Hoang v. People

• Decision Date: 21 April 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC219
• Citation: 323 P.3d 780
• Parties: Ricky Cuong HOANG, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

323 P.3d 780

Ricky Cuong HOANG, Petitioner

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC219

Supreme Court of Colorado.

April 21, 2014

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 06CA1518

Attorney for Petitioner: Office of Alternate Defense Counsel, Kimberly K. Caster, Littleton, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Four armed men broke into a home, assaulted three people inside, and stole jewelry and cash at gunpoint. Prosecutors alleged that Ricky Hoang was the leader and tried him for his involvement in the home invasion robbery. Hoang was restrained with leg shackles during his jury trial, over his repeated objections. After the jury convicted him on more than twenty counts, Hoang appealed. Due to prolonged delay in producing the record, over three-and-a-half years passed from filing Hoang's appeal to certifying the record with the court of appeals.

¶ 2 The court of appeals affirmed the manner in which the trial court permitted Hoang to be restrained during trial, because there was no evidence that any juror saw or heard the shackles and, consequently, no indication that their use undermined Hoang's presumption of innocence. The court of appeals further held that Hoang's rights to a meaningful and a speedy appeal were not violated because he could not demonstrate prejudice resulting from the delay or from errors or omissions in the record.¹

¶ 3 We accepted certiorari to review two alleged errors. First, Hoang argues that the trial court erred by requiring him to be tried in leg shackles without a finding of specific necessity. Second, he claims that delays and deficiencies in producing the record violated his rights to a meaningful and a speedy appeal.²

¶ 4 We affirm the court of appeals' ruling that shackling Hoang at trial did not violate his due process right. Specifically, we hold that when the record does not show that restraints were plainly visible, the defendant must point to something in the record justifying an appellate court's reasonable inference that at least one juror saw or heard them. If a defendant fails to meet that burden, then the constitutional harmless error standard announced in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), does not apply.

¶ 5 We also affirm the court of appeals' ruling on Hoang's rights to a meaningful and a speedy appeal. We hold that Hoang was not deprived of these rights because he was not prejudiced by deficiencies in the record or by the delay. In so holding, we address whether errors and omissions in the record prevented meaningful appellate review, and, for the first time when evaluating appellate delay, we apply the factors enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (describing four-factor test to assess trial delay).

¶ 6 We address each issue in turn.

I. Shackling

¶ 7 The prosecution first raised the issue of shackling Hoang at trial during a pretrial motions hearing, concerned that visible restraints could raise “a lot of appellate issues.” Although Hoang had been shackled in previous hearings after a conflict arose between two of his co-defendants, he argued that he had not been involved in that clash and therefore should not be forced to appear in restraints at trial. The trial court postponed its decision to give the sheriff's deputies time to speak with a superior officer regarding the appropriate level of security.

¶ 8 The issue remained unresolved on the first day of trial. Hoang appeared in leg shackles ³ that were potentially noticeable to a casual observer. Before the prospective jurors entered the courtroom for voir dire, Hoang objected to restraints as a due process violation. The judge replied, “Well, I've spoken with the deputies. They feel that it's necessary, and I'm going to defer to them.”

¶ 9 Following this exchange, deputies shackled Hoang for the remainder of the eleven-day trial, over his objections that the shackles violated the presumption of innocence and his right to due process. The court of appeals affirmed the decision to restrain him, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because there was no evidence that any juror saw or heard the shackles.

¶ 10 Hoang claims that his shackles were visible and audible to the jury, and he contends that the trial court erred by failing to make findings of fact and an individualized determination that it was necessary for him to be shackled at trial.

¶ 11 We begin with the standard of review before turning to a criminal defendant's due process right to be free from physical restraints visible to a jury. We then discuss Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), which applies constitutional harmless error review to a trial court's unjustified decision ordering a defendant to be shackled in a manner that is visible to jurors. We also consider other cases finding Deck inapplicable when no juror observed the defendant's restraints. We conclude that when the record does not show that restraints were plainly visible, the defendant must point to something in the record justifying an appellate court's reasonable inference that at least one juror saw or heard them. When a defendant fails to meet this burden, Deck's heightened review is not implicated.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review a trial court's decision to restrain a defendant for abuse of discretion. Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 491, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (1946). Abuse occurs when a trial court's decision is “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,” or if a ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law. People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 15, 312 P.3d 144, 148 (internal quotations omitted).

B. Due Process and Visible Restraints

¶ 13 “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 629, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (observing that this prohibition has deep roots in the common law and now forms part of the federal due process guarantee). Shackling a defendant in the presence of a jury “undermines the presumption of innocence,” “interfere[s] with a defendant's ability to participate in his own defense,” and affronts the “dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 630–31, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (internal citations omitted). “The presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence....” Eaddy, 115 Colo. at 492, 174 P.2d at 718. “[T]he sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant,” and use of these techniques “arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).

¶ 14 The constitutional right to be free from visible restraints at trial is not absolute, however. Restraints may be justified to avoid a defendant's escape, to prevent trial disruptions, and to ensure the security of those in the courtroom. Lucero v. Lundquist, 196 Colo. 95, 97, 580 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1978); accord Deck, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007. To preserve the rights of the accused, the United States Constitution prohibits the use of visible shackles absent a case-specific finding of special need. Deck, 544 U.S. at 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007.

C. Burden of Proof as to Apparentness

¶ 15 To determine whether shackling Hoang at trial violated his due process right, we must first determine which party bears the burden of proof as to whether any juror saw or heard Hoang's restraints.

¶ 16 In the past, we have reviewed alleged shackling errors for harmlessness, requiring a defendant to show prejudice before a conviction will be reversed. SeeScott v. People, 166 Colo. 432, 440, 444 P.2d 388, 392 (1968) (when a defendant appears before the jury in handcuffs, “it [is] reversible error only if it [is] shown to be unnecessary and prejudicial to the defendant”).

¶ 17 This area of law has evolved since Scott, however, at least where visible restraints are concerned. In Deck, the Supreme Court held that “where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendantto wear shackles that will be seen by the jury,” the heightened constitutional harmless error standard applies. 544 U.S. at 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007. The defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice; instead, “[t]he State must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); accord United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1293 (10th Cir.2009) (visible stun belt “triggers ‘close judicial scrutiny’ ” (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976))). If restraints are apparent to jurors, the prosecution bears the burden to prove that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. This is now settled law.

¶ 18 But which party bears the burden of proof to show whether a juror actually saw or heard the shackles when it's not obvious from the record that the shackles were observed? When presented with this question, most courts have not applied Deck's constitutional harmless error standard unless there was evidence that at least one juror saw or heard the restraints, or that they were plainly visible. After all, in Deck, the defendant wore leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain during his sentencing by a jury; the record was clear that the restraints were plainly visible. And the Supreme Court made clear that its opinion concerned “visible shackles”—restraints that are “visible to the jury” and “will be seen by the...