Hagler v. Small

• Decision Date: 11 April 1923
• Docket Number: No. 15261.,15261.
• Citation: 307 Ill. 460,138 N.E. 849
• Parties: HAGLER v. SMALL, Governor, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

307 Ill. 460

138 N.E. 849

HAGLER

v.SMALL, Governor, et al.

No. 15261.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 11, 1923.

Suit by Elmer E. Hagler against Len Small, Governor and others, to enjoin the defendants from carrying into effect the Soldiers' Compensation Act. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; Elbert S. Smith, judge.

Sherman & Bainum, of Springfield, for appellant.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., and Albert D. Rodenberg, of Springfield (Harry A. Newby, of Chicago, and Howard C. Knotts, of Springfield, of counsel), for appellees.

STONE, J.

Appellant, as a citizen and taxpayer, sought to enjoin the appellees, as officers of the state and members of the Service Recognition Board, from enforcing the provisions of an act entitled:

‘An act to provide payment of compensation to certain persons who served with the military or naval forces of the United States in the recent war with Germany.’ Laws 1921, p. 67.

To this end he filed his bill in the circuit court of Sangamon county, alleging that the act is void in that it violated certain provisions of the Constitution of the state. An answer was filed and a hearing had before the chancellor, who found the issues of fact for the appellees and dismissed the bill for want of equity. The cause comes here for review.

The act in question consists of 15 sections. Section 1 provides that every person who served honorably in active duty in the military or naval service of the United States for a longer period than two months, and who was enlisted, inducted, warranted, or commissioned between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, and who was at the time of entering such service a resident of this state, and who had been honorably discharged from service or is still in active service or retired, shall be entitled to receive compensation of 50 cents for each day's service, not exceeding a total of $300. Section 2 provides for the payment of such allowance to relatives of a deceased person entitled thereto. Section 3 defines those not entitled to compensation, and section 4 prohibits the assignment of any right or claim under the act. A service recognition board, consisting of the Governor, State Treasurer, and Adjutant General, is created by section 5 of the act. This section provides that the board shall have complete charge and control of the payments authorized by the act and of the formation of necessary rules for that purpose. Section 6 authorizes the employment of clerical help by the board, and section 7 limits the time in which application for compensation must be made to January 1, 1925. By section 8 bonds of the state in the amount of $55,000,000 are authorized for the purpose of providing funds for the payments under the act. This section requires that the funds, when so derived, shall be kept in a separate fund in the state treasury, to be known as the soldiers' compensation fund. The sum of $55,000,000 is by section 9 appropriated to the Service Recognition Board, such appropriation to be paid out as provided in the State Finance Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, c. 127a 3/4). By section 10 it is provided that if there be a surplus remaining in the soldiers' compensation fund after all payments provided for in the act have been made, such surplus may be expended by the ServiceRecognition Board for the relief of veterans of the World War and their families, in such manner as the General Assembly shall specify, and not otherwise. Section 11 provides for an annual tax levy to pay the interest on and meet the retirement of such bonds. By section 12 the manner of submission of the act to vote of the people is prescribed, together with the form of ballot. Section 13 provides for the publication of the act before the election. Section 14 requires that the act shall be irrepealable until the debt and interest are paid, and section 15 provides that the act shall go into force only after receiving the majority of the votes required by by the Constitution.

Appellant's objections relate to the manner of passage of the act and the power of the Legislature to enact it. Concerning the object that the law was not passed as required by the Constitution, it is contended that under section 18 of article 4 of the Constitution the act was not voted for by two-thirds of all of the members elected to each of the of all of the members elected was not entered on the journals of each house, as required by law. The proof in the record shows that the act received 150 affirmative votes in the House and 48 affirmative votes in the Senate. No vote was cast against the act in either branch of the Legislature. The evidence also shows that the same was passed on yea and nay vote and was properly entered upon the journals of both houses, and even though section 18 of article 4 of the Constitution, requiring a two-thirds vote of all members of each house, is applicable to this bill (which is not conceded), those conditions are shown to have been fully complied with. The evidence shows that the act was published as required by law.

It is contended that the majority of the electors of the state voting at said election did not vote for the act, as required by section 18 of article 4 of the Constitution. That section requires an affirmative vote by a majority of the voters voting at an election for members of the General Assembly. This court held in Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327, 123 N. E. 566, that under the system of minority representation in this state a majority of the voters voting at the election must vote for the act, and that it is not required that it receive a majority of the total vote for members of the Legislature, which might be three times the number of voters. In this case the proof shows that 1,220,815 votes were cast in favor of the act and 502,372 votes against it. The highest legislative vote at the election was 1,704,857, showing a majority for the act of 368,387 votes. The act received a constitutional majority.

Appellant also contends that the act violates the provision of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, requiring that no act shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title; that in the present act the provisions for the creation of a debt of $55,000,000, the appropriation of that sum, the provision for an annual tax, the requirement that funds shall be paid out in accordance with the State Finance Act, the creation of a special fund in the state treasury, known as the soldiers' compensation, bond, interest, and retirement fund, and the creation of a service recognition board, are all provisions of the act not expressed in the title. The title to an act is not an index of it. The purpose of the constitutional provision here referred to is to prevent joining in one act unrelated subjects. The restriction does not apply to the provisions in the act provided said provisions are germane to the title of the act. Dolese v. Pierce, 124 Ill. 140, 16 N. E. 218. The rule has frequently been laid down by this court that if the title of an act be general, any number of provisions may be contained therein, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and so long as they may be considered in furtherance of the subject. Mitchell v. Lowden, supra; People v. Ankrum, 286 Ill. 319, 121 N. E. 579;Sutter v. People's Gaslight Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N. E. 562;People v. Sargent, 254 Ill. 514, 98 N. E. 959;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994. The act in this case is not open to this objection.

Nor can it be objected that because section 9 of the act provides that the funds accruing shall be payable in accordance with the provisions of the State Finance Act the act violates the provision of the section of the Constitution relating to amendments. This court has held that there is no constitutional objection of incorporating in an act the provisions of another law by reference thereto. People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, 117 N. E. 784;Zeman v. Dolan, 279 Ill. 295, 116 N. E. 642.

Appellant contends that the submission of this act to the vote of the people, containing, as it does, provisions authorizing a debt to be contracted and others providing for the levy of a tax, violated the provisions of section 18 of article 2 of the Constitution, requiring that all elections shall be free and equal, in that it restricted the right of suffrage by compelling the voters to cast their ballots either for or against both laws, thereby depriving them of any freedom of choice. This objection was considered by this court in the case of Mitchell v. Lowden, supra, where a law similar in this respect was questioned, and it was there held not to be a violation of the Constitution.

It is the contention of appellant that the act violates section 12 of article 4 of the Constitution, requiring a yea and nay vote upon each bill separately; it being contended that this act was, in effect, two bills, for the reason just referred to. This question is likewise disposed of, contrary to the contention of appellant, in Mitchell v. Lowden, supra.

The bill also charges that the act violates section 16 of article 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits the appropriation of money by private laws, and also section 17 of article 4 of that instrument, prohibiting the withdrawal of money in the treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law. Section 16 referred to does not prohibit an appropriation to a private person but prohibits appropriations for any purpose in a private law. Fergus v. Russel, 277 Ill. 20, 115 N. E. 166. As to the objection that the act violates section 17 of article 4 of the Constitution, an examination of the provisions of section 9 of the act in question, requiring that payments be made in accordance with the act in relation to state finance is sufficient to show that such objection is not...