Hilley v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1999
• Citation: 800 So.2d 150
• Parties: Jerry W. HILLEY, test case claimant, and all similarly situated claimants v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

800 So.2d 150

Jerry W. HILLEY, test case claimant, and all similarly situated claimants

v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

2971177.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 30, 1999.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 1999.

John L. Quinn and K. Kathy Brown of Nakamura & Quinn, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellant Jerry W. Hilley.

Charles A. Powell III, William D. Jones III, Spencer A. Kinderman, and William C. Barker of Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellee.

MONROE, Judge.

Jerry Hilley and certain other employees of two General Motors plants in Alabama, those being the Delphi-Harrison radiator plant in Tuscaloosa and the Delphi-Saginaw steering plant in Athens, were laid off because of decreased productivity at the Delphi chassis plant in Dayton, Ohio ("Delphi-Dayton"). The Dayton plant's productivity decreased because of a strike by members of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers ("UAW") Local 696 in Dayton. Hilley and other claimants applied to the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations ("DIR") for unemployment-compensation benefits, and their claims were denied. A large number of claimants appealed from DIR's decision. Rather than conducting more than a thousand hearings, DIR, the claimants, and GM agreed to conduct a single hearing or "test case."¹ Counsel for GM and counsel for the claimants selected Hilley to act as the test-case claimant representing all similarly situated claimants. The parties also agreed to bypass the appeals referee stage and proceed to the DIR State Board of Appeals ("Board"). After holding a hearing, the Board issued an opinion on December 17, 1996, determining that Hilley and the other claimants were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. On January 23, 1997, GM appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The Jefferson Circuit Court transferred the case to the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County. On June 15, 1998, the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court entered an order reversing the Board's award of benefits. Hilley appealed.

Hilley argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear GM's appeal from the decision of the Board. The relevant statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

"Within 30 days after the decision of the Board of Appeals has become final, any party to the proceeding including the director who claims to be aggrieved by the decision may secure a judicial review thereof by filing a notice of appeal in the circuit court of the county of the residence of the claimant.... In such action, the notice of appeal need not be verified, but shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought."

§ 25-4-95, Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). Hilley states that GM's notice failed to comply with two of this section's requirements.

First, Hilley contends that the notice of appeal filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court should have been dismissed because it did not state the grounds upon which relief was sought. GM's notice of appeal stated that the Board's decision was "incorrect in law and fact." This court has previously held that it is sufficient for the notice of appeal to state merely that the Board's decision was incorrect under the facts or the law. Donaldson v. State Dep't of Indus. Relations, 439 So.2d 1301 (Ala. Civ.App.1983). Thus, the ground stated by GM was sufficient.

Hilley also argues that GM's notice of appeal was not filed in the county of his residence. Although it is undisputed that Hilley is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, GM stated in its notice of appeal to Jefferson Circuit Court that Hilley was a resident of Jefferson County. Hilley moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because Hilley was not a resident of Jefferson County. GM objected to the dismissal and requested that the court deny Hilley's motion or transfer the case to Tuscaloosa County. The Jefferson Circuit Court opted for the latter and transferred the case to Tuscaloosa County. Hilley then moved the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal on the same grounds, arguing that the Jefferson Circuit Court should have dismissed the case rather than transfer it. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court held a hearing and ultimately entered an order denying Hilley's motion on the ground that the appeal was properly filed in the county of residence of any of the participating claimants.

In Director of the State of Alabama Department of Industrial Relations v. Nolin, 374 So.2d 903 (Ala.Civ.App.1979), this court held that the trial court in Blount County did not have jurisdiction to hear the claimant's appeal from the Board's decision because the claimant was a resident of St. Clair County at the time the appeal was filed. Reasoning that the unemployment compensation laws are solely a creature of statute, this court held that the relevant portion of § 25-4-95 was one of jurisdiction rather than venue and that the failure to comply with it necessitated the dismissal of the appeal. Nolin has been followed by this court in several cases, such as in Cruce v. Demarco Concrete & Block Co., 380 So.2d 900 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980), Security Engineers, Inc. v. Anderson, 421 So.2d 1298 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982), and most recently in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Thompson, 719 So.2d 847 (Ala.Civ. App.1998). In all of these cases, this court held that, pursuant to § 25-4-95, the trial court must dismiss an appeal that is not filed in the county of the claimant's residence.

GM states that Hilley's residence is close to the Tuscaloosa-Jefferson County line and that Hilley uses a postal Zip Code that covers a portion of Jefferson County. However, GM does not dispute that Hilley is a resident of Tuscaloosa County. We note that during oral argument before this court, counsel for GM stated that GM played a large role in selecting Hilley to be the test-case claimant. In Tyson Foods, supra, this court held that the Marshall Circuit Court had properly dismissed the employer's appeal, because the claimant's physical residence was in Blount County even though her address indicated that she lived in Marshall County. Following the Nolin line of cases, we must hold that the Jefferson court erred in not dismissing the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tyson Foods, supra.

Because the Jefferson Circuit Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, its judgment in this case is void. Therefore, the trial court's judgment of June 15, 1998, is vacated.

Although we vacate the judgment of the trial court, we take this opportunity to discuss the meaning of the term "establishment" in § 25-4-78, Ala.Code 1975. That statute provides that people who meet certain criteria are disqualified from receiving unemployment-compensation benefits. Hilley contends that the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court misapplied § 25-4-78. Section 25-4-78 provides in pertinent part:

"An individual shall be disqualified for total or partial unemployment:

"(1) Labor Dispute in Place of Employment. —For any week in which his total or partial unemployment is directly due to a labor dispute still in active progress in the establishment in which he is or was last employed. For purposes of this section only, the term `labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. This definition shall not relate to a dispute between an individual worker and his employer."

"For a claimant to be disqualified under § 25-4-78(1), `five separate and distinct conditions must coincide, namely (1) his unemployment must be directly due, (2) to a labor dispute, (3) in active progress, (4) in the establishment, (5) in which he was last employed.'" Flowers v. Director, Dep't of Indus. Relations, 435 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.Civ.App.1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, Ex parte Flowers, 435 So.2d 76 (Ala.1983),

quoting Davis v. Pickett, 412 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Civ.App.1981). The unemployment-compensation statute was created to provide a remedial measure for the benefit of the unemployed worker. Polk v. State Dep't of Industrial Relations, 413 So.2d 1164 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). Thus, the statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Id. The employer has the burden of proving any disqualification under section § 25-4-78(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Ex parte Flowers, 435 So.2d 76 (Ala.1983).

The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court determined that Hilley's unemployment was directly due to a labor dispute in the establishment in which he was employed. Thus, the court ruled that he was disqualified from receiving unemployment-compensation benefits. The parties disagree as to the proper interpretation of the term "establishment."

The record shows the following pertinent facts concerning GM's operations. GM is made up of five business sectors, one of which is Delphi Automotive Systems ("Delphi"). Delphi manufactures automotive components for GM assembly plants in North America. The two Alabama GM plants involved in this case are Delphi plants. The Delphi-Harrison plant in Tuscaloosa produces thermal systems and the Delphi-Saginaw plant in Athens produces steering systems. The Delphi-Dayton plant, at which the strike occurred, produces braking systems. Delphi plants utilize a "just in time" inventory system, meaning that components are manufactured in accordance with the production schedules of the assembly plants. Under this system, each Delphi plant produces a component and immediately ships it in a special container and special tray to an assembly plant, so that the component arrives at the assembly plant "just in time" for installation in an unfinished car. The empty containers and trays are then returned to the Delphi plants for reuse.

The...