Gordon v. Village of Monticello, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 December 1995
• Citation: 637 N.Y.S.2d 961,661 N.E.2d 691,87 N.Y.2d 124
• Parties: , 661 N.E.2d 691, 24 Media L. Rep. 1631 In the Matter of Victor W. GORDON et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 961

637 N.Y.S.2d 961

87 N.Y.2d 124, 661 N.E.2d 691, 24

Media L. Rep. 1631

In the Matter of Victor W. GORDON et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO, INC., et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 7, 1995.

[661 N.E.2d 692] Loran Shlevin, Callicoon, and John J. Keating, Cochecton, for appellants.

[87 N.Y.2d 125] Martin S. Miller, Village Attorney of Village of Monticello, and Mark Lewis Schulman, pro se, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

This case raises the issue of the statutory discretion afforded trial courts to award costs and attorneys' fees under New York's Open Meetings Law (Public Officers Law §§ 100-111). Given the intentional and flagrant nature of the Open Meetings Law violations that took place, the trial court was fully justified in awarding attorneys' fees under the statute.

On February 17, 1993, the Board of Trustees of Monticello--the governing body of the Village--decided in closed, executive session to create the new position of full-time Village Attorney and to divide up by resignation and subsequent appointment various other elected leadership positions. At a public meeting two weeks later, the Board passed a resolution, as had been agreed previously, creating the position of Village Attorney. Within minutes, the elected Village Justice was appointed to the position of Village Attorney, the then-Mayor was appointed Village Justice, the then-Deputy Mayor was appointed Mayor, the Assessor's office was abolished and the then-Assessor was appointed a Member of the Board. By the end of the meeting, every supposedly elected position had been redistributed, as privately prearranged by the Board at the earlier, closed meeting.

Plaintiffs, citizens of Monticello, challenged these actions as violations of the Open Meetings Law (see, Public Officers Law § 105). Both Supreme Court and the Appellate Division agreed, finding the Board's machinations to be patently illegal and declaring them null and void (207 A.D.2d 55, 56-59, 620 N.Y.S.2d 573). The factual and legal accuracy of those rulings is not even contested on this appeal.

What is challenged is the trial court's award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to the statutory provision stating that "costs and reasonable attorney fees may be awarded by the court, in its discretion, to the successful party" (Public Officers Law § 107[2]. The Appellate Division reversed that award as a matter of law, holding that in order for there to be an award of attorneys' fees under the statute, there must be an "indication in the record that [defendant] repeatedly has acted in violation of the Open Meetings Law or that its actions were undertaken in bad faith " (207 A.D.2d, at 59, 620 N.Y.S.2d 573 [emphasis added]. In so doing, the Appellate Division extended its dictum in Matter of Plattsburgh Publ. Co. v. City of Plattsburgh, 185 A.D.2d 518, 520, 586 N.Y.S.2d 346, and erroneously engrafted an additional legal requirement onto the statute.

The Open Meetings Law, passed in 1976 after the crisis of confidence in American politics occasioned by Watergate, was intended--as its very name suggests--to open the decision-making process of elected officials to the public while at the same time protecting the ability of the government to carry out its responsibilities (Sciolino v. Ryan, 81 A.D.2d 475, 477, 440 N.Y.S.2d 795; Matter of Orange County Publs. v. Council of City of Newburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409, 418, 401 N.Y.S.2d 84, aff'd 45 N.Y.2d 947, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564, 383 N.E.2d 1157; see also, Communications Sys. v. Federal Communications Commn., 595 F.2d 797, 800 [interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552b]. ^* Thus, the statute provides generally that "[e]very meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public" (Public Officers Law § 103[a]. As the Legislature stated in its preamble to the statute: "It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials" (Public Officers Law § 100). Given this explicit declaration, it is clear that the provisions of the Open Meetings Law are to be liberally construed in accordance with the statute's purposes (Matter of Orange County Publs. v. Council of City of Newburgh, 45 N.Y.2d 947, 950, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564, 383 N.E.2d 1157 [Cooke, J., concurring], supra; Matter of Holden v. Board of Trustees, 80 A.D.2d 378, 381, 440 N.Y.S.2d 58).

Moreover, unlike New York's Freedom of Information Law--a related statute enacted two years earlier (Public Officers Law art. 6, L. 1974, ch. 578)--the Open Meetings Law contains no requirement, for an award of attorneys' fees, that the information withheld from the public be of "clearly significant interest" and that there be no "reasonable basis" for withholding it (compare, Public Officers Law § 89[4][c] ).

As we explained in Matter of New York Univ. v. Whalen, however, not every violation of the Open Meetings Law automatically triggers its enforcement sanctions (46 N.Y.2d 734, 735, 413 N.Y.S.2d 637, 386 N.E.2d 245; see also, Matter of Goodson Todman Enters. v. City of Kingston Common Council, 153 A.D.2d 103, 106, 550 N.Y.S.2d 157). In contrast to the provisions of Federal and State civil rights laws, awards of attorneys' fees under the Open Meetings Law should not be granted by courts to the prevailing party simply as a matter of course (compare, Matter of Thomasel v. Perales, 78 N.Y.2d 561, 578 N.Y.S.2d 110, 585 N.E.2d 359 [42 U.S.C. § 1988]; Matter of Northeast Cent. School Dist. v. Sobol, 79 N.Y.2d 598, 610, 584 N.Y.S.2d 525, 595 N.E.2d 339 [20 USC § 1415]; see also, Matter of New York State Clinical Lab. Assn. v. Kaladjian, 85 N.Y.2d 346, 625 N.Y.S.2d 463, 649 N.E.2d 811 [CPLR 8601] ).

Thus, as with awards of injunctive relief (see, Public Officers Law § 107[1] ), purely technical and non-prejudicial infractions (e.g., Town of Moriah v. Cole-Layer-Trumble Co., 200 A.D.2d 879, 606 N.Y.S.2d 822; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Bickford, 107 A.D.2d 1062, 486 N.Y.S.2d 566) or wholly unintentional violations (e.g., Addesso v. Sharpe, 44 N.Y.2d 925, 408 N.Y.S.2d 8, 379...