Hall v. State
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D17-2058,3D17-2058 |
| Citation | 319 So.3d 691 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Juaquan Antonio HALL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Rasco Klock Perez Nieto and Joseph P. Klock, Jr. ; Thomas A. Cobitz, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Joanne Diez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON and LOBREE, JJ.
Juaquan Antonio Hall ("Hall") appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted robbery with discharge of a firearm, as well as the fifty-year sentence as a juvenile for the murder. Although we affirm on all issues, we write only to address Hall's Eighth Amendment challenges based on Miller and Graham,1 including the minimum mandatory term of forty years he received for the murder pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes (2015).
At sentencing, the trial court considered the entire trial record and all evidence presented, including testimony by Hall's mother and expert witnesses, primarily about his intelligence and ability to be rehabilitated. The court further considered new evidence of phone calls between Hall and co-defendant Terrence Smith and statements by Hall, wherein he admitted belonging to a criminal gang, and threatened to kill a fellow inmate when they both got out. The crime's impact on the victim's family was also considered. The trial court observed that the victim, Ramiro Izquierdo, was the caretaker of both his brother Javier and their grandmother, with whom they lived. According to his family, Ramiro dreamed of opening a business so that he could employ the rest of his family. Speaking of Javier in particular, the court noted that the impact on him was immeasurable, finding, "[Hall] set out to steal an iPhone," "[i]nstead he stole the eyes, legs and soul of a family."
Sixteen-year-old Hall was sentenced to a total of seventy years in prison with a sentencing review in twenty-five years: fifty years on the murder count, forty of which were a minimum mandatory term under section 775.082(1)(b)(1), twenty years on one of the attempted robbery counts, to be served concurrent with the murder count, and twenty years on the remaining attempted robbery count, to be served concurrent to the murder count but consecutive to the other attempted robbery count.
Hall argues that section 775.082(1)(b) 1’s minimum mandatory term of forty years reviewable after twenty-five years for juveniles convicted of murder is facially unconstitutional pursuant to Miller and Graham. He additionally claims that the section is unconstitutional as applied to him, given its failure to require the kind of individualized sentencing prescribed by Miller and Graham, as well as the trial court's alleged failure to consider certain evidence regarding the statutory factors enacted. The trial court denied Hall's request that it declare the statute unconstitutional.
We review a trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of a statute de novo , recognizing the strong presumption of validity with which the statute is clothed. See Gonzalez v. State, 948 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ; see also Andrews v. State, 82 So. 3d 979, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) () (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ). Moreover, while "[a]n as-applied challenge ... is an argument that a law which is constitutional on its face is nonetheless unconstitutional as applied to a particular case or party, because of its discriminatory effects[,] in contrast, a facial challenge asserts that a statute always operates unconstitutionally." Miles v. City of Edgewater Police Dep't/Preferred Governmental Claims Sols., 190 So. 3d 171, 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Since they are reviewed differently, we address each challenge separately.
A facial challenge "is ... the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid." Pinnacle Hous. Grp., LLC v. Fla. Hous. Fin. Corp., 239 So. 3d 722, 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d 46, 50 (Fla. 2017) ). Hall argues that, because the section's minimum forty-year term is mandated , its prescription for all juveniles as a class is unconstitutional, since he reads Miller and Graham to allegedly hold that any sentence that is mandated derogates from a juvenile's right to be punished only after the trial court has, in its discretion, considered several mitigating factors involving his youth and circumstances. We reject this contention.
Section 775.082(1)(b) 1 reads:
A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40 years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
Section 921.1401(2), Florida Statutes (2015), referenced therein, reads:
Lastly, section 921.1402(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), also incorporated by reference in section 775.082(1)(b) 1, reads:
A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b) 1. is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 25 years. However, a juvenile offender is not entitled to review if he or she has previously been convicted of one of the following offenses, or conspiracy to commit one of the following offenses, if the offense for which the person was previously convicted was part of a separate criminal transaction or episode than that which resulted in the sentence under s. 775.082(1)(b) 1 ... [listing murder and nine other felonies].
As recently explained by our Supreme Court, these statutes were amended in response to Miller and Graham:
Although the holdings of Graham and Miller are narrow and specific, the discussion in both cases broadly outlines Eighth Amendment principles requiring states to take into account, as part of the sentencing process, the immaturity of those under the age of 18—and the consequent ability of younger offenders to reform as they mature. In response, the Florida Legislature adopted chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes, to address the Eighth Amendment principles articulated in Graham and Miller ... With the enactment of chapter 2014-220, the Legislature amended section 775.082(1) to provide new sentencing options for juveniles convicted of capital offenses.
State v. Purdy, 252 So. 3d 723, 725-26 (Fla. 2018) ; see also Bailey v. State, 277 So. 3d 173, 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ().
Miller narrowly held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ " 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (emphasis added). Graham, in turn, held that "life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment when imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders." Id. at 466, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (emphasis added); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011 () (emphasis added). In neither case was the mandated nature of the sentences what primarily made them run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, but the "confluence of ... two lines of precedent." Miller, 567 U.S. at 470, 132 S.Ct. 2455. One line, "adopt[ing] categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty" (likening life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself), and another, prohibiting mandatory capital punishment and "requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death." Id.
The ultimate rationale of the two cases was "that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot...
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