Hill Construction Company v. State of Connecticut

• Decision Date: 30 October 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. No. B-655.
• Citation: 366 F. Supp. 737
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: The HILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al. v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT et al.

366 F. Supp. 737

The HILL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al. v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT et al.

Civ. No. B-655.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

October 30, 1973.

William M. Ivler, Stamford, Conn., for plaintiffs.

Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., F. Michael Ahern, and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Hartford, Conn., James F. Bingham, and Julian K. Melmed, Stamford, Conn., for defendants.

Before SMITH, Circuit Judge, and BLUMENFELD and CLARIE, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BLUMENFELD, District Judge:

In this action plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Conn.Gen.Stats. § 19-347r, and § 18-25 of Article IV, Ordinance 246 Supplemental of the City of Stamford, which pertain to the regulation of rental housing. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, 28 U. S.C. §§ 2201 et seq., and jurisdiction is claimed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3). Plaintiffs are owners of certain apartment houses located in the City of Stamford. Defendants are the State and City which seek to enforce the challenged statute and ordinance and the Director of Health of the City of Stamford, who is charged with implementing the challenged provision of the Stamford ordinance.

Connecticut General Statutes § 19-347r is an enabling statute¹ pursuant to which the City of Stamford enacted Ordinance 246 Supplemental, which became effective on January 1, 1973. The provision of the Ordinance which is here challenged, § 18-25 of Article IV, establishes a procedure whereby landlords must obtain a Certificate of Apartment Occupancy (hereinafter "CAO") from the Director of Health before renting any apartment in an apartment house containing four or more dwelling units.² If the landlord fails to obtain a CAO prior to rental, the tenant may assert such failure as a defense to an action for rent. The requirements of § 18-25 do not apply to apartment houses less than fifteen years old or to those owned by a Housing Authority organized under the provisions of Conn.Gen.Stats. Chapter 128.

Plaintiffs attack the Ordinance (and through it, the Statute) on two grounds.³ First, they claim that its application only to those buildings containing four or more dwelling units, more than fifteen years old, and not owned by a Housing Authority, is arbitrary and capricious, thereby denying plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. Second, they claim that the ordinance fails to provide a constitutionally adequate procedure whereby CAO's are to be granted or denied. They specifically point to the facts that no particular procedure is established in the ordinance for the actual issuance of the CAO's and that no time limit is set by which the Director of Health must issue or deny the CAO. In consequence, plaintiffs contend, they may be deprived of property without due process of law. They assert that a landlord who obtains the CAO even one day after the tenant moves in, whether through his own negligence or due to tardiness on the part of the Director of Health, will be unable to recover rent for the balance of the tenancy.

I. ABSTENTION

The claim most heavily stressed by the plaintiffs goes to the specific construction which it fears may be given the Statute and Ordinance. Yet neither the statute nor the ordinance has received judicial construction, nor is there reason to believe that an attempt at a state court construction would be futile. The case may thus be within the doctrine of abstention noted in Lake Carriers' Asso. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-511, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 1757, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972):

"The paradigm case for abstention arises when the challenged state statute is susceptible of `a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the federal constitutional question. . . .

`Where resolution of the federal constitutional question is dependent upon, or may be materially altered by, the determination of an uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication. . . .'"

While this court might thus abstain on plaintiffs' due process challenge to the ordinance, a construction of the ordinance by the state courts would not resolve the Equal Protection question. We shall thus proceed to the merits of plaintiff's case.

II. EQUAL PROTECTION

Plaintiffs claim that the exemption by the ordinance of apartment buildings containing less than four dwelling units, buildings less than fifteen years old, and buildings owned by Housing Authorities, is arbitrary and capricious and thus in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

The relevant constitutional inquiry begins with the determination whether the ordinance "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 33 (1973).⁴

It is beyond dispute that the purpose of the ordinance and its enabling statute is the enforcement of minimum standards of maintenance and repair for rental housing, and that such purpose is "legitimate"⁵ and "articulated."⁶

It is equally evident that the ordinance rationally furthers such purpose. Since older buildings utilized as income-producing investments by private owners are more likely to be in need of repairs and alterations for the protection of health and safety of their tenants than are like properties of more recent construction, the ordinance is rational and not arbitrary and capricious. The application of the ordinance to privately-owned apartment buildings more than fifteen years old and containing four or more dwelling units is certainly a reasonable means of utilizing limited enforcement resources in an efficient manner and concentrating enforcement activities where they are likely to be most needed. The Equal Protection Clause requires no more. "It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 69 S.Ct. 463, 466, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949). As the Supreme Court noted recently in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285, 296 (1972):

". . . in `the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.' A legislature may address a problem `one step at a time,' or even `select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.' Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 573 (1955)."

The fact that certain apartment buildings are treated differently than others is not in itself cause for complaint. As Mr. Justice Stewart noted, concurring in Rodriguez, supra:

"There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people differently from others. But the basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes. And with respect to such legislation, it has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are invidiously discriminatory —only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary or capricious. See, e. g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 footnote omitted."

Nor can plaintiffs complain because the ordinance applies to buildings of a particular size and age. As Judge Frankel wisely stated in Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 865 (S.D.N.Y.1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 (1969):

"Like the life of the law generally, the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed as an exercise in logic. It is ancient learning by now that a classification meets the equal protection test `if it is practical, and is not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary.' Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 562, 19 S.Ct. 281, 282, 43 L. Ed. 552 (1869). If the classification has `some reasonable basis,' it cannot be held offensive to the Equal Protection Clause `because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). `The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations . . . ." Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730 (1913)."

Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim that they have been denied equal protection is rejected. We turn next to their claim that the ordinance enacted by the City does not afford due process.

III. DUE PROCESS

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides procedural safeguards for the protection of certain interests. Thus due process requires notice and a hearing before persons are deprived of certain property interests, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), and in particular circumstances where interests "`more precious . . . than property rights'" are in issue, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Constantinou v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).

The Due Process Clause, however, does not require specific procedures every time private interests are alleged to be in jeopardy. "`Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1514, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). Due process ...