Harris v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1956
• Docket Number: No. 395,395
• Citation: 90 S.E.2d 710,58 A.L.R.2d 939,243 N.C. 346
• Parties: , 58 A.L.R.2d 939 Walter A. HARRIS v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 710

90 S.E.2d 710

243 N.C. 346, 58 A.L.R.2d 939

Walter A. HARRIS v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION.

No. 395

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 13, 1956

Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.

Ratcliff, Vaughn, Hudson, Ferrell & Carter and R. M. Stockton, Jr., Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellee.

BOBBITT, Justice.

Defendant, a common carrier, was not an insurer of the safety of its passengers. Its liability, if any, was for negligence proximately causing injury to its passengers. Hollingsworth v. Skelding, 142 N.C. 246, 55 S.E. 212, expressly disapproving a contrary dictum in Daniel v. Petersburg R. Co., 117 N.C. 592, 23 S.E. 327, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 485; White v. Chappell, 219 N.C. 652, 14 S.E.2d 843; Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 399, 45 S.E.2d 546; Jenkins v. City Coach Co., 231 N.C. 208, 56 S.E.2d 571.

This Court has quoted with approval Lord Mansfield's definition of the carrier's legal duty to its passengers, viz.: ' 'As far as human care and foresight could go he must provide for their safe conveyance."' Hollingsworth v. Skelding, supra [142 N.C. 246, 55 S.E. 213]; Perry v. Sykes, 215 N.C. 39, 200 S.E. 923; Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N.C. 567, 5 S.E.2d 828; Smith v. Camel City Cab Co., 227 N.C. 572, 42 S.E.2d 657.

The definition adopted by this Court and stated repeatedly is that a carrier owes its passengers 'the highest degree of care for their safety so far as is consistent with the practical operation and conduct of its business'. White v. Chappell, supra [219 N.C. 652, 14 S.E.2d 847]; Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., supra; Garvey v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 228 N.C. 166, 45 S.E.2d 58; Jenkins v. City Coach Co., supra.

We perceive no inconsistency in these definitions. Indeed, in Smith v. Camel City Cab Co., Devin, J. (later C. J.), said: 'The duty owed by common carriers to passengers being transported by them has been frequently stated by this Court to be to provide for the safe conveyance of their passengers 'as far as human care and foresight' can go, consistent with practical operation of the business.' [227 N.C. 572, 42 S.E.2d 658.] Even so, the definition quoted from White v. Chappell, supra, ordinarily would seem quite sufficient as a general definition.

The carrier's legal duty to its passenger continues until such time as it affords its passenger an opportunity to alight safely from its conveyance to a place of safety. Wood v. North Carolina Public-Service Corp., 174 N.C. 697, 94 S.E. 459, 1 A.L.R. 942; Loggins v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 181 N.C. 221, 106 S.E. 822; White v. Chappell, supra. The passenger is entitled, as stated by Stacy, J. (later C. J.), in the Loggins case [181 N.C. 221, 106 S.E. 823] to 'a safe landing', which refers to the act of the passenger in alighting from the carrier's conveyance, and to 'a landing in safety', which refers to the condition in which he finds himself immediately after he has alighted from the carrier's conveyance. Once the passenger has alighted safely from the carrier's conveyance to a place of safety, the relationship of carrier and passenger ends. Loggins v. Southern Public Utilities Co., supra; White v. Chappell, supra; Patterson v. Duke Power Co., 226 N.C. 22, 36 S.E.2d 713.

In passing upon defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit, the evidence, whether offered by plaintiff or by defendant, must be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N.C. 634, 80 S.E.2d 676; Marshburn v. Patterson, 241 N.C. 441, 85 S.E.2d 683.

When the evidence is so considered, it is clear that it was sufficient for submission to the jury as to defendant's negligence. Defendant's contention is that its motion for judgment of nonsuit should have been granted because, as it contends, 'plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.' Conceding that the evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury as to alleged contributory negligence of plaintiff, we do not think it establishes plaintiff's contributory negligence so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn therefrom. Horton v. Peterson, 238 N.C. 446, 78 S.E.2d 181. Hence, we concur in the court's ruling denying defendant's said motion.

In connection with the alleged contributory negligence of plaintiff, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, tends to show these facts: The bus traveled beyond Bethabara Road, but plaintiff did not then know that it had done so; and, having received no warning from the bus driver, he stepped from the bus into a place of danger rather than of safety. The bus did not stop abruptly, but slowed down and gradually came to a stop. Plaintiff, according to the testimony of the bus driver, asked that the driver stop at said intersection; and, in getting off, assumed that the bus had stopped at said intersection, a place where he could alight therefrom in safety. But having reached the conclusion that there must be a new trial, for reasons stated below, we refrain from expanding arguments pro and con bearing upon the issues of fact.

In instructing the jury, the court reviewed what certain of the evidence offered by plaintiff and by defendant, respectively, tended to show, and reviewed the contentions of the respective parties. Definitions of a carrier's duty to its passenger, to and including the passenger's alighting safely from the conveyance to a place of safety, quoted from the Hollingsworth, Loggins and White cases, cited above, were given; and in addition the court gave correctly the law as to burden of proof and general definitions of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause.

Then, in charging the jury as to the negligence issue, the court's instruction was: '* * * the Court charges you that if you find from this evidence, all of this evidence, and by its greater weight, that the defendant was negligent on this occasion, as the Court has defined negligence to you, and that that negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, as the Court has defined proximate cause, taking into consideration the duty that the defendant as a carrier owed to the plaintiff as a passenger, as the Court has defined that duty from the decisions of our Court, then it would be your duty to answer this first issue 'Yes.' If you are not so satisfied, then it would be your duty to answer it 'No."'

And, in charging the jury as to the contributory negligence issue, the court's instruction was: 'The Court charges you that the burden is on the defendant to satisfy you by the greater weight of the evidence that there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to his injuries, in order that it would justify you in answering this second issue 'Yes.' If you are not so satisfied from all of this evidence and by its greater weight, then you'd answer that second issue 'No."'

Earlier in the charge, the court had instructed the jury as follows: 'Now, Members of the Jury, the law provides that the Judge declare or explain to you the law in the case. It, therefore, becomes the duty of the Court, that is, the one speaking to you now, to relate to you the law that is applicable in this case. You will apply the facts to the law in making up your answer to the issues.'

G.S. § 1-180 provides, in part, that the trial judge, in giving the charge to the petit jury, either in a civil or a criminal action, shall declare and explain the law arising on the evidence given in the case. The court, not the jury, is to relate and apply the law to the variant factual situations having support in the evidence. Citizens National Bank v. Phillips, 236 N.C. 470, 73 S.E.2d 323, and cases cited.

Analysis of the evidence discloses sharp conflict as to where plaintiff alighted from the bus. If plaintiff alighted therefrom safely at the intersection 10 or 12 feet south of the parapet and ditch, and was standing there when the bus drove away, and thereafter, notwithstanding he was thoroughly familiar with the lay of the land at said intersection, for some unexplained reason or none walked or wandered over to the edge of the ditch and fell in, the defendant would not be guilty of negligence proximately causing plaintiff's injuries.

On the other hand, if the bus went beyond the intersection and plaintiff was invited or directed to alight therefrom at or near the edge of the ditch and parapet, then a factual situation calling for an application of other principles of law was presented. In such case, it would be for the jury to say whether the bus driver failed to exercise due care to stop at a place where plaintiff might alight safely from the bus to a place of safety or to warn plaintiff of a danger of which the bus driver was aware, or of which he should have been aware had he exercised due care; and in relation to the contributory negligence issue, it would be for the jury to say whether plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known, that the bus had passed the intersection and was in the vicinity of the ditch and parapet when he undertook to alight from the bus and whether in alighting from the bus under...