Hodge v. Montgomery Cnty. Prosecutor's Office
| Decision Date | 01 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2019-01111PQ |
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 4520 |
| Parties | AIESHA M. HODGE Requester v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE Respondent |
| Court | Ohio Court of Claims |
{¶1} On or about October 19, 2019, requester Aiesha Hodge made a public records request to respondent Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office seeking the following material from the criminal case of State of Ohio v. Demetrius Williams, Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2017CR02793:
(Complaint at 2.) On October 24, 2019, the Prosecutor's Office advised Hodge that it was conducting a review of responsive records, and would respond to the request in a reasonable amount of time. (Id. at 4.)
{¶2} On November 21, 2019, Hodge filed a complaint under R.C. 2743.75 alleging denial of access to public records in violation of R.C. 149.43(B). The case was referred to mediation, during which the Prosecutor's Office sent a December 4, 2019 letter to Hodge denying the request. (Response, Exh. A.) Following termination of mediation, the Prosecutor's Office filed a motion to dismiss (Response) on January 31, 2020. On March 12, 2019, the Prosecutor's Office filed an additional brief and supplemental information (Supplemental Response).
{¶3} In order to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts warranting relief after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in claimant's favor. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Schroeder, 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581, 669 N.E.2d 835 (1996). As long as there is a set of facts consistent with the complaint that would allow the claimant to recover, dismissal for failure to state a claim is not proper. State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 138 Ohio St.3d 84, 2013-Ohio-5477, 3 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 10.
{¶4} The Prosecutor's Office asserts that Hodge has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the requested records are exempt as trial preparation records. On review, I find that the facts required to support the current application of this exception are not shown on the face of the complaint and attachments. I therefore recommend that the motion to dismiss be denied, and the claim determined on the merits.
{¶5} The Public Records Act (PRA) is construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records. State ex rel. Cordell v. Paden, 156 Ohio St.3d 394, 2019-Ohio-1216, 128 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 7. In mandamus, "[a]lthough the PRA is accorded liberal construction in favor of access to public records, 'the relator must still establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief by clear and convincing evidence.'" State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 428, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 15. Under the special statutory proceeding in R.C. 2743.75, a requester must likewise establish public records violations by clear and convincing evidence. Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820, 97 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.).
{¶6} If a public office asserts an exception to the Public Records Act, the burden of proving the exception rests on the public office. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Coroner's Office, 153 Ohio St.3d 63, 2017-Ohio-8988, 101 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 15. Exceptions to disclosure under the Act must be strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian bears the burden to establish applicability of an exception. State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 155 Ohio St.3d 545, 2018-Ohio-5111, 122 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 7. A custodian does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely within the exception. Id.; State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure. State ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ., 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 169, 637 N.E.2d 911 (1994).
{¶7} The Prosecutor's Office asserts that all the requested records may be withheld as "trial preparation records." R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) and (A)(4). However, the exception was waived for any records the Prosecutor's Office released to the public by disclosing them at trial or otherwise placing them on the court record in State v. Williams.
(Response at 8.) Although it provides few specifics beyond the bare assertion that documents specified by Hodge were compiled in anticipation of a named criminal case, the court may take notice that all of Hodge's requests describe the type of records typically compiled by a Prosecutor's Office in preparation for trial. I find that the Prosecutor's Office has met its burden, if minimally, to show that the requested records were subject to the statutory trial preparation records exception at the time they were created or compiled.
{¶9} Absent waiver, a prosecutor's trial preparation records do not lose their exempt status unless and until all trials, actions and/or proceedings have been fully completed. Steckman at paragraph four of the syllabus; State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 40-41 (obiter dictum, citing Steckman). The Supreme Court recently held that the similar and overlapping exception in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) for confidential law enforcement investigatory work product does not last beyond the trial for which the information was gathered, State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 47. Although the Caster majority compared the two exceptions and their evolution in case law, it did not expressly or by implication disturb the duration of the trial preparation records exception; that is, until the completion of all court proceedings. Id. at ¶ 30-31. The Prosecutor's Office provides evidence that the defendant in this case has filed an appeal of his conviction, and that the appeal has not been concluded. (Response, Exh. B.) The requested documents are thus shown to meet the definition of trial preparation records. The remaining question is whether the exception has been waived for any of the records.
"Waiver" is defined as a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. See Chubb v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 275, 278, 690 N.E.2d 1267, 1269, citing State ex rel. Athens Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton Joint Solid Waste Mgt. Dist. Bd. of Directors (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 611, 616, 665 N.E.2d 202, 207. Persons may either expressly or impliedly waive statutory provisions intended for their own benefit.
(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Wallace v. State Med. Bd., 89 Ohio St.3d 431, 435, 732 N.E.2d 960 (2000). Public disclosure of previously exempt records generally waives application of the exemption to a public records request:
"Absent evidence that respondents have already disclosed the investigatory records to the public and thereby waived application of certain exemptions, the exemptions are fully applicable." State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 316, 2001 Ohio 193, 750 N.E.2d 156, quoting State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 361, 1997 Ohio 273, 673 N.E.2d 1365.
(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St.3d 70, 81, 2005-Ohio-3807, 831 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 60. Accord State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Petro, 80 Ohio St.3d 261, 265, 685 N.E.2d 1223 (1...
To continue reading
Request your trial