Hatcher v. Hatcher
| Decision Date | 08 June 1897 |
| Citation | 39 S.W. 479,139 Mo. 614 |
| Parties | Hatcher, Appellant, v. Hatcher et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. M. Robinson, Judge.
Affirmed.
Thomas & Hackney for appellant.
(1) The trial court erred in finding for defendants and dismissing plaintiff's bill. The proof was overwhelming that the deeds sought to be set aside were obtained by the defendants from plaintiff by fraudulent representations and undue influence and the decree should have been for plaintiff. The defendant, B. F. Hatcher, was her son and had been her business adviser ever since the death of her husband and was her agent for the transaction of her business, and had in his hands at and before the making of the deeds the land in controversy, for sale and management as her agent. The defendant, Jacob Litteral, was her son-in-law, in whom she reposed absolute trust and confidence, and was her chosen business adviser in this very transaction. She, being aged infirm and uneducated, and harassed by the fear that her land would be taken from her under the mortgages, called upon them for advice and assistance. They accepted the trust and magnified the danger by falsely representing that E. T. Webb threatened to and would foreclose the mortgages on her land in May, 1885, unless the debt was paid. They deterred her from seeking and obtaining disinterested advice, before dealing with her, and advised her that the best thing to do and the only thing to do, was to turn the property over to them, jointly, to manage for her, agreeing to protect her interests in the land; and without paying a dollar, and without incurring any liability, they obtained from her deeds to land then worth, according to the most moderate estimate $ 12,000. (2) A court of equity will enforce the trust thereby assumed by the defendants, and require them to account to the plaintiff for the management of her property, and declare them trustees, holding the title for her benefit. Yosti v. Laughran, 49 Mo. 594; Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 228; McClure v. Lewis, 72 Mo. 314; Hall v. Knappenberger, 97 Mo. 511; Rothenbarger v. Rothenbarger, 111 Mo. 1; Armstrong v. Logan, 115 Mo. 465; Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1; Bohm v. Bohm, 10 P. 790. (3) The defendants occupied toward plaintiff such a confidential and fiduciary relation that they will not be permitted to retain the fruits of a bargain entered into between her and them to her disadvantage, while the confidential relation existed. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. [10 Ed.], secs. 307, 308; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sec. 956, pp. 1378, 1379; 1 Perry on Trusts [4 Ed.], secs. 209, 210; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake [1 Ed.], pp. 150 and 151; Turner v. Turner, 44 Mo. 537, 538; Street v. Goss, 62 Mo. 226; Harper v. Harper, 3 S.W. 5; Crips v. Towsley, 73 Mich. 395; Smith v. Cuddy, 96 Mich. 562, 569; Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 145. (4) The undue advantage taken by the defendants of the plaintiff in her helpless and distressed condition, is such as to show unmistakably and beyond a reasonable doubt that her mind was so subdued, her free agency so destroyed, the just result of her judgment so mislead, confused and disturbed by the oppression of defendants, as to condemn and avoid the contract entered into by her. Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1, and cases cited; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence [2 Ed.], sec. 948, p. 1364; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake [1 Ed.], p. 183. (5) A deed between parties, one of whom is subject to the influence of the other, should contain a fair and truthful statement of the transaction. If the statement of the consideration is untrue, the instrument can not be upheld. The party seeking to uphold it can not prove in order to sustain it, that the actual consideration was partly that represented in the deed and partly something else. Ahearne v. Hogan, 1 Dru. 310; Uppington v. Bullen, 2 Dru. and War. 184; Clifford v. Turrell, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 138; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 104; Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms. 203; Willan v. Willan, 2 Dow. 274; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483.
McReynolds & Halliburton for respondents.
(1) Before a deed can be contradicted and the title to land can be affected, there should be not only clear and unequivocal evidence, but there should be no room for a reasonable doubt as to the facts relied on. Johnson v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 423; Ringo v. Richardson, 53 Mo. 385; Worley v. Dryden, 57 Mo. 233. (2) When it is sought to establish a trust by parol evidence, the evidence to warrant a decree must be so clear, definite and positive as to leave no reasonable ground of doubt as to the right to have the trust established. Philpott v. Penn, 91 Mo. 38; Burdett v. May, 100 Mo. 13; King v. Isley, 116 Mo. 155. (3) Where a grantor in a deed for land seeks its cancellation and the re-investment of title on the ground of mistake, the burden of establishing the same is on such grantor, and before the relief asked for will be given, the fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Jackson v. Wood, 88 Mo. 76; Brown v. Foster, 112 Mo. 297. (4) The relationship between plaintiff and defendants is not sufficient to show a relation of trust and confidence between plaintiff and defendants. McKinney v. Hensley, 74 Mo. 326; Kirschner v. Kirschner, 113 Mo. 290. (5) It appears in this case that plaintiff knew all about the facts upon which she charges the defendants with making fraudulent misrepresentations; therefore she can not ask a rescission. Warren v. Ritchie, 128 Mo. 311. (6) The plaintiff has been guilty of such laches in this case that she is not entitled to any relief. Bispham's Prin. Eq., sec. 360; Bliss v. Pritchard, 67 Mo. 181; Landrum v. Bank, 63 Mo. 56; Moreman v. Talbot, 55 Mo. 397; Smith v. Washington, 11 Mo.App. 525; Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 247; Taylor v. Short, 107 Mo. 384; Kroenung v. Goehri, 112 Mo. 648; Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 291. (7) Defendants paid full value for the land at the time they received deeds for it, but mere inadequacy of price unaccompanied by fraud or unfair dealing is not a distinct ground for setting aside a sale. Phillips v. Stewart, 59 Mo. 491; Stoffel v. Schroeder, 62 Mo. 147; Nelson v. Betts, 21 Mo.App. 219.
Thomas & Hackney for appellant in reply.
(1) The delay of plaintiff in instituting her suit does not debar her of equitable relief, neither does it in anywise impair the force of the testimony introduced to establish her cause. The plaintiff was impoverished, feeble in mind and body, ignorant of her rights in the premises and confided in the defendants, hoping with confidence that the defendants would voluntarily do that which was just and proper, and some part at least of what they had promised, and reluctant to believe that it would be necessary for her to take hostile steps and engage in strife and litigation with the defendants in order to procure from them that which was justly her due. Under such circumstances, nothing short of the statute of limitations would bar the plaintiff of the relief to which she is clearly shown to be justly entitled. Wright v. Wright, 37 Mich. 55; Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 17; Kelly v. Hurt, 61 Mo. 466; Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 232.
This is a suit to set aside four deeds made by plaintiff to defendants, two to each one of them for sixty acres of land, in all one hundred and twenty acres, in Jasper county. The first two are quitclaim deeds made in March, 1885. The last two are warranty deeds made in May, 1886. The petition was filed January 31, 1894. It alleges that the deeds were obtained by fraud and undue influence on the part of defendants. The trial resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's bill and a judgment in favor of defendants against her for costs. Plaintiff appealed.
On March 2, 1885, plaintiff was the owner of one hundred and sixty acres of land in Jasper county, one hundred and twenty of which is involved in this litigation. Defendant Benjamin F. Hatcher is her son, and the defendant Litteral is her son-in-law, having married her eldest daughter. At the time of the commencement of this suit plaintiff had seven living children, -- three sons and four daughters, -- the youngest being about twenty-eight years of age. On May 4, 1877, plaintiff executed to her brother John C. Webb a mortgage on all of her land, one hundred and sixty acres, to secure the payment of a loan of $ 1,158 and on January 4, 1882, she executed to him another mortgage on the same land to secure the payment of an additional loan of $ 1,170.75. Both loans were evidenced by notes executed by her bearing ten per cent interest per annum. The total amount at the time of the execution of the deeds in question was $ 2,328.75 principal, with several years' interest past due.
John C Webb died April 12, 1883, and his son E. T. Webb qualified as executor of his estate. His second annual settlement as such executor became due in May, 1885. E. T. Webb was desirous of settling up his father's estate, and plaintiff became impressed with the idea that she would have to sell the land in order to raise the money to pay off the deed of trust liens, or else all the land would be sold to satisfy them and pass out of the hands of the family. But there was no immediate danger of such a result, as the executor had no intention of foreclosing the deeds of trust until it was necessary to do so in the discharge of his duties as executor. As to whether this impression upon the mind of the plaintiff was created by the defendant B. F. Hatcher, or was caused by the surrounding circumstances, the evidence was conflicting. At any rate she had been for some time trying to sell the land, or a part of it, to satisfy the liens, and had been unable to do so. She offered it during the years of ...
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