Hayden v. Ford Motor Company
Decision Date | 29 December 1967 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 63-40-M. |
Citation | 278 F. Supp. 267 |
Parties | Roy HAYDEN and Muriel Hayden, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Albert P. Zabin, Schneider, Reilly & Swartz, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.
John L. Lyman, Brickley, Sears & Cole, Boston, Mass., for defendant.
This action came on to be heard on defendant's motion for summary judgment, more particularly described below, and was argued by counsel for the parties.
In this diversity action brought by plaintiffs, residents of Massachusetts, against defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford), a Delaware corporation, it is alleged that Ford negligently failed to equip a Ford truck (truck) manufactured by it with a reasonably safe braking system and to use reasonable care in the inspection thereof, and that such failure resulted in plaintiffs' injuries on or about January 26, 1961 when the truck collided with the rear of plaintiffs' motor vehicle in which they were riding on a highway in Massachusetts. Plaintiffs also brought an action in the United States District Court of Rhode Island against Folgo Ford Sales, Inc., a Rhode Island corporation, and R. I. Metallurgy, Inc., also a Rhode Island corporation, seeking damages against each for the injuries caused by the same collision. In that action plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of the truck by R. I. Metallurgy, Inc. (Metallurgy), and, as against Folgo Ford Sales, Inc. (Folgo), alleged that as owner and in control it was negligent in leasing the truck to Metallurgy at a time when the truck was defective in its braking mechanism, and negligent in permitting Metallurgy to use the truck in that condition. The action in this court was transferred to the District Court of Rhode Island for trial, but the motion to consolidate the actions for trial was there denied; and it was then returned to this court. In the course of trial in the District Court of Rhode Island the actions against Folgo and Metallurgy were settled by the payment of $12,500.00 to plaintiffs contemporaneously with the delivery of a release to Folgo and Metallurgy. Thereafter, in this action Ford pleaded the release, and moved for entry of summary judgment on the ground that by the release Ford, as a joint tortfeasor, had been also released and thereby discharged from the liability claimed herein.
The issues are (1) whether the law of Massachusetts should govern the effect of the release given by plaintiffs, and (2) whether the release, properly construed, discharged the liability of defendant Ford to plaintiffs.
1. Since in the instant case jurisdiction of this court is based upon diversity of citizenship of the parties, the applicable rule of conflict of laws is governed by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), which held that federal district courts should apply the conflicts rule of the state where the court sits. In giving effect to that holding I find the Massachusetts rule is stated in Trudel v. Gagne, 328 Mass. 464 (1952) at pages 465-466, 104 N.E.2d 489 at page 490, to be that "all substantive rights of action growing out of an injury * * * have their origin in the law of the place where the wrong was done" and that "determination of the persons * * * entitled to sue upon a cause of action is a matter of substance * * * controlled by the law which creates the right * * *." The effect of a release has been held to be a substantive matter, DeBono v. Bittner, 13 Misc.2d 333, 178 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct.1958), aff'd 10 A.D.2d 556, 196 N.Y. S.2d 595 (1st Dept. 1960), and it follows that the question whether plaintiffs are barred by the release from maintaining this action is to be determined by the law of Massachusetts. Accord, Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg., 277 F.2d 868, 872, 76 A.L.R.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1960), Bittner v. Little, 270 F.2d 286-289 (3rd Cir. 1959), Melo v. National Fuse and Powder Co., 267 F.Supp. 611-612 (D.Colo.1967), Garlock v. New York Tree Savers, Inc., 199 F.Supp. 59, 60-61 (W.D.N.Y.1961), Pilosky v. Dougherty, 179 F.Supp. 148-149 (E.D.Pa.1959), Mayle v. Criss, 169 F. Supp. 58, 60 (W.D.Pa.1958).
2. Until 1963,1 the law of the Commonwealth had been that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases all others. Fleming v. Dane, 298 Mass. 216, 219, 10 N.E.2d 85 (1937); Gold v. Boston Elev. Ry., 244 Mass. 144, 138 N.E. 251 (1923); Muse v. De Vito, 243 Mass. 384, 388, 137 N.E. 730 (1923); Cormier v. Worcester Consolidated Ry., 234 Mass. 193, 196, 125 N.E. 549 (1919); Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 93-94, 97 N.E. 638, 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 475 (1912); Brewer v. Casey, 196 Mass. 384, 389, 82 N.E. 45 (1907); Pickwick v. McCauliff, 193 Mass. 70, 75, 78 N.E. 730 (1906); Aldrich v. Parnell, 147 Mass. 409, 18 N.E. 170 (1888); Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 397, 2 N.E. 107 (1885); Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass. 503 (1884); Stone v. Dickinson, 89 Mass., 7 Allen 26, 28 (1863); Stone v. Dickinson, 87 Mass., 5 Allen 29-30 (1862); Brown v. City of Cambridge, 85 Mass., 3 Allen 474, 476 (1862). That rule apparently was based upon the view that the liability of joint wrongdoers is indivisible and is destroyed by the discharge of any one of them. Selby v. Kuhns, 345 Mass. 600 (1963), at page 605, 188 N.E.2d 861 at page 864, on that point has this to say:
The Massachusetts Court has recognized the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue. Lyons v. Durocher, 341 Mass. 382, 383-384, 169 N.E.2d 911 (1960), Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 311, 21 N.E.2d 542, 124 A.L.R. 1292 (1939), Matheson v. O'Kane, supra.
The giving of a covenant not to sue to one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the liability of the other joint tort-feasors. Lyons v. Durocher, supra; Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 152, 21 N.E.2d 1, 128 A.L.R. 682 (1939); O'Neil v. National Oil Co., 231 Mass. 20, 120 N.E. 107 (1918); Johnson v. Von Scholley, 218 Mass. 454, 457, 106 N.E. 17 (1914); Matheson v. O'Kane, supra.
The case at bar is one not where the release is absolute and unconditional, or where the instrument given by the plaintiffs is a mere agreement not to sue. Here, the instrument, although in form a release, discloses the intention, though doubtless it could have been more artfully expressed, to preserve the liability of Ford. Certain parts of the release pertinent to that issue, after setting forth recitals acknowledging receipt of $12,500.00 paid by Metallurgy and Folgo, are as follows:
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