Gronquist v. Dep't of Corr. of Wash.

• Decision Date: 12 November 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 97277-0,97277-0
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Derek GRONQUIST, Respondent, Richard King and Richard Jackson, individually and representing a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS of the State of Washington, Defendant, King County Prosecutor Daniel Satterberg, Petitioner, v. Chase Riveland and Janet Barbour, in their official capacities; the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board; and Ken Eikenberry, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Washington, Defendants.

196 Wash.2d 564

475 P.3d 497

Derek GRONQUIST, Respondent,

Richard King and Richard Jackson, individually and representing a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,

v.DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS of the State of Washington, Defendant,King County Prosecutor Daniel Satterberg, Petitioner,

v.Chase Riveland and Janet Barbour, in their official capacities; the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board; and Ken Eikenberry, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Washington, Defendants.

NO. 97277-0

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued January 14, 2020

Filed: November 12, 2020

David J. Hackett, King County Administration Building, 500 4th Ave. Ste. 900, Seattle, WA, 98104-2316, for Petitioner.

Haley Christine Beach, Washington Attorney General's Office, 1125 Washington St. Se., Olympia, WA, 98504-0116, for Defendant.

Tiffany Mae Cartwright, Jesse Andrew Wing, Macdonald Hoague & Bayless, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1500, Seattle, WA, 98104-1745, for Respondent.

STEPHENS, C. J.

¶ 1 Courts may impose remedial sanctions in favor of a person who is "aggrieved by a contempt of court in the proceeding to which the contempt is related." RCW 7.21.030(1). Among available sanctions is an order to pay "for any losses suffered by the party as a result of the contempt and any costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees." Id. at .030(3). This case requires us to decide whether courts have discretion to impose remedial sanctions under RCW 7.21.030(3) in the absence of ongoing, continuing contempt. We hold they do. However, because Derek Gronquist failed to establish that he suffered any compensable losses, and because there is no ongoing contempt, any claim for sanctions here is moot. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

¶ 2 Gronquist was convicted of violent sexual offenses in 1988. While confined, he participated in a sex offender treatment program until 1991. That same year, former participants of the program brought a class action against the Department of Corrections (Department) to enjoin the release of their treatment files, which contained extensive medical and personal information. See King v. Riveland , 125 Wash.2d 500, 502-04, 886 P.2d 160 (1994). Gronquist was not a named class member. The case resulted in a permanent injunction in 1993 that prohibited the Department from releasing certain documents from any class member's file. Though not a named party in King , Gronquist fell within the class of persons protected by the King injunction.

¶ 3 As Gronquist approached his earned early release date, the Department referred him to the King County prosecutor for possible commitment as a sexually violent predator. Under then-current statutory law, the prosecutor sought all records relating to Gronquist's treatment.

¶ 4 Gronquist filed a civil contempt motion against the Department and the King County prosecutor for releasing his treatment records. He also sought an accounting for all breaches of the injunction, an order transferring him to community custody, destruction of all improperly disclosed confidential information, at least $500 a day per contemnor, disqualification of a potential expert witness, and attorney fees and costs under RCW 7.21.030(3). Gronquist's claims were not inconsequential: it appears likely the Department and the prosecutor shared some of Gronquist's files in direct contravention of a valid injunction.¹ On motion by the Department, and before considering Gronquist's contempt motion on the merits, the trial court prospectively invalidated the 1993 King injunction as to Gronquist. Neither the merits of that decision nor the validity of the injunction is before us.

¶ 5 After transferring the remainder of Gronquist's treatment files, the Department moved to dismiss Gronquist's contempt motion as moot, arguing that, absent the Department's continuing contempt of the now-invalidated injunction, the trial court could no longer impose coercive, remedial sanctions. The trial court granted the Department's motion to dismiss in an oral ruling, but the hearing transcript of that proceeding, along with the trial court's reasoning, was omitted from the record. The trial court's written order incorporating its oral ruling simply states, "Defendant's Motion to Deny Intervenor Gronquist's Motion for Contempt is GRANTED ; [ ] Intervenor Gronquist's motion for contempt is denied as moot." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 741-42.

¶ 6 Gronquist appealed the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Gronquist's motion was not moot because a compensatory order for losses and attorney fees could still be awarded. Gronquist v. Dep't of Corr. , No. 49392-6-II, slip op. at 2, 2019 WL 949430 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049392-6-II%20Order%20Amending%20Opinion.pdf. The Department and the prosecutor petitioned this court for review, arguing that Gronquist's contempt motion, and any attendant relief sought, became moot once the trial court could no longer impose coercive sanctions. We granted the petition. Gronquist v. King County Prosecutor , 193 Wash.2d 1037, 449 P.3d 663 (2019).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 Whether a claim is moot is a question of law, which we review de novo. De novo review also applies to questions of statutory interpretation. Applying de novo review, and interpreting the distinct remedy provisions in RCW 7.21.030, we hold that continuing or ongoing contempt is not a prerequisite to a trial court's ability to fashion a remedy for a party's losses under .030(3). Gronquist's civil contempt motion is nonetheless moot because he failed to allege any compensable losses.

1. When a Cause of Action Is Dismissed as Moot, the Proper Standard of Review Is De Novo

¶ 8 As an initial matter, it is important to note that the trial court did not make any determination as to whether contempt was warranted; rather, it simply denied Gronquist's motion for contempt as moot. CP at 741-42. Whether a legal claim or issue is moot raises a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. See Barr v. Snohomish County Sheriff , 193 Wash.2d 330, 335, 440 P.3d 131 (2019) (citing Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood , 178 Wash.2d 635, 641, 310 P.3d 804 (2013) ). A case becomes moot when a court can no longer provide effective relief. SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire , 168 Wash.2d 593, 602, 229 P.3d 774 (2010) (citing In re Recall Charges Against Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 Dirs. Butler-Wall , 162 Wash.2d 501, 505, 173 P.3d 265 (2007) ); City of Sequim v. Malkasian , 157 Wash.2d 251, 259, 138 P.3d 943 (2006) (" ‘The central question of all mootness problems is whether changes in the circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.’ " (quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.3, at 261 (2d ed. 1984) )).

¶ 9 Because mootness was the basis for the trial court's decision, the correct standard of review is de novo.² Applying this standard, we address whether a finding of continuing contempt is required for the trial court to exercise its discretionary authority to order a contemnor to compensate a moving party for any losses, costs, and attorney fees.

2. Continuing Contempt is Not a Prerequisite To Granting Compensatory Relief under RCW 7.21.030(3)

¶ 10 Intentional disobedience of any lawful court order is contempt of court. RCW 7.21.010(1)(b). In addition to their inherent contempt powers, courts are statutorily authorized to impose both punitive and remedial sanctions. Remedial sanctions are civil sanctions imposed "for the purpose of coercing performance when the contempt consists of the omission or refusal to perform an act that is yet in the person's power to perform ." RCW 7.21.010(3) (emphasis added); In re Pers. Restraint of King , 110 Wash.2d 793, 799-800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). Washington's civil contempt statute outlines the court's authority to impose remedial sanctions designed to coerce a contemnor into purging continuing contempt. RCW 7.21.030(2). Specifically, before imposing coercive sanctions under .030(2), the court must first find that "the [contemnor] has failed or refused to perform an act that is yet within the person's power to perform." Id .

¶ 11 This prerequisite is limited to subsection (2). In contrast, subsection (3) of the civil contempt statute provides that "[t]he court may, in addition to the remedial sanctions set forth in subsection (2) of this section, order a person found in contempt of court to pay a party for any losses suffered by the party as a result of the contempt and any costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees." RCW 7.21.030(3) (emphasis added). Subsection (3), by its plain terms, does not predicate the court's authority to order compensatory relief on a finding of continuing contempt, nor does it state that an order must serve a coercive purpose.

¶ 12 We apply ordinary rules of statutory construction to decide whether a court's authority to issue a compensatory order under subsection (3) against a contemnor is subject to subsection (2)’s restrictions on imposing remedial sanctions. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Spokane County v. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife , 192 Wash.2d 453, 457-58, 430 P.3d 655 (2018) (citing State v. Velasquez , 176 Wash.2d 333, 336, 292 P.3d 92 (2013) ). Our starting point in interpreting a statute is the statute's plain language and ordinary meaning. Id. "When possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." State v. Evans , 177 Wash.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). " ‘Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all...