Gray v. State

• Decision Date: 08 August 2018
• Docket Number: A18A1107
• Citation: 347 Ga.App. 235,817 S.E.2d 723
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: GRAY v. The STATE.

347 Ga.App. 235

817 S.E.2d 723

GRAY

v.The STATE.

A18A1107

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 8, 2018

Reconsideration Denied September 5, 2018

Certiorari Denied April 15, 2019

Michael Wayne Tarleton, for Appellant

Sherry Boston, Dist. Atty., Decatur, Gerald Mason, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for Appellee

McMillian, Judge.

In 2010, Ronald Bernard Gray was indicted on one count of feticide, three counts of family violence aggravated assault, one count of false imprisonment, one count of misdemeanor family violence battery, one count of family violence simple battery, and two counts of cruelty to children in the third degree.¹ Following a jury trial in December 2015, Gray was convicted of one count of family violence aggravated assault, two counts of misdemeanor family violence battery (one count as a lesser-included crime to family violence aggravated assault), one count of false imprisonment, and two counts of cruelty to children in the third degree.² Gray appeals the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement and (2) finding that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,³ the evidence shows that at the time of the incident, Gray lived with his wife, Latasha McGhee, and her two young children at a boarding house in DeKalb County. On Monday, May 11, 2009, Gray's wife asked Devondra Starks, a fellow boarder, to call an ambulance because her husband had been "beating her up all weekend." Starks saw that McGhee was "very emotional" and had a black eye, a bald spot on her head, a swollen foot, and bruises on her stomach, back, arms, and legs. McGhee, who was seven months pregnant at the time, feared that she had not felt her baby move since Friday.

While the resident was on the phone with 911, Gray returned home, and McGhee ran to her room in fear, and Gray followed. Shortly thereafter, police arrived and escorted Gray outside. One officer went back upstairs with Gray to retrieve his identification, but Gray jumped from a second story window and escaped. After Gray fled, McGhee was taken to the hospital, where she learned that her baby had died and was induced to deliver her stillborn daughter. On May 14, Gray was found in a Stone Mountain apartment hiding in a small cabinet and arrested. He was then interviewed by two DeKalb County police detectives. Gray confessed that he had committed several of the acts for which he was later indicted, including punching his wife in the face and beating her with a belt.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of McGhee, who recounted that over the course of that weekend, Gray repeatedly kicked her and beat her with a variety of objects, including a lamp, phone, belt, and shoes. At one point, McGhee asked him to stop before he hurt their baby, but he told her "I don't give a ‘f’ about that baby. She is going to be a b*tch just like the rest of you h*'s." Some of the beatings took place while her children watched. The older child, who was 11 years old at the time of trial, testified that he saw Gray hitting his mother and heard his mother crying the day the police came. An audio recording of Gray's confession to hitting his wife was played for the jury, along with the testimony of one of the detectives to whom Gray confessed.

1. Although Gray does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude upon review that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gray was guilty of the offenses of which he ultimately was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his first enumeration of error, Gray asserts that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statements under OCGA § 24-8-824 because they were given without a full understanding of his Miranda rights and thus were not voluntary.

Miranda warnings are intended to preserve a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and "must be administered to an accused who is in custody and subject to interrogation[.]" State v. Troutman , 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1), 797 S.E.2d 72 (2017). OCGA § 24-8-824 provides: "To make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury." Statements made to police are deemed to be voluntary, and thus admissible, if the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his rights under Miranda . Benton v. State , 302 Ga. 570, 573 (2), 807 S.E.2d 450 (2017) ; Clay v. State , 290 Ga. 822, 825-26 (1) (A) (2), 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012). This "waiver must be ... made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (III) (B), 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010). See also State v. Floyd , 306 Ga. App. 402, 405-06, 702 S.E.2d 467 (2010).

In making this determination, the trial court looks to the totality of circumstances under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Floyd , 306 Ga. App. at 405, 702 S.E.2d 467. "On appeal, we accept the trial court's findings of fact and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous ... [but] independently apply the legal principles to the facts." Norris v. State , 302 Ga. 802, 804 (II), 809 S.E.2d 752 (2018). And where there are no disputed facts, such as here when the statement was recorded, "our review of the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts is de novo." Mack v. State , 296 Ga. 239, 241-42, 765 S.E.2d 896 (2014). See Benton , 302 Ga. at 572 (2), 807 S.E.2d 450 ("[w]here controlling facts are not in dispute, such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo") (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the record shows that the detectives began the interview by handing Gray a printed copy of his Miranda rights and reading them aloud. Gray was instructed that he could "decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements." He was then asked if he understood everything that had been read to him, to which he responded, "Yes." One of the detectives also asked Gray if he was "clear on all that," and Gray responded, "Yes." Gray was then asked whether he wanted to continue with the interview, and again he responded, "Yes."

The detectives then asked Gray to initial by each statement of his rights on the printed copy of the Miranda form to indicate that he had read and understood each one, and Gray did so. Gray then signed a statement confirming "I have read the above statement of my rights and I understand each of those rights." Finally, Gray was asked to sign under the line that read "[h]aving these rights in mind, I am willing to give up these rights at this time and willingly make a statement." At that point, Gray responded, "Hold up. What you mean give my rights up?" One of the detectives answered that he would be giving his rights up "to make a statement," but that he could "stop at any time" and that "[j]ust cause you sign that doesn't mean ... you have to answer anything. You're not really giving up any rights ... you know, just—you talk; you feel like you don't want to talk anymore, you just stop talking. That's—that's your—your right." The detectives then proceeded to interview Gray, and he answered their questions, at no point invoking any of his rights.

Gray argues that his question demonstrates that he did not have the understanding necessary to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and that the detective's response undermined the entirety of the warnings read and given to him. Because the detective's response that Gray would not be "really giving up any rights" directly contradicted the Miranda warnings he had just administered to Gray, and the detective then incompletely paraphrased the right to remain silent, we agree. See Benton , 302 Ga. at 573-74 (2), 807 S.E.2d 450 (custodial statement invalid where officer's rephrasing of Miranda warnings following defendant's demonstration of lack of understanding was both incomplete and misleading); Clay , 290 Ga. at 825–26 (1) (A) (2), 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012) (custodial statement invalid where officer's "super-speed" reading coupled with defendant's drug-induced stupor made any possibility of understanding impossible); State v. Floyd , 306 Ga. App. at 405–06, 702 S.E.2d 467 (2010) (statement invalid where officer read Miranda rights too quickly to be reasonably understood and did not ascertain whether defendant understood). Once Gray expressed that he did not understand that he was giving up his rights, it was incumbent on the interrogating officers to take steps to ensure that Gray understood what his rights were and that he would be waiving them by proceeding to make a statement. Here, not only did the officer incompletely describe the rights that Gray would be waiving but he erroneously told Gray that he would not be giving up any rights. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Gray did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights under Miranda , and the trial court erred in holding otherwise. See Benton , 302 Ga. at 573-74 (2), 807 S.E.2d 450.

However, "a violation of Miranda is not reversible if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Benton , 302 Ga. at 575 (2), n.8, 807 S.E.2d 450. In addition to Gray's statement, the State presented the testimony of McGhee, who identified Gray and detailed the methods and manner in which he violently assaulted her; the son who recounted that he had seen Gray beating his mother; various medical professionals who treated McGhee and described her injuries; the responding officer, who noted both...