Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Water Irrigation Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 27 May 2021
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13-20-00355-CV
• Citation: 627 S.W.3d 529
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: HIDALGO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 3, Appellant, v. HIDALGO COUNTY WATER IRRIGATION DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellee.

627 S.W.3d 529

HIDALGO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 3, Appellant,

v.HIDALGO COUNTY WATER IRRIGATION DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellee.

NUMBER 13-20-00355-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

Delivered and filed May 27, 2021

J. Joseph Vale Jr., McAllen, Meredith Helle, Daniel G. Gurwitz, McAllen, for Appellee.

Frank E. Weathered, Corpus Christi, Randolph R. K. Whittington, Warren Anderson, Austin, for Appellant.

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Opinion by Justice Benavides

In this case, we must decide whether a governmental entity is immune from suit to condemn its property. Appellant Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 (Improvement District) filed a condemnation proceeding against appellee Hidalgo County Water Irrigation District No. 1 (Irrigation District) seeking a permanent subterranean easement for the purpose of installing a water pipeline. The trial court dismissed the proceeding for want of jurisdiction based on the Irrigation District's assertion of governmental immunity from suit. On appeal, the Improvement District contends that immunity does not apply to this in rem proceeding in the first instance, but even if it does, a legislative waiver exists. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The Improvement District and Irrigation District are both political subdivisions of the State performing governmental functions. See Bennett v. Brown Cnty. Water Imp. Dist. No. 1 , 153 Tex. 599, 272 S.W.2d 498, 499–01 (1954). "As such, they enjoy governmental immunity from suit, unless immunity is expressly waived." Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake Water Auth. , 320 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. 2010). They also both enjoy eminent domain authority. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 49.222.

In 2018, in conjunction with the City of McAllen's extension of a public roadway known as Bicentennial Boulevard, the Improvement District decided to extend its raw water pipeline along the roadway's public right-of-way. To that end, the Improvement District obtained an easement from the City and a crossing agreement from another irrigation district.

However, the planned extension would also cross the right-of-way of the Irrigation District's canal. Unable to secure the Irrigation District's permission to cross under its property, the Improvement District filed its Original Petition for Condemnation, seeking a subsurface easement for the "public purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining a new public water pipeline." The trial court appointed three special commissioners who, after conducting a hearing, awarded the Irrigation District $1,900 in damages for the taking of its property.

The Irrigation District objected to the award under the paramount purpose doctrine, alleging that the taking would materially interfere with its existing public use of the property: "providing water and irrigation services to numerous residents of Hidalgo County." The Irrigation District alleged that constructing the new water line would necessarily damage their existing water lines and compromise the canal, thereby preventing the Irrigation District from providing service to its customers. Moreover, because the two entities provide the same or similar public services, the Irrigation District argued that the Improvement District "cannot satisfy its burden under the paramount purpose standard."

The Irrigation District then filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity from suit. The trial court granted the plea, and this appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's authority to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993) ). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez , 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). A plaintiff must plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Fleming v. Patterson , 310 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. struck) (citing Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d at 446 ).

A plea to the jurisdiction is a procedural vehicle used to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction. Blue , 34 S.W.3d at 554. When a plea challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, we construe the pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff's intent. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Id.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Eminent Domain

"A government is vested with certain inherent powers commensurate with its status as a sovereign, including the right of ‘eminent domain’ in which private property is taken—in exchange for compensation—and converted for public use." Alewine v. City of Houston , 309 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet denied) ; Byrd Irrigation Co. v. Smythe , 146 S.W. 1064, 1065 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1912, no writ) ("The power of eminent domain is an attribute of government, and is inherent in it."). Deemed an "extraordinary power," Incorporated Town of Hempstead v. Gulf States Utils. Co. , 146 Tex. 250, 206 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1947), the only constitutional constraints on the right of eminent domain are that the condemned property be for public use and the landowner receive just compensation. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett , 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ). Public use means "the public obtains some definite right or use in the undertaking to which the property is devoted." City of Austin v. Whittington , 384 S.W.3d 766, 779 (Tex. 2012) (citing Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate , 158 Tex. 171, 309 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1958) ). In this case, it is undisputed that the Improvement District's installation of a raw water pipeline would constitute a public use.

B. Immunity

Governmental immunity from suit protects the political subdivisions of the State from lawsuits for money damages and deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas , 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006) (citations omitted). Like eminent domain, immunity from suit is "one of the essential attributes of sovereignty." Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Walling , Dallam 524, 525 (Tex. 1843).

Immunity's primary justification—at least in modern times—is "to shield the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments." Tooke v. City of Mexia , 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Without this protection, public funds would be used to defend lawsuits and pay judgments instead of providing public services, leading to "governmental paralysis." Hughes v. Tom Green County , 573 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex. 2019). Thus, immunity "protects the public as a whole by preventing potential disruptions of key government services that could occur when government funds are unexpectedly and substantially diverted by litigation." Brown & Gay Eng'g, Inc. v. Olivares , 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. 2015). Relatedly, immunity "preserves separation-of-powers principles by preventing the judiciary from interfering with the Legislature's prerogative to allocate tax dollars." Id. ; see also Hillman , 579 S.W.3d at 367 (Guzman, J., concurring) ("Sanctioning the recovery of monetary damages—without any legislatively considered limitations like those in the Texas Tort Claims Act—would have significant public-fisc implications that raise separation-of-powers concerns.").

The judiciary generally defers to the Legislature to waive immunity because the Legislature is better suited to address the conflicting policy concerns associated with allowing suits to proceed against the government. Reata , 197 S.W.3d at 375 (citing Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT–Davy , 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002) ). As a creature of the common law, however, the judiciary determines the existence of immunity in the first instance, defining its boundaries where immunity's purposes are not implicated. Id. at 374. If immunity applies to a claim, "then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity." Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , 489 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. 2016) (citations omitted). In deciding whether immunity applies, a court considers "both the nature and purposes of immunity." Id. at 432.

Following Reata , the "foundational case" discussing judicial abrogation of immunity, State ex rel. Best v. Harper , 562 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2018), the Supreme Court of Texas has continued to "prune[ ] and shape[ ] the doctrine of immunity." Wasson Ints. , 489 S.W.3d at 432, 434 (finding immunity does not apply to contract claims against cities arising out of their performance of proprietary functions); see also, e.g., Brown & Gay Eng'g , 461 S.W.3d at 121 (declining to extend immunity to private contractors authorized to perform governmental functions); Harper , 562 S.W.3d at 19 (deciding immunity does not apply to a counterclaim for attorney's fees under the Texas Citizens Participation Act); Hillman v. Nueces County , 579 S.W.3d 354, 361–63 (Tex. 2019) (declining invitation to abrogate immunity from Sabine Pilot claims for wrongful termination); City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth. , 602 S.W.3d 444, 457–58 (Tex. 2020) (finding immunity does not apply to suits under the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act).

However, our high court has "never decided whether a governmental entity is immune from suit to condemn its property." In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1 , 493 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016) ; see also Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit , 369 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2012) ("We assume, without deciding, that governmental entities are immune from condemnation suits."). Only one of our sister courts has addressed...