Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson

Decision Date09 November 2006
Docket NumberNo. SC05-675.,SC05-675.
Citation952 So.2d 498
PartiesWilliam F. HAYES, Jr., et al., Petitioners, v. GUARDIANSHIP OF Mae E. THOMPSON, etc., Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Eduardo I. Rasco and Jessica B. Lassman of Rosenthal, Rosenthal, Rasco, LLC, Aventura, FL, for Petitioners.

Stephen B. Fuller, Coral Gables, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 934 So.2d 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Bachinger v. Sunbank/South Florida, N.A., 675 So.2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified conflict involves the issue of standing to participate in guardianship proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a person, including an heir of a ward, has standing to participate in a guardianship proceeding if the applicable provisions of either the Florida Guardianship Law or the Florida Probate Rules entitle the person to notice of the proceeding or authorize the person to file an objection in the proceeding. Applying this holding to guardianship proceedings concerning attorney's fees under section 744.108, Florida Statutes (2006), we conclude that, in addition to the attorney making the fee request, only the guardian, the ward, and those "interested persons" who have requested notice under Florida Probate Rule 5.060 have standing to participate in the proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case concerns the guardianship of Mae E. Thompson, now deceased. Thompson lived with her nephew, William F. Hayes, III, who, along with Thompson's sister, Vivian Hayes, and brother-in-law, William F. Hayes, Jr., are the petitioners in this case. In February 2003, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition under the Adult Protective Services Act, sections 415.101-415.113, Florida Statutes (2002), to have Thompson, who was then eighty-one years of age, removed from her nephew's home because of poor living conditions. The circuit court granted the petition and ordered that Thompson receive protective services.1 The circuit court also adjudicated Thompson incapacitated,2 and appointed a guardian and court monitor.3

In a subsequent comprehensive order, the circuit court agreed with DCF's initial assessment finding that Thompson was a victim of multiple abuses at the hands of her nephew and sister, who had been responsible for assisting Thompson with her medical and financial needs. The circuit court also specifically found that the living conditions at the nephew's home were deplorable and that Thompson was placed at risk of harm and danger by living there. The circuit court determined that Thompson had been "exploited by her sister, Vivian, and nephew Billy," that she could "be easily influenced," and that she had "poor insight and judgment regarding her finances." The court also concluded that Vivian was responsible for "gross misappropriations" from Thompson's financial account.

The guardianship proceedings involved significant financial issues, including the extent of the petitioners' mismanagement of Thompson's money and whether some of the funds frozen by the circuit court belonged to any of the petitioners individually. There were also several hearings involving the petitioners' violation of court orders.

During the guardianship, Thompson's counsel filed several petitions for attorney's fees pursuant to section 744.108. The petition for attorney's fees at issue in this case was sent to Thompson's guardian and the court-appointed monitor. Neither the guardian nor the monitor objected to the fee request. However, at the hearing on the petition, counsel for the petitioners objected to the petition for several reasons: that an accounting needed to be conducted before further fees could be disbursed;4 that expert testimony on the amount of fees was required; and that a portion of the fees claimed was for work for which counsel had already received compensation. In response, Thompson's attorney asserted that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the petition. The trial court agreed, but allowed the petitioners to explain their objections as a "friend of the court."

After hearing the petitioners' objections and finding that Thompson was solvent, the circuit court determined that this case involved exceptional circumstances and awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $3,071 for legal services rendered from January 8, 2004, through March 22, 2004. The circuit court determined that the attorney's fees were both reasonable and necessary.5

The petitioners appealed the circuit court's order awarding Thompson's counsel $3,071 in attorney's fees. The Third District affirmed, concluding that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the award. The Third District cited its decision in McGinnis v. Kanevsky, 564 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and certified conflict with the Fourth District's decision in Bachinger. The Third District did not decide whether the fee award was proper.

ANALYSIS

Chapter 744, Florida Statutes, the Florida Guardianship Law, governs guardianship proceedings in this state. Section 744.108, which concerns guardian's and attorney's fees and expenses, states that "[a] guardian, or an attorney who has rendered services to the ward or to the guardian on the ward's behalf, is entitled to a reasonable fee for services rendered and reimbursement for costs incurred on behalf of the ward." § 744.108(1), Fla. Stat. The statute further provides that a "petition for fees or expenses may not be approved without prior notice to the guardian and to the ward, unless the ward is a minor or is totally incapacitated." § 744.108(6), Fla. Stat.

The issue in this case requires us to determine whether standing to participate in guardianship proceedings under this statute is limited to the guardian and the ward—and their counsel in attorney's fees proceedings—or whether it also extends to other parties. We first review case law addressing standing in the context of different types of guardianship proceedings. We then set out the analysis that courts should undertake in making a determination on standing and explain why the summary approach adopted by the Third District in McGinnis is incomplete.

I. Case Law Addressing Standing in Guardianship Proceedings

In McGinnis, the issue was whether relatives of a deceased ward had standing as heirs of the ward's estate to challenge awards of guardian's fees that had previously been approved by the court under section 744.108 on the ground that the fees were excessive. See 564 So.2d at 1142. The Third District held that "guardianship fees, properly authorized by the probate court, may not be set aside after the ward's death merely because his heirs consider that the awards were too high." Id.

McGinnis construed a version of section 744.108 that provided:

A guardian of the person or of the property shall receive a reasonable fee for his services to be fixed by the court after such notice as the court shall require.

Id. at 1143 n. 7 (quoting § 744.108, Fla. Stat. (1981)). Based on this language, the Third District explained why the heirs of the ward's estate were not entitled to notice:

The lack of any requirement for further notice reflects the idea that, in the case of a guardianship, the ward and his estate are the only interested parties. Insofar as these interests may be contrary to those of the guardian seeking fees, they are represented and safeguarded by the probate court itself.

Id. The Third District noted that even under the "new and far broader guardianship law" enacted in 1989, heirs of a ward's estate are not within the class of persons "cognizably interested in the guardianship estate" because the statute provides notice to only the ward, guardian, and attorney. Id.

The Third District also rejected the argument that the heirs were entitled to revisit the issue of guardianship fees under section 744.424(2), Florida Statutes (1987), which provided for objections to attorney's fees and guardianship expenses sought in annual and final returns unless previously allowed. McGinnis, 564 So.2d at 1143 & n. 8. The Court reached the same conclusion about Florida Rule of Probate and Guardianship Procedure 5.700(a) (1977), id. at 1143-44, which provided for objections to annual financial returns by "a person interested as creditor, or otherwise." Id. at 1144 (quoting rule 5.700(a) (1977)).6 Because the heirs of the ward's estate were not entitled to notice under section 744.108 and were not authorized to file objections under section 744.424 or rule 5.700(a), the Third District ruled in McGinnis that the heirs lacked standing to challenge the previously awarded guardian's fees. 564 So.2d at 1144-45.

Finally, the Third District observed that in guardianship proceedings, "the court is concerned only with the welfare of the ward himself in the administration of what are, after all, only his funds." Id. at 1144. Heirs of a ward's estate "are only contingent or potential beneficiaries who cannot complain that any expenditures on behalf of the ward have diminished what they may eventually receive and thus are not interested parties in the administration of the guardianship." Id. The Third District expressed concern that allowing heirs standing to challenge an award of guardian's fees was akin to allowing heirs or devisees standing to challenge "the supposedly excessive spending habits of a competent person during his lifetime" or to seek a "pre- or post-mortem determination of the appropriate expenditures of the assets from the guardianship," which is "not the law." Id. at 1144 n. 9.

Bachinger, the conflict case, also involved whether heirs of a deceased ward had standing to participate in a guardianship proceeding. However, unlike the proceedings in McGinnis and Hayes, which involved guardian's and attorney's...

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