, 569 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1997). However, when the applicant alleges constitutional error, review is de novo "in light of the totality of the circumstances and the record upon which the postconviction court's rulings was made." Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 1994).

III. Discussion.

A. The Heemstra Decision. Under Iowa law, a defendant may be convicted of first-degree murder if the defendant "willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person." Iowa Code § 707.2 (2009). In the alternative, a person may be convicted of first-degree murder if the defendant "kills another person while participating in a forcible felony." Id.

The second alternative is commonly known as the felony-murder rule. In seeking a conviction under the felony-murder rule, the State is not required to show willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation. The mental element of the crime is imputed from the commission of the underlying felony. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 270 (Iowa 1979). Under this alternative, the State need only prove that the homicide occurred in the perpetration of a forcible felony. Id.

One of the questions that arises under Iowa's version of the felony-murder rule is whether a felonious assault, such as willful injury under Iowa Code section 708.4, may serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes. In other words, can the same act that causes the death of another serve as the underlying felony or does that act merge with the homicide unless the felonious assault is a separate and distinct action?

We first considered this question in State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 1982). In Beeman, the defendant kicked and choked the victim before inflicting seventeen wounds to the chest. 315 N.W.2d at 772. Under these facts, there was ample evidence to convict the defendant of first-degree murder even if the court adopted a requirement that the underlying felony be independent of the act causing death. This court, however, elected to announce a broader approach, namely, that felonious assaults could serve as predicate felonies as merger rules do not apply. Id. at 777. The approach in Beeman was vigorously upheld in subsequent cases. See State v. Mayberry, 411 N.W.2d 677, 682-83 (Iowa 1987) (noting "[w]e rejected the legal premise [merger] ... in State v. Beeman"); State v. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1988) ("We see no reason to retreat from our previous decisions."); State v. Rhomberg, 516 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1994) ("We have now reexamined the argument ... and confirm our prior analyses."); State v. Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1994) ("We have steadfastly declined these invitations to disavow the principles established in Beeman ... [a] settled construction. ...").

In Heemstra, this court once again revisited the question. 721 N.W.2d at 554-58. The court noted that the felony-murder approach under Beeman and its progeny was far broader than the approach employed in other states under similar statutes and by other state courts. Id. at 556-58. We further noted that Beeman had been subject to local criticism on the ground that it unduly expanded the felony-murder rule far beyond that intended by the legislature. Id. at 555-56.

After reconsidering the issue, we held in Heemstra that where the act causing willful injury is the same act that caused the victim's death, the former merges with the murder and cannot serve as a predicate felony for felony-murder purposes. Id. at 558. This is not to say, however, that willful injury could never serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes. We narrowed Heemstra's scope by noting, for example, that where a "defendant assaulted the victim twice, first without killing him and second with fatal results," only the second act would be merged with the murder and that the first act could be considered as a predicate felony. Id. at 557. Thus, the merger rule announced in Heemstra applied only in cases involving a single felonious assault on the victim which results in the victim's death.

Our original opinion in Heemstra disposed of the case before us, but did not address the question of whether and how the decision would be applied to other cases. On rehearing, we modified the opinion to state,

The rule of law announced in this case regarding the use of willful injury as a predicate felony for felony-murder purposes shall be applicable only to the present case and those cases not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the issue has been raised in the district court.

Id. at 558.

A number of subsequent cases have challenged the constitutionality of this statement. Goosman asserts that the federal guarantees of due process and equal protection and the separation of powers doctrine require retroactive application of Heemstra to his postconviction-relief proceeding.

B. Federal Due Process. At the outset, the threshold question in considering whether federal due process requires a judicial decision be applied to postconviction relief proceedings is whether the decision is substantive or procedural. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-53, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2522-23, 159 L.Ed.2d 442, 449 (2004). Here, the parties agree that our decision in Heemstra was substantive rather than procedural in nature.

Federal precedent concerning the application of substantive law in collateral proceedings, therefore, guides our analysis. The United States Supreme Court has recently considered the question of retroactive application of state court judicial decisions affecting substantive criminal law in two cases, Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001), and Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003).

In Fiore, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the defendant's conviction for violating a state statute that prohibited operating a waste facility without a permit. 531 U.S. at 226, 121 S.Ct. at 713, 148 L.Ed.2d at 632. Fiore was convicted of the offense even though he actually had a permit to operate the facility in question. Id. at 227, 121 S.Ct. at 713, 148 L.Ed.2d at 632. The prosecution successfully asserted, however, that his activities exceeded the scope of the operations authorized by the permit and Fiore was convicted of the offense. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined review, and Fiore's conviction became final. Id.

After Fiore's conviction became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Fiore's...