Green v. Obledo

• Decision Date: 06 November 1984
• Citation: 161 Cal.App.3d 678,207 Cal.Rptr. 830
• Parties: Elizabeth GREEN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Mario OBLEDO et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 22869.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 830

207 Cal.Rptr. 830

161 Cal.App.3d 678

Elizabeth GREEN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Mario OBLEDO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 22869.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Nov. 6, 1984.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 5, 1984.

Hearing Denied Feb. 14, 1985.

Thomas W. Pulliam, Jr., San Francisco, David J. Rapport, Ukiah, for plaintiffs and appellants.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Thomas E. Warriner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard M. Ross, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants and respondents.

BLEASE, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs were denied enforcement of a final judgment for attorneys' fees, entered following their success in an action which invalidated a state welfare regulation. (See Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) The trial court held that payment is precluded by restrictions in the State Budget Act. There is no such impediment. We will reverse the trial court's order.

Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Green and others, were denied Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits because a state welfare regulation disallowed work-related expenses. The California Supreme Court upheld a judgment declarating that the regulation was invalid as a violation of federal law. (Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 134-140, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) The plaintiffs filed a cost bill for appellate attorney fees of $34,439. (See Code Civ.Procedure, § 1034.) It was not opposed and the award became final in 1981. Plaintiffs then sought attorneys' fees for their services in the trial court on the grounds that "at least two statutes authorize such an award", namely Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In 1982 they were awarded fees for services in the trial court in the amount of $53,246.25. No appeal was taken from this order.

Plaintiffs were not paid their attorney fees. They sought an order in the trial court, predicated upon 42 United States Code section 1988, compelling the defendant Director of the Department of Social Services to submit a claim to the controller and compelling the controller and treasurer to authorize and pay the claim. The motion was denied. This appeal followed.

Discussion

The award of attorneys' fees was predicated (in part) upon provisions of state law which arguably are subject to monetary restrictions in the State Budget Acts. To avoid these potential impediments to payment, the plaintiffs sought enforcement of the award predicated upon the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1988) ¹ which, they say, suffers no such impediment. Section 1988 applies only when the action arises under the substantive provisions of the act, here 42 United States Code section 1983. ² The defendants rejoin that by this move the plaintiffs seek to add a new (federal) cause of action after judgment. Failing this argument, defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the court to predicate attorneys' fees upon a federal claim which entails payment of moneys restricted by the budget acts. We review these challenges seriatim.

I

Whether the plaintiffs tendered a 1983 claim in the underlying action is measured by their pleadings. They alleged Woods adopted and enforced a regulation which violated a federal statute governing the AFDC program, resulting in the improper denial of federal benefits to plaintiffs. This pleads a 1983 claim. Under our code pleading system (See 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading § 1) the complaint need only contain a "statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." (Code Civ.Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a); 3 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, supra, § 268 et seq.) No label is required.

Whether the facts alleged tender a 1983 claim is measured by federal law. (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 560-563, 195 Cal.Rptr. 268.) "[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." (Parratt v. Taylor (1981) 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420, 428.) The denial of AFDC benefits by state officials in violation of federal statutes presents a classic 1983 claim. (E.g. Shea v. Vialpando (1974) 416 U.S. 251, 94 S.Ct. 1746, 40 L.Ed.2d 120; Maine v. Thiboutot (1980) 448 U.S. 1, 2-8, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2503-2506, 65 L.Ed.2d 555, 558-562.)

The defendants rely upon Logan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116, 185 Cal.Rptr. 878. Logan held that a complaint, which alleged a violation of procedural due process as a legal conclusion, failed to state a claim under section 1983. Conclusory assertions are insufficient to state a section 1983 claim. (See Agnew v. City of Compton (9th Cir.1957) 239 F.2d 226, 231-232.) That did not happen here. The complaint identifies the federal statute and details the facts showing a deprivation of a right secured by federal law. The plaintiffs prevailed on this ground. (See Green v. Obledo, supra.)

Having prevailed on the 1983 claim, attorneys' fees may be awarded plaintiffs under section 1988. "It follows from [the legislative history of section 1988] and from the Supremacy Clause that the [attorneys] fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court." (Maine v. Thiboutot, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 11, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2508, 65 L.Ed.2d at p. 563; cf. Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 638, fn. 26, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985.) This court has so held. (See Filipino Ac countants' Assn. v. State Bd. of Accountancy (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1032, 204 Cal.Rptr. 913.)

But, say the defendants, section 1988 cannot support the enforcement of the attorney fees award since 1988 was not explicitly tendered as a ground of the award. This argument sounds in estoppel. It is not persuasive. It is true that a portion of the attorney fees award (for work in the trial court) was predicated upon state law entitlements without mention of section 1988. But that is a fact without significance. The criteria for the calculation of attorneys' fees are the same under both sections. (Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 638-639, fns. 27-29, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985.) The state was not disadvantaged in the measurement of fees by the subsequent reliance on section 1988 as a ground justifying enforcement of the award. The state points to no issue concerning the section 1988 award not subsumed in the prior adjudication. ³

II

Failing these arguments, the defendants attack the jurisdiction of the court to invoke section 1988 because, so they say, that would engender a confrontation between federal law and State Budget Act restrictions resulting in a usurpation of the Legislature's power to appropriate funds. The plaintiffs respond that the federal Supremacy Clause preempts the restrictions. ⁴ We need not play host to a confrontation because the State Budget Acts, properly construed, impose no restrictions upon the payment of attorney fees predicated upon section 1988. (See generally e.g. Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 65-66, 195 P.2d 1.)

The plaintiffs seek enforcement of the fee awards by an order compelling the Director of the Department of Social Services to submit a claim to the Controller for payment of the fees award. The defendants concede that, in the absence of a budget restriction, the satisfaction of a fee award entered against a state official, sued in his official capacity, may be obtained from funds appropriated to the operating expense account of the responsible state agency. (See Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 542-545, 174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935; but see Sullivan v. Gage (1905) 145 Cal. 759, 765-769, 79 P. 537.) ⁵

But, say the defendants, there is a restriction in the State Budget Acts. They imply it from a fusion of two provisions of the acts. The first provides that "[w]henever [ ] an appropriation is made in accordance with a schedule [ ], the expenditures from such item for each category, program, or project included in the schedule shall be limited to the amount specified [ ], except as otherwise provided ...." (Emphasis added.) ⁶ The second limits attorney fee awards, "but only [those awards made] pursuant to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the 'private attorney general' doctrine, or the 'substantial benefit' doctrine ...." (See item number 9810-001-001 in Stats.1982, ch. 326, § 2; Stats.1983, ch. 324, § 2; Stats.1984, ch. 258, § 2 [hereafter collectively item 9810-001-001] ⁷; emphasis added.) This latter provision, so the defendants assume, establishes the categories for attorney fee awards and the amounts to which the limitation applies. Defendants then analogize a 1983 action to one brought as a "private attorney general", thereby bringing this action within one of the specified categories. The argument is unpersuasive.

The argument assumes that item 9810-001-001 is the only budgetary source of money for attorney fees, thus justifying a broadened use of analogy. That is not the case; the listed grounds subsume but one statutory basis (among many) and two (judicially created) common law bases (among several) of recovery of attorneys' fees. The provision only addresses the specified kinds of cases; a 1988 case is not specified. If the term " 'private attorney general' doctrine" were to subsume analogous statutory authorizations for the payment of fees, there would be no need to separately specify Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, as the item does, for it is such. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200.) The item does not embrace the statutory ground...