Hayes v. Superior Court

• Citation: 490 P.2d 1137,98 Cal.Rptr. 449,6 Cal.3d 216
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 06 December 1971
• Parties: , 490 P.2d 1137 Frank R. HAYES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 29861. In Bank

Page 449

98 Cal.Rptr. 449

6 Cal.3d 216, 490 P.2d 1137

Frank R. HAYES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent;

The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. 29861.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 6, 1971.

Roger Jon Diamond, Pacific Palisades, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack K. Weber, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Petitioner is confined in the Nevada State Prison under a sentence imposed by a Nevada district court. He is subject to a California detainer based on his violation of a probation order of respondent Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondent to dismiss the California criminal action on the ground that respondent made no attempt to comply with petitioner's requests that he be returned to this state for a speedy hearing as to reinstatement of probation or pronouncement of sentence.

We decline the relief requested by petitioner. We conclude, however, that if petitioner wishes respondent to dispose finally of the pending action he may invoke the procedure set out in Penal Code section 1203.2a. That statute provides that a defendant who has been granted probation without imposition of sentence and who is then 'committed to a prison in this State' for another offense can obtain final disposition of the case in which he received probation by requesting imposition of sentence 'in his absence and without his being represented by counsel.' We hold that the Legislature's purported limitation of the procedure to those committed to prison 'in this State' denies the equal protection of the laws required by the federal and California Constitutions. We reject petitioner's contention that the statutory procedure is unconstitutional because if he invokes it he will have to forego his right to appear in person and with counsel at the time of imposition of sentence.

In September 1968, in respondent court, petitioner was convicted of possessing a money order with intent to defraud, an offense punishable either by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 14 years or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year. (Pen.Code, § 475a.) In October 1968 respondent suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation for the period of two years. The conditions of probation included requirements that petitioner violate no law and that he not leave the State of California without the probation officer's written permission. Petitioner did not appeal from the order granting probation.

Petitioner violated probation by going to Nevada without permission and by committing robbery in that state. In February 1969 he was convicted of the robbery and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in the Nevada State Prison. He did not appeal from the Nevada judgment.

In March 1969 the San Bernardino probation officer reported petitioner's violations of probation and imprisonment in Nevada to respondent court. Respondent revoked probation Ex parte and issued its bench warrant for petitioner's apprehension as a probation violator. In April 1969 the San Bernardino Sheriff lodged a copy of the warrant with the Nevada prison as a detainer, with a letter stating, 'After subject has fulfilled his obligation to your department and should he become available to us, advise if he will waive extradition. If he should decline, we will request that our district attorney seek to extradite subject.' Because of the California detainer petitioner is confined in a maximum security facility, his opportunities to participate in educational and rehabilitative programs are limited, and his prospects for parole are adversely affected.

By a series of letters and written Pro se motions addressed to respondent court commencing in May 1969 petitioner asked that probation be reinstated and the bench warrant recalled, or that he be produced promptly before respondent for hearing and final disposition of the California case, or that the case be dismissed for want of speedy prosecution. Respondent denied these requests. Petitioner than filed a Pro se petition for a writ of mandate. We issued the alternative writ and appointed counsel to represent him in this proceeding.

Petitioner has a substantial interest in obtaining prompt and final disposition of the criminal action which is pending in respondent court. Correctional authorities have pointed out and courts and legislatures have found that in the usual course of prison and parole administration a detainer against a prisoner results in adverse effects on the conditions of his custody and the prospects for his parole. (Smith v. Hooey (1969) 393 U.S. 374, 378--379, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607; United States v. Candelaria (S.D.Cal.1955) 131 F.Supp. 797, 805--806; United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney (W.D.Pa.1961) 194 F.Supp. 154, 155; Pen.Code, § 1389 et seq., the statutory Agreement on Detainers which has been enacted in 28 states; 22 Assembly Interim Com. Report No. 3, Criminal Procedure (1961--1963) p. 157, Appendix to Journal of Assem. (1963 Reg. Sess.) vol. 2, hereafter cited as Assem.Com.Rep.) These adverse effects appear in petitioner's case.

A detainer based on an untried charge or on a conviction as to which no sentence has been imposed is particularly discouraging to rehabilitative efforts by prison administrators and the prisoner himself because of uncertainty as to whether the detainer will be exercised or dropped when the prisoner is released from his current confinement. 'The adjustment to prison is difficult at best; when the prisoner does not know whether he will have to serve another sentence at the completion of the present one, the problem is greatly increased.' (Assem.Com.Rep., supra, p. 158.) Many officers who file detainers deliberately delay decision as to whether the hold will be exercised for as long as possible (Barker v. Municipal Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, 810, 51 Cal.Rptr. 921, 415 P.2d 809; People v. Brown (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 745, 749, 67 Cal.Rptr. 288; Assem.Com.Rep., supra, p. 160) yet many detainers are not exercised and many are filed without intent to exercise them. (Assem.Com.Rep., supra, p. 161; 9B U.L.A. (1966) p. 364, Commissioners' Note on the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act.) ¹

Petitioner is further prejudiced by delay in final disposition of the pending California case because he loses the possibility of receiving a sentence which will run concurrently with his Nevada sentence. (Smith v. Hooey (1969) supra, 393 U.S. 374, 378, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607; In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 621, 94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206).

Penal Code section 1203.2a ² establishes a procedure by which one committed to prison in California can obtain relief from the harmful uncertainty of other outstanding California convictions as to which he has been granted probation with imposition or execution of sentence suspended. That procedure benefits both the prisoner and the state. 'Fairness to one committed to a state prison and proper administration by the prison officials and the Adult Authority require that such outstanding convictions be reduced to judgment or be otherwise finally disposed of by termination of the trial court's jurisdiction.' (In re Perez (1966) 65 Cal.2d 224, 228, 53 Cal.Rptr. 414, 416, 418 P.2d 6, 8.) When the prisoner requests imposition of sentence under section 1203.2a he receives the benefit of the possibility of concurrent sentences. (In re White (1969) 1 Cal.3d 207, 211, 81 Cal.Rptr. 780, 460 P.2d 980.) The trial court and its clerk and probation officer are afforded the convenience of closing their files in a case which otherwise might remain undisposed of for years. Moreover, the procedure seeks to give prisoners the benefit of prompt sentencing or other final disposition while avoiding the government's expenditure of time and funds to produce imprisoned defendants for unnecessary court appearances. (People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946, 49 Cal.Rptr. 283; Senate Fact Finding Com. on Judiciary Report, Post-Conviction Procedures (Jan. 1963) p. 51, Appendix to Journal of Sen. (1963 Reg.Sess.) vol. 1, hereafter cited as Sen.Com.Rep.)

The foregoing considerations apply equally to the cases of defendants committed in California and the cases of defendants committed in other jurisdictions. Section 1203.2a, however, is limited to defendants 'committed to a prison In this State.' (Italics added.)

The California Constitution (art. I, §§ 11, 21; art. IV, § 16), like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that classifications of those to whom the state accords benefits and those on whom it imposes burdens must be reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 303, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201; In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 232, 90 Cal.Rptr. 15, 474 P.2d 983.) An out-of-state prisoner in petitioner's circumstances has the same interest as a California prisoner would have in the final disposition of an outstanding California conviction, and the burdens of the California detainer filed against this petitioner do not differ significantly from those of a detainer filed against one confined in California. Considerations of this state's expense and administrative and judicial convenience in reducing an outstanding conviction to judgment are the same whether the prisoner who asks to be sentenced in his absence is confined in California or in another state.

Also we consider the rights granted by the Legislature to prisoners of other states and federal prisoners who are subject to the burden of outstanding untried California charges and detainers based on such charges. (See People v. Smith (1971) 5 Cal.2d 313, 316, 96 Cal.Rptr. 13, 486 P.2d 1213.) In this regard it has evidenced substantially equal concern for those committed...