Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 12-94-00029-C,S-O,12-94-00030-CV,s. 12-94-00029-C
• Citation: 907 S.W.2d 12
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: GREGG COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., Laidlaw Waste Systems (Texas), Inc., Laidlaw Waste Systems Holdings, Inc., & Four-il Co., Appellees.

Page 12

907 S.W.2d 12

GREGG COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., Laidlaw Waste Systems (Texas) Inc., Laidlaw Waste Systems Holdings, Inc., &amp Four-S-Oil Co., Appellees.

Nos. 12-94-00029-CV, 12-94-00030-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Tyler.

May 31, 1995.

Rehearing Overruled July 11, 1995.

Roy Price, Jr., Longview; R. Douglas Muir, Austin, for appellant.

C.W. Stocker, Fort Worth; Edward L. Merritt; and Gregory P. Grajczyk, Longview, for appellees.

HADDEN, Justice.

The previous opinion in this cause which was delivered on March 31, 1995, is hereby withdrawn. The following opinion, which only modifies the previous opinion as it addressed Appellant's points of errors seven through ten, is substituted therefor.

This case involves a dispute over valuations of land for ad valorem tax purposes. Appellant, Gregg County Appraisal District ("District"), appeals from two judgments in which the trial court reduced its appraisals of a 250 acre tract of land for tax years 1990, 1991, and 1992, and assessed attorneys' fees and sanctions. The Appellees are: (1) Four-S-Oil Corporation, Inc. ("Four-S"), a Texas corporation which owns the tract of land in question, (2) Laidlaw Waste Systems (Texas), Inc. ("Laidlaw Texas"), (3) Laidlaw Waste Systems Holdings, Inc. ("Laidlaw Holdings"), and (4) Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., a Delaware Corporation ("Laidlaw Delaware"). Laidlaw Texas is a wholly owned subsidiary of Laidlaw Holdings, which in turn is owned by Laidlaw Delaware. We will affirm in part and reverse in part.

The land was leased to Tiger Corporation, a Texas corporation, under an agreement dated March 19, 1981, to be used as a Title I solid Waste landfill. Tiger Corporation was purchased by Laidlaw Holdings and its corporate name changed to Laidlaw Waste Systems (Texas), Inc., a Texas corporation. The term of the lease was for 25 years, and as long thereafter as lessee conducts continuous landfill operations on the premises. In the lease, Four-S appointed Laidlaw Texas as its designated agent for ad valorem tax purposes, and this designation was never revoked. The 250 acre tract remained subject to the lease agreement at all times during tax years 1990, 1991, and 1992.

For several years preceding 1990, the District carried the land's appraised value on its tax rolls at $587,220. The District then reappraised the land and increased its appraisal to $7,129,080 for tax year 1990, $8,538,440 for tax year 1991, and $9,455,810 for tax year 1992. After formal protest hearings for each of the three years, the Appraisal Review Board ("Board") issued its "Orders Determining Protests," which approved the District's new valuations for 1990 and 1991. The order reduced the 1992 valuation to $5,914,600; however, this amount nevertheless constituted a ten-fold increase over the appraisals prior to 1990.

The Board's decisions for all three years were appealed to the Gregg County District Court for judicial review. Upon trial de novo before a jury, the trial court rendered judgments adverse to the District, finding that the value of the land was $587,220 for each of the three disputed years. In addition, the trial court awarded attorneys' fees for all three years and sanctioned the District for costs for discovery abuses covering tax years 1990 and 1991. The District brings this appeal.

The District assigns eighteen (18) points of error which we divide into five areas of dispute:

(1) the challenge by the District to the jurisdiction of the trial court for tax years 1990 and 1991 (points one and two);

(2) a dispute over the market value amount listed by the District in the 1990 tax appraisal rolls (points three through six). Because of our holding in point one, we do not reach points three through six;

(3) the claim by the District that the income methodology of appraisal was a proper method and should not have been excluded by the trial court (points seven and ten);

(4) the challenge by the District that evidence supporting the jury's verdict of $587,220 for all three years was legally and factually insufficient (points twelve through fifteen); and,

(5) the complaint by the District that the trial court erred in ordering cost sanctions and awarding attorneys' fees (points eleven and sixteen through eighteen).

JURISDICTION

In points one and two, the District challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the appeal of the Board's order for tax years 1990 and 1991 on the grounds that the appeal was filed by Laidlaw Delaware, who was neither the property owner nor its designated agent for property tax purposes. It argues that neither the property owner, Four-S, nor its agent, Laidlaw Texas, filed the appeal within the 45 day time requirement of Section 42.21 of the TEXAS TAX CODE. ¹ Section 42.21(a) of the TAX CODE requires that a petition for review of an Appraisal Review Board order must be filed within 45 days after receipt of notice of the final order. Section 42.21(a) further provides that "[f]ailure to timely file a petition bars any appeal under this chapter." The District maintains that Section 42.21 is jurisdictional, and that failure of the property owner or its designated agent to timely file suit deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the appeal of the Board's "Order Determining Protest" for 1990 and 1991.

The record reflects that after the Board found the appraisal of $7,129,080 for the 1990 tax year to be correct, Laidlaw Delaware filed a petition for review in trial court on March 15, 1991. This petition was filed within the 45 day requirement of Section 42.21 of the TAX CODE. When the Board found the $8,538,440 appraisal for 1991 to be correct, Laidlaw Delaware amended its petition so as to include the 1991 tax year. This amendment was also filed within the statutory 45 day time period. On July 31, 1992, which was beyond the 45 day time requirement, Laidlaw Texas was joined for the first time as a party in the suit. Four-S intervened even later by its "Plea in Intervention" filed on April 19, 1993. By a subsequent trial amendment, Laidlaw Holdings became a party to the proceeding.

Appellees contend that the untimely joinder of Four-S and Laidlaw Texas caused no harm and that the true parties should be allowed to realign themselves properly, even after the 45 day time period. They further assert: (1) that the trial court had obtained jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) that Laidlaw Texas personnel were dealt with through all prior dealings; (3) that the mere use of the word "Delaware" in the name instead of "Texas" is inconsequential, and to find otherwise would be "hypertechnical"; and, (4) that under these circumstances, Laidlaw Delaware was the agent of Four-S. The trial court agreed with the Appellees, finding that Laidlaw Delaware was an agent "de facto" of Four-S. However, we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeals for tax years 1990 and 1991.

There is ample Texas authority that the rights, procedures, and remedies set forth in the TAX CODE are exclusive, and supersede a property owner's common law rights and remedies. TEX.TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1992); Scott v. Harris Methodist HEB, 871 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1994, no writ); Watson v. Robertson Co. Appraisal Review Board, 795 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.App.--Waco 1990, no writ). TAX CODE sections 42.01 (standing to sue), 42.21 (pleadings), 42.25 and 42.26 (relief authorized), all require that the plaintiff be the property owner in order to sue or obtain relief in a tax appeal. The property owner is the only party, other than the chief appraiser, with standing to appeal from an Appraisal Review Board's order determining protest of a taxpayer's appraisal protest. Plaza Equity Partners v. Dallas Central Appraisal Dist., 765 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). Without exception, Texas cases have followed this rule and required the plaintiff to be the owner of the legal title to the property made the subject of a property tax appeal.

To obtain a judicial review of an Appraisal Review Board's decision, a property owner must comply with Section 42.21(a) of the TAX CODE. These statutory provisions creating rights and remedies are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects. Hood v. Hays County, 836 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, no writ). Where a cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from a statute, "the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable." Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Ass'n. v. Council of Co-Owners of Saida II Towers Condominium, 706 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1986). Where statutory rights and remedies are concerned, the court may act only in the manner provided for by the statute. Bullock v. Amoco Production Co., 608 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.1980). The requirements of this statute are jurisdictional, and the failure of the property owner to timely file its petition appealing an appraisal review board's order determining protest deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over a petition for review of a property tax decision. Appraisal Review Board v. Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel, 719 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.1986); Dallas Central Appraisal Dist. v. Las Colinas Corp., 814 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 835 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.1992); Poly-America, Inc. v. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 704 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.App.--Waco 1986, no writ). Although in Poly-America and Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel, the defect was the failure to name the correct party defendant, we conclude that the jurisdictional principles followed therein apply equally to party plaintiffs where judicial review is sought under Chapter 42 of the TAX CODE.

In the instant case, the sole plaintiff in the appeal to the trial court from the date the original petition until Laidlaw Texas was...