Purchase v. Seelye

• Decision Date: 30 December 1918
• Citation: 121 N.E. 413,231 Mass. 434
• Parties: PURCHASE v. SEELYE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

231 Mass. 434

121 N.E. 413

PURCHASE

v.SEELYE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Dec. 30, 1918.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Christopher T. Callahan, Judge.

Action by Edward R. Purchase against Ralph H. Seelye. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions sustained.

Harvey & Mulcare, of Springfield, for plaintiff.

Green & Bennett, of Springfield, for defendant.

CROSBY, J.

This is an action to recover for an unauthorized surgical operation performed by the defendant, a surgeon, upon the body of the plaintiff.

On March 21, 1916, the plaintiff suffered a rupture in his right groin while in the employ of the Boston & Albany Railroad, New York Central Railroad Company, lessee; on the same day he consulted the defendant, and the next day was operated on by the latter. The following day the plaintiff discovered that the operation had been performed on his left side, and so stated to the defendant. The plaintiff testified that the defendant said:

‘I took you for another patient of mine that had a hernia on the left side. Well, the only thing we can do is to operate on the right side in about two or three days.’

Afterwards an operation was performed by the defendant upon the plaintiff's right side.

On July 19, 1916, the plaintiff made a settlement of his claim against the railroad company and executed and delivered to it a release of all claims and demands ‘arising or which may arise out of said injury.’ This action having been brought since the settlement, an important question is whether it is barred by the release.

If the plaintiff's employer, in an action brought against it to recover for original injury, would have been liable for the negligence of the defendant in improperly treating the plaintiff, then the release included such damages, and is a bar to the present action for the reason that in such a case the plaintiff had a claim against both the railroad company and the defendant for the same cause of action, a release of one of the alleged wrongdoers would operate as a release of both. Brewer v. Casey, 196 Mass. 384, 82 N. E. 45;Stimpson v. Poole, 141 Mass. 502, 6 N. E. 705;Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N. E. 107;Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the alleged negligence of the defendant had no causal relation to the original injury, but created a new, separate and independent cause of action, the liability for which was not barred by the release.

It is well settled in this commonwealth, and in many other jurisdictions, that in an action for personal injuries arising out of the alleged negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the injuries resulting from the defendant's negligence although such injuries are aggravated by the negligence of an attending physician if, in his selection and employment the plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care. McGarrahan v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 171 Mass. 211, 219, 50 N. E. 610;Gray v. Boston Elev. Ry., 215 Mass. 143, 102 N. E. 71, and cases cited.

The question is whether the act of the defendant in operating by mistake upon the plaintiff's left side was a natural and probable result of the negligence of the railroad company. We are of opinion that the general rule as above stated is not applicable to the case at bar. There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant made a mistake in the identity of the plaintiff at the time the operation was performed and that he then believed he was operating upon another patient who had a hernia on his left side. The reason why a wrongdoer is held liable for the negligence of a physician whose unskilful treatment aggravates an injury, is that such unskilful treatment is a result which reasonably ought to have been anticipated by him.

The railroad company could not be held liable because of the defendant's mistaken belief that he was operating upon some person other than the plaintiff; such a mistake was not an act of negligence which could be found to flow legitimately as a natural and probable consequence of the original injury, and a ruling in effect to the contrary could not properly have been made. The fact that the mistake made by the defendant might possibly occur is not enough to charge the railroad company with liability; the unskilful or improper treatment must have been legally and constructively anticipated by the original wrongdoer as a rational and probable...