Hampton v. Glendale Union High School Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1992
• Docket Number: CA-CV,No. 1,1
• Citation: 172 Ariz. 431,837 P.2d 1166
• Parties: , 77 Ed. Law Rep. 956 Kenneth Lee HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLENDALE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee. 90-454.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1166

837 P.2d 1166

172 Ariz. 431, 77 Ed. Law Rep. 956

Kenneth Lee HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLENDALE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 90-454.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department D.

April 9, 1992.

Review Denied Oct. 20, 1992.

[172 Ariz. 432] Skarecky, Cales & Holder, P.A. by William W. Holder, Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellant.

Teilborg, Sanders & Parks, P.C. by David J. Damron, Phoenix, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

TAYLOR, Judge.

In this appeal, the parties ask us to decide whether Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 15-544(C) requires a school district to give a preferred right of reappointment to a teacher it dismissed for economic or efficiency reasons when the dismissed teacher is hired by another school district before a reappointment position becomes available. We hold that the school district must comply with the statute by notifying the dismissed teacher of an open position, even if the teacher has obtained a teaching position in another district. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Glendale Union High School District (GUHSD) and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant Kenneth Lee Hampton was employed by GUHSD as a special education teacher for the school years 1986-87, 1987-88, and 1988-89. By letter dated April 6, 1989, GUHSD informed Hampton that the governing board of the district would be unable to renew his teaching contract for the 1989-90 school year due to a reduction of certificated staff necessitated by a reduction of enrollment and/or elimination of course offerings. The letter contained the following statement:

Consistent with Arizona Revised Statutes and with the administrative guidelines for staff transfer, staff assignment and staff reduction, should a position become available in your teaching area for which you are qualified, you will be contacted on the basis of seniority to fill the position.

Thereafter, Hampton sought new employment. On June 28, 1989, he signed a contract for the 1989-90 school year with the Agua Fria School District ("Agua Fria"). During June 1989, Hampton spoke with Barbara Beery, GUHSD director of personnel, and told her that he had obtained employment with Agua Fria for the next school year.

In early August 1989, Beery learned of the availability of a GUHSD teaching position for which Hampton might be qualified. After contacting persons on the reduction-in-force list who were senior to Hampton, she placed a call to Hampton's residence but received no answer. Upon receiving no answer, she called Agua Fria to determine if Hampton had contracted with that district and was informed that he had done so. Beery then moved to the next person on the list. No other effort was made to contact Hampton about the available position.

Although Hampton began his new job that fall, the Agua Fria governing board allowed him to resign from his contract during the 1989-90 school year when he had the opportunity to start a private school. The private school subsequently failed.

Hampton filed his complaint against GUHSD on January 22, 1990. He alleged that the district violated A.R.S. § 15-544(C) and breached its contract with him. Hampton subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability in which he argued that GUHSD had violated § 15-544(C) as a matter of law by failing to offer Hampton the position for which he was qualified. In response, GUHSD contended that it could not have offered the position to Hampton because if it had done so it would have risked liability to Agua Fria for tortious interference with a contractual relationship. GUHSD also argued that Hampton waived any right to reappointment in the 1989-90 school year by contracting to work for another school district and that he was no longer qualified for the open position at GUHSD because he had accepted a position with another district.

The trial court agreed with GUHSD. In denying Hampton's motion, the court commented:

As to the facts of this case, the Court finds that the law does not require the defendant's school district to do a needless act. To require the defendant to make an offer of employment pursuant to statute to one who has entered into a valid and binding contractual obligation with another is not within the meaning of the above-cited statute. Further, it would constitute an unlawful interference with an existing contract and the Court further finds that the plaintiff, by entering into an employment contract with another, has waived the notice requirements of [A.R.S. § 15-544].

Based on this ruling, GUHSD moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of GUHSD. Hampton timely appealed from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

The parties do not disagree on any of the material facts in this case; rather, their dispute focuses on the meaning and proper application of A.R.S. § 15-544(C). In these circumstances, we review whether the trial court, in granting summary judgment, correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts. Long v. Buckley, 129 Ariz. 141, 142, 629 P.2d 557, 558 (App.1981). Because the interpretation of a statute involves legal rather than factual questions, we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the law and thus conduct a de novo review of the statute and its application in the case before us. Libra Group, Inc. v. State, 167 Ariz. 176, 179, 805 P.2d 409, 412 (App.1991).

The statute at issue in this appeal, A.R.S. § 15-544(C), provides:

A certificated teacher dismissed for reasons of economy or to improve the efficient conduct and administration of the schools of the school district shall have a preferred right of reappointment in the order of original employment by the governing board in the event of an increase in the number of certificated teachers or the reestablishment of services within a period of three years.

Hampton argues that under this statute, GUHSD was required to offer the open position to him. Hampton also argues that GUHSD may not rewrite the statute to give school districts the power to decide that there are situations in which it need not extend the "preferred right of reappointment."

As to GUHSD's contention that it was excused from compliance with A.R.S. § 15-544(C) based on its perceived risk of liability to Agua Fria for intentional interference with contract, Hampton argues that Agua Fria could not maintain such an action because it could not satisfy the elements required to establish intentional interference with contract. Hampton specifically notes that (1) Agua Fria would not be able to show damages unless it were unable to replace Hampton with another teacher at the same or lower pay; (2) Agua Fria would not be damaged by GUHSD's offer unless Hampton accepted the offer; (3) GUHSD would not have intended to interfere with the relationship between Agua Fria and Hampton because its intent would have been to comply with the statute, and (4) GUHSD would not have done anything improper by making an offer that it was required by statute to make.

GUHSD responds that A.R.S. § 15-544(C) does not require a school district to give a certificated teacher a preferred right of reappointment if after dismissal the teacher signs a teaching contract with another district. GUHSD reasons that such a requirement would only create chaos and confusion between the school districts and that it would do nothing to further the legislative intent of protecting teachers from layoffs and insuring that they have a continuing opportunity to practice their profession.

GUHSD asserts that the term "shall" in the statute may be read in the directory rather than mandatory sense. GUHSD argues that a directory reading would avoid the absurd and harsh result that would occur if a district must offer a position to a teacher who has contracted with another district, thus engendering a fight between the districts for the teacher and disrupting the educational system. GUHSD further contends that A.R.S. § 15-544(C) should not be interpreted to require a school district to expose itself to the risk of liability for intentional interference with a contractual relationship. It disagrees with Hampton's assertions that Agua Fria would not have been able to win a lawsuit against GUHSD if GUHSD had offered the open teaching position to Hampton.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the courts must primarily attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991). We find in the legislative record no indication of the legislature's intent regarding the application of the preferred right of reappointment where the dismissed teacher has obtained employment with another district. In this situation, the most reliable indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute. State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 594, 667 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1983). To determine legislative intent, we may also look to the context of the statute and its historical background, subject matter, effects, consequences, and purpose. Wyatt, 167 Ariz. at 284, 806 P.2d at 873.

Section 15-544(C) provides that a certificated teacher who is dismissed for economy or efficiency reasons "shall have a preferred right of reappointment in the order of original employment by the governing board...." (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "shall" indicates a mandatory intent by the legislature. Insurance Co. of North America v. Superior Court, 166 Ariz. 82, 85, 800 P.2d 585, 588 (1990); In re Guardianship of Cruz, 154 Ariz. 184, 185, 741 P.2d 317, 318 (App.1987). GUHSD points out, however, that in some instances "shall" has been construed to indicate desirability, preference, or permission. Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 554, 637 P.2d 1053, 1057 (1981)....