Hall v. Hall
| Decision Date | 11 December 1940 |
| Docket Number | 36801 |
| Parties | Anna K. Hall v. Port Hall, Martha Hall, Louwilla McReynolds, and Harry McReynolds, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lewis Circuit Court; Hon. Edmund L. Alford Judge.
Affirmed.
Walter M. Hilbert and Otto P. Shanks for appellants.
It is the well-settled law of this State that any conveyance of the homestead tract of land or part of it by the husband alone is not only void as to the wife and children, but also as to the husband, and that a contract to convey made by the husband alone cannot be enforced. Haines v. Carroll, 327 Mo 1030, 38 S.W.2d 1047; Growney v. O'Donnell, 272 Mo. 167; Bushness v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371; Sec. 608 R. S. 1929. It is the rule in equity suits to correct a written contract on the ground of mistake that the burden is cast upon the party asserting the mistake to overthrow by evidence that is clear and convincing the prima facie presumption that the contract exhibits the ultimate agreement of the parties, and of showing that the mistake was mutual. Robinson v. Korns, 250 Mo. 675.
William E. Stewart and Harry S. Rouse for respondent.
(1) A husband may make a deed directly to his wife and it will convey the legal title to the real estate therein described, subject to the husband's marital rights. Freidel v. Bailey, 329 Mo. 35, 44 S.W.2d 14; Carson v. Lumber Co., 270 Mo. 338; Givens v. Marbut, 259 Mo. 223. (2) In construing a deed the grantor's intention must control; and such intention must be gathered from all parts of the deed. The entire deed must be considered in determining such intention and undue preference should not be given to any one clause. An instrument refered to in a deed is a part thereof and the two become one in determining the intention of the grantor. Shaw v. Bank of Dearborn, 324 Mo. 348, 23 S.W.2d 20; Straus v. Nichols Land Co., 327 Mo. 205, 37 S.W.2d 505; Erkle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 424, 165 S.W. 1035; Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157; Monroe v. Lyons, 339 Mo. 515, 98 S.W.2d 544; Goins v. Melton, 121 S.W.2d 821; Norman v. Horton, 126 S.W.2d 187; Kane v. Roath, 310 Mo. 684, 276 S.W. 39; Agan v. Shannon, 103 Mo. 661; Waldermeyer v. Loebig, 222 Mo. 540; Allen v. DeGroodt, 105 Mo. 442; Tillman v. Carthage, 297 Mo. 74. (3) A deed must be construed most strongly against the grantor and most favorably to the grantee; to ascertain and make effective the intention of the grantor and when the literal reading introduces an absurdity or hardship one word may be used as a substitute for another, if thereby the obvious intent is subserved and no obscurity is introduced. Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 424, 165 S.W. 1035; Grooms v. Morrison, 249 Mo. 544, 155 S.W. 430; Straus v. Nichols Land Co., 327 Mo. 205, 37 S.W.2d 505. (4) By an antenuptial contract, entered into in good faith and for a valuable consideration, an intended wife can relinquish all her interest in the property of her intended husband, including homestead, and where said parties act upon the said contract it becomes binding and valid on both parties. Young v. Sangster, 322 Mo. 802, 16 S.W.2d 92; Davis v. Cook, 337 Mo. 33, 85 S.W.2d 20; Hall v. Greenwell, 231 Mo.App. 1093, 85 S.W.2d 150; 13 R. C. L., sec. 34, p. 1013; Kroell v. Kroell, 291 Ill. 105, 76 N.E. 63. (5) The homestead law, being for the protection of the wife and minor children, is to be liberally construed, and a deed from a husband directly to his wife (there being no minor children) which in no wise injuriously but rather beneficially affects the widow's occupancy of the homestead property, should not be held to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 608, Revised Statutes 1929. Regand v. Ensley, 283 Mo. 306; Dennis v. Gorman, 289 Mo. 9; Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119. (6) The deed from Will Hall directly to his wife, Anna K. Hall, the respondent herein, was not an alienation of the homestead. Thompson on Homestead & Exemptions, sec. 473; 13 R. C. L., sec. 425, p. 1378; Polk v. Stephens, 126 Ark. 159, 189 S.W. 838; Beedy v. Finney, 118 Iowa 276, 91 N.W. 1070; Lynch v. Dorn, 95 Mich. 395, 54 N.W. 886; Furrow v. Athey, 21 Neb. 671, 33 N.W. 209; Wehe v. Wehe, 44 N.D. 280, 175 N.W. 368; Earl v. Mundy, 227 S.W. 973; Bassett v. Powell, 178 Ala. 340, 60 So. 89; Hall v. Pawell, 8 Okla. 276, 57 P. 170; Williams v. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 So. 39; Russ v. King, 127 S.E. 101.
Bradley, C. Hyde and Dalton, CC., concur.
This cause is to determine title to real estate in Lewis County. The court found that plaintiff was the owner and defendants appealed.
It is in effect, conceded that prior to June 16, 1933, Will Hall, deceased, owned the land, and had, with his family, lived on it for many years. His first wife, Lonnie, died June 11, 1924. Their children are defendants Port Hall and Louwilla McReynolds. Defendant, Martha Hall, is the wife of Port, and Harry McReynolds is the husband of Louwilla. March 6, 1926, and immediately prior to their marriage, Will Hall and plaintiff, who was then Anna L. Kell, entered into an antenuptial contract by which each relinquished to the other all after-acquired marital rights in their respective properties. Paragraph (f) provided: "In the event first party (Will Hall) predeceases second party (Anna L. Kell) then second party is to be paid the sum of $ 2,000 (two thousand dollars) from the estate of first party."
June 16, 1933, Will Hall, by warranty deed, conveyed, for a recited consideration of $ 2,000, the land in question to his wife, Anna K., plaintiff, who did not join in the execution of the deed. The deed contained the following:
(italics ours).
Will Hall died March 28, 1936. This cause was filed September 3, 1936, tried November 21, 1938, and judgment entered May 9, 1939.
Plaintiff alleged that she was the owner and in the possession of the land; that the word not, italicized in the paragraph, supra, from the deed, was a clerical error; that defendants claimed some interest in the land adverse to her, and asked that the title be determined.
Defendants denied that plaintiff had title; alleged that Lonnie Hall, deceased, first wife of Will, and the mother of Port and Louwilla, purchased and improved, with her own money, the lands in question; that the legal title was placed in Will Hall, but that he held as trustee for his wife, Lonnie; that at the time of the execution of the deed to plaintiff, the land in question was the homestead of Will Hall, the grantor therein, and that since plaintiff, the then wife of the grantor, did not join in the deed, said deed was "absolutely null, void and of no effect." Also, defendants denied that the word not was a clerical error.
In her reply plaintiff denied generally, and specifically denied the claims of defendants as to the land having been purchased, etc., by Lonnie Hall, but alleged that if such were the case, defendants were barred by the Statute of Limitations.
It was admitted that defendants, Port Hall and Louwilla McReynolds, were the only living children of Will Hall, and that they were over 21 years old on June 16, 1933, date of execution of the deed to plaintiff, and that neither of them lived on the land. There was no evidence offered to support the allegations in the answer that the land was purchased, developed, etc., by Lonnie Hall, but it is, in effect, conceded that the land was the homestead of Will Hall.
Mr. Noah W. Simpson, an attorney, drew the antenuptial contract and made a pencil draft of the paragraph, supra, from the deed, and gave this draft, for insertion in the deed, to the notary who prepared the deed. Mr. Simpson testified that the italicized words grantee and grantor, in the paragraph, supra, from the deed, were transposed as compared to the position of these words in the draft he gave to the notary. The antenuption spelling and the transportation were likely due to the scrivener's inability to accurately read Mr. Simpson's writing. Mr. Simpson, when on the stand, said that his handwriting was "mighty poor."
This cause was not argued orally, and defendants, appellants here, make no written argument, but in their brief say that (1) "it is the well settled law of this State that any conveyance of the homestead tract of land or part of it by the husband alone is not only void as to the wife and children, but also as to the husband, . . . and (2) that it is the rule in equity suits to correct a written contract on the ground of mistake that the burden is cast upon the party asserting the mistake to overthrow by evidence that is clear and convincing the prima facie presumption that the contract exhibits the ultimate agreement of the parties, and of showing that the mistake was mutual."
As supporting the proposition that the conveyance of the homestead was void, defendants rely on Sec. 608, R. S. 1929, 6 Ann. Stat., p. 4221; Haines v. Carroll, 327 Mo. 1026, 38 S.W.2d 1047; Growney et al. v. O'Donnell et al., 272 Mo. 167, 198 S.W. 863; Bushnell et al. v. Loomis et al., 234 Mo. 371, 137 S.W. 257.
Section 608, among other things, provides that ...
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