Hendrix v. Taylor
Decision Date | 07 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 25615.,25615. |
Citation | 579 S.E.2d 320,353 S.C. 542 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | William F. HENDRIX, III, Appellant, v. Gene TAYLOR, Sheriff of Anderson County, Respondent. |
Charles W. Whiten, Jr., of Anderson, for appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Tracey Colton Green, all of Columbia, for respondent.
William Hendrix ("Appellant") appeals from the trial judge's refusal to grant injunctive relief to prevent Appellant from being listed in the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry.
William Hendrix pled guilty to sexual assault in the third degree; assault in the third degree; and trespass in the first degree in Gunniston County, Colorado on August 25, 2000. The sexual assault charge stemmed from an incident in which Appellant grabbed the breasts and buttocks of a woman several times in a bar without her consent. The Colorado court sentenced Appellant to 62 days in jail, four years probation, and a fine of nearly $19,000. Appellant was also required by Colorado statute to register as a sex offender,1 but could petition to be removed from the registry five years after the date of his guilty plea.2
On November 15, 2000, Appellant and his spouse moved to Anderson, South Carolina, which triggered the requirements of the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act ("Act"). S.C.Code Ann. §§ 23-3-400 through -520. The Act mandates that Appellant register as a sex offender in South Carolina for life. S.C.Code Ann. § 23-3-460; See South Carolina Sex Offenders Registry at http://www.sled.state.sc.us. The online registry provides information like sex, age, height and weight to help identify the offender. It also includes the offender's last reported address and the sex offense that he committed. Originally, Appellant was registered as having committed Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature ("ABHAN"), but sometime between March 22, 2002, and October 8, 2002, the offense was changed to Assault with Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Third Degree.3
On November 22, 2000, Appellant filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act does not apply to his Colorado conviction for third degree sexual assault, and that his mandatory listing on the Sex Offender Registry of South Carolina violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process. Appellant also moved to permanently enjoin the Sheriff of Anderson County from requiring that he register under the Act. The trial court denied Appellant's request for injunctive relief, rejected his constitutional claims, and required him to register under the Act.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the trial court err when it concluded that requiring Appellant to register under the Sex Offender Registry Act did not violate his right to Equal Protection or Due Process when the equivalent offense, if committed in South Carolina, would not have required registry?
Appellant argues that the state has violated his right to equal protection by forcing him to register on the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry for an offense he committed in Colorado when the equivalent offense, if committed in South Carolina, would not have triggered the requirement that he register.4 We disagree.
The movement to enact sex offender registration statutes arose after Megan Kanka, a seven-year old child, was raped and murdered in New Jersey by a convicted sex offender who had moved in across the street from her family.5 The killer enticed the girl to come over to his house in order to see his new puppy.6 The New Jersey legislature responded to this highly publicized event by declaring a legislative emergency to immediately debate and enact a sexual crimes bill.7 On October 31, 1994, Governor Whitman signed the bill, which became known as Megan's Law.8 N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:7-1 et seq. The law requires sexual criminals to register with local law enforcement.
The United States Congress also reacted to the national outrage over sexual crimes by passing the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Predator Act ("Jacob Wetterling Act"), which President Clinton signed on September 13, 1994. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 1994). The Jacob Wetterling Act gives states incentives to enact laws that protect the public from sexual criminals by conditioning federal funding under the Public Health and Welfare Code to state enactment of a sex crimes law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(g)(1) and (g)(2). The Jacob Wetterling Act also creates a national sexual offender database, in which the states are required to participate. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(b)(2)(B).
By the time that the New Jersey legislature and Congress passed these laws, the South Carolina General Assembly had enacted its own Act, which became effective on July 1, 1994. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 23-3-400 et seq. The following types of sex criminals are placed on the registry:
S.C.Code Ann. § 23-3-430(A) and (D).
Appellant pled guilty to the Colorado crime of sexual assault in the third degree, which is not listed as a sex offense in S.C.Code Ann. § 23-3-430. Instead, Appellant was registered in South Carolina as committing Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature ("ABHAN"). The Act provides that the sentencing judge may order registration for this offense.10 Appellant argues that registering him as committing ABHAN—a crime he technically did not commit—is "misleading" and deprives him of his right to equal protection.
The equal protection clause of United States Constitution provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also S.C. Const. art. I, § 3. If a statutory provision "does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, ... the question under equal protection analysis is whether the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose." Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 574, 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001).11
Appellant argues that the state has deprived him of his fundamental right to privacy,12 and therefore that the court should apply the strict scrutiny analysis. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L.Ed.2d 465, 471 (1988)
(. ) Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy in limited circumstances, the privacy protections do not extend to information about a sexual offense Appellant committed in another state, which became a matter of public record when Appellant registered as a sex offender in Colorado. Accordingly, the Court need not apply a strict scrutiny analysis to this matter.
Since the classification did not affect a fundamental right, this Court applies the "rational relationship" test in determining that the statute did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection. The scope of review should be limited "in cases involving a constitutional challenge to a statute because all statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to render them valid." Curtis, 345 S.C. at 569,549 S.E.2d at 597. Under this analysis, Appellant's classification as a sex offender in South Carolina is justified if
(1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis.
Id. at 574, 549 S.E.2d at 599-600. The Act complies with the first prong of the test, as the legislative purpose is clearly defined:
S.C.Code Ann. § 23-3-400. Thus classifying Appellant as a sex offender is reasonably related to the legitimate state purpose of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement in limiting the risk that sex offenders pose to communities. See Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 482-483. Appellant's classification as a sex offender in South Carolina also comports with the second prong of the test because all persons who must register under the Act are subject to uniform administrative and legal procedures regardless of which sexual offense they commit. See S.C.Code Ann § 23-3-450 through -490.
Appellant argues that his classification as a sex offender in South Carolina fails the third prong of the Curtis test because the state has no reasonable basis for asserting that he committed an ABHAN in South Carolina when the actual crime he pled guilty to was sexual assault in the third degree in Colorado. In our...
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