Harlow v. Pulsifer

• Decision Date: 21 April 1923
• Citation: 120 A. 621
• Parties: HARLOW v. PULSIFER.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

120 A. 621

HARLOW

v. PULSIFER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 21, 1923.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County, at Law.

Action by Elmer L. Harlow against Chester S. Pulsifer, for trespass. From an order refusing nonsuit, defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, DUNN, and MORRILL, JJ.

Frank A. Morey, of Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Pulsifer & Ludden, of Auburn, for defendant.

DUNN, J. Desiring to sell a farm he owned in Minot, the defendant caused it to be offered at auction on July 2, 1920, and the plaintiff became the successful bidder. The terms were $200 down, the balance within 7 days, unless the owner would put off the latter payment longer. He consented to a total delay of 30 days for the deferred part. Within that time the bidder tendered full payment, and demanded a deed, but the owner refused to make the conveyance. The refusal continued until December, when there was compliance with a decree for specific performance.

After receiving the deed, the plaintiff, as the grantee of that instrument, brought this action of trespass quare clausum, alleging, so far as essential to be recited, that, "on divers days and times during the month of August," his vendor entered the afterward conveyed premises, without the plaintiff's leave, and therefrom cut and carried away the grass.

The defendant interposed a brief statement, advancing: (a) That he, and not the plaintiff, had had both title and possession of the premsies till the December day when the deed was given; (b) that the judgment in equity for specific performance rendered this action res adjudicata, since the bill carried an allegation which the answer denied, that the defendant's refusal to deed made it "impossible for the plaintiff to cut the grass," followed by a prayer for resultant damages. Defendant reserved an exception to a refusal to nonsuit.

There is a general doctrine, to pass first to the second insistance, that, when once equity acquires jurisdiction of a cause on any ground, or for any purpose, it will, on the same principle as that of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, draw into its consideration and determination all equities connected with the subject of the suit which the pleadings may authorize. Pom. Eq. Jur. § 181; Story's Equity, § 72; 21 C. J. 134; O. R. C. L. p. 374; Traip v. Gould, 15 Me. 83: Nash v. Simpson, 78 Me. 142, 151, 3 Atl. 53; Braman v. Foss, 204 Mass. 404, 90 N. E. 563. This doctrine seemingly originates from the equitable jurisdiction for purposes of discovery. Not infrequently it is stated broadly and classified as valuable by courts and commentators. But it is neither universal, unyielding, nor infallible. It is permissive rather than peremptory. "It is not true, by any means, that when a court of conscience has acquired cognizance for one purpose, it thereby acquires cognizance over the entire controversy for all purposes." Lodor v. McGovern, 48 N. J. Eq. 275, 22 Atl. 199, 27 Am. St. Rep. 446. The application of the rule, again to quote the New Jersey court, "rests somewhat in the discretion of the chancellor." Shaw v. Beaumont Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 333, 102 Atl. 151, 2 A. L. R. 122. See, too, Story's Equity, §§ 7, 73; Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164, 59 L. R. A. 556, 94 Am. St. Rep. 895.

In the equity suit the judgment in which the defendant invokes, the justice who heard it went no further than to enforce performance. Defendant points to that which he denominates as significant in the findings, namely, to this sentence: "That plaintiff did not enter into possession of the farm." The justice so said, but his words should be read in the light that the context throws upon them, in which it can be seen that his meaning was that the plaintiff did not enter into possession of the farm within the 30-day period. Notice this excerpt from the findings:

"*** That the defendant at the request of plaintiff extended the time for payment of the balance for 30 days from day of sale; that within said period of 30 days the plaintiff tendered the balance of the purchase price and requested a conveyance, which defendant refused; that plaintiff did not enter into possession of the farm."

A prior domestic judgment constitutes an absolute bar, concluding the parties and those in privity with them with regard to every matter which was advanced to sustain or defeat the claim then made, and also as to every matter belonging to the subject, which, under the pleadings, might have been brought forward, of right, at that time. Buck v. Collins, 69 Me. 445; Fuller v. Eastman. 81 Me. 284, 17 Atl. 67; Rose v. Parker, 116 Me. 52, 99 Atl. 817; Maddocks v. Gushee. 120 Me. 247, 113 Atl. 300. But where the second action between the same parties is on a different claim or demand, the earlier judgment is an estoppel only as to those matters which were determined in the previous litigation. Smith v. Brunswick, 80 Me. 189, 13 Atl. 890. The sole question between the parties to this action which was considered and decided in the equity suit between them was that of specific performance. Touching this, as we have seen, it was stated that the plaintiff did not take possession of the property during the 30 days limited for final payment. The equity suit was not concerned with trespass. Let it be marked, that the bill alleged that de...