Hill v. Knox, CIVIL NO. SA-14-CA-1132-XR (PMA)
Decision Date | 16 March 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL NO. SA-14-CA-1132-XR (PMA) |
Parties | ROCKY HILL, TDCJ No. 1596897, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant FNU KNOX, Warden FNU PARALTA, Sergeant FNU TANNER, Lieutenant FNU TOMME, Officer FNU SIFFORD, and Grievance Investigator FNU SALAS, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Plaintiff Rocky Hill, currently an inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal Jusitice's John B. Connally Unit in Kenedy, Texas, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 naming as defendants the Warden of the Connally Unit and a number of other officers and employees at that facility, complaining of alleged violations of his rights, and requesting injunctive relief, including the immediate return of his property and his immediate transfer to another TDCJ facility. For the reasons set forth hereinafter, Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed.
Plaintiff's Section 1983 complaint was accompanied by neither the appropriate filing fee nor an In Forma Pauperis (IFP) application. Likewise, Plaintiff did not submit a certified copy of his TDCJ inmate trust account setting forth the average monthly balance and average monthly deposits in Plaintiff's inmate trust account for the past six months, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). The Magistrate Judge's Show Cause Order issued January 8, 2015 (ECF no. 2) directed Plaintiff toeither pay the filing fee or submit a complete IFP application, together with a certified copy of his TDCJ inmate trust account statement for the past six months as required by Section 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff has done neither. The Magistrate Judge's Show Cause Order also identified numerous substantive deficiencies in Plaintiff's original complaint and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging specific facts. Despite the Magistrate Judge twice granting Plaintiff extensions of time on the deadline for responding to the Court's Show Cause Order, to date Plaintiff has failed to do so.
When Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ["PLRA"], it specifically amended 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and added new Section 1915A to provide that a complaint filed by a prisoner could be dismissed as frivolous regardless of whether any filing fee or portion thereof had been paid. Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims herein are subject to review under Section 1915(e) and may be dismissed as frivolous regardless of whether he paid any portion of the filing fee in this cause. See Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) ( ); 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c).
In an action filed in forma pauperis, a court may raise sua sponte the issue of whether an action is malicious or frivolous under Section 1915(e). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) ( ); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). Dismissal of a claim as frivolous under Section 1915(e) is permissiblewhere the claim lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 325; Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013).
A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Rogers, 709 F.3d at 407; Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009).
A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Rogers, 709 F.3d at 407; Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009) ( ); Samford, 562 F.3d at 678.
In an action proceeding under Section 1915(e), a federal court may also consider sua sponte affirmative defenses that are apparent from the record even where they have not been addressed or raised in the pleadings on file. Harris, 198 F.3d at 156 ( ); Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434 ( ). Significantly, the court is authorized to test the proceeding for frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of an answer. Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767 (); Harris, 198 F.3d at 156; Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1993); Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990); Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989).
A case is not frivolous simply because it fails to state a claim. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 331, 109; Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993); Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 259; Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). However, if the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact, the complaint can be dismissed under Section 1915(e). Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 259; Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 191 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992); Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 1990). "A complaint is legally frivolous if it is premised on an 'undisputably meritless legal theory.'" Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). An IFP complaint that recites bare legal conclusions, with no suggestion of supporting facts, or that postulates facts of an entirely fanciful nature, is a prime candidate for dismissal under Section 1915(e). Ancar, 964 F.2d at 468 ( ); Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 259; Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, when it is clear from the face of the complaint that the claims asserted are subject to an obvious meritorious defense, such as a peremptory time bar, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1993).
The pleading standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ( ) does not require detailed factual allegations but it does demand more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund ex rel. Bunte v. Health Special Risk, Inc.,756 F.3d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 2014). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1935, 188 L. Ed. 2d 960 (2014). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Health Special Risk, Inc., 756 F.3d at 360. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not do. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it renders "naked assertions" devoid of further factual enhancement. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 420 n.17 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1789, 188 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2014).
There are two essential elements to a Section 1983 action: (1) the conduct in question must be committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Whitley, 726 F.3d at 638; Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2013).
Insofar as Plaintiff complains that the defendants failed to comply with a variety of state statutes and code provisions, those complaints cannot support a Section 1983 claim. Absent some showing that the defendants violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights, complaints about theviolation of state statutes or state agency regulations are insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim for relief under Section 1983. See Jones v. Lowndes County, Miss., 678 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2012) (); Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998) (...
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