Holdorf v. Holdorf
Decision Date | 14 December 1918 |
Parties | ANNIE HOLDORF, Appellant, v. CHARLES HOLDORF, Appellee |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED MARCH 20, 1919.
Appeal from Pottawattamie District Court.--J. B. ROCKAFELLOW, Judge.
ACTION for damages. Directed verdict for defendant. The material facts are stated in the opinion.
Reversed.
Cullison & Wyland, and F. A. Turner, for appellant.
Preston & Dillinger, for appellee.
Plaintiff brings this action to recover damages caused by an alleged assault upon her by the defendant, resulting in a miscarriage, accompanied by severe and painful lacerations. The defendant denied the assault, and contends in argument that whatever injuries, if any, plaintiff is shown to have suffered, were due solely to fright, for which no recovery can be had. According to the testimony of plaintiff, defendant came to the farm where she was living with her husband, in the latter part of August, 1914, where the following transpired:
She further testified that, upon arrival at the house, she experienced severe pain in her abdomen, which continued at intervals, with increasing violence, until on or about the 5th day of September, when a physician was called, and she gave premature birth to a child. The court, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
I. Plaintiff and her husband resided as tenants upon a farm owned by defendant, who was engaged in erecting a barn thereon, at the time of the transaction complained of. The first contention of counsel for appellee is that, under the evidence of plaintiff, defendant, at most, committed a simple assault upon her, for which, in the absence of some physical injury, nominal damages alone could be recovered. An assault has been variously defined by this court; but acts threatening violence to the person of another, coupled with the means, ability, and intent to commit the violence threatened, constitute an assault. The evidence does not disclose that defendant made verbal threats of violence, or that he touched her person; but he was apparently very angry, and approached plaintiff in a manner, and with demonstrations, well calculated to inspire in her the fear and belief that he intended to make a violent assault upon her person. The force relied upon as constituting the alleged assault was not quiescent, but was accompanied by all of the manifestations of an intended battery. His acts and conduct were a clear violation of the plaintiff's rights, and the results following the assault were such as might reasonably have been expected, under the circumstances, to follow therefrom. We have no hesitation in holding that, if plaintiff suffered some physical injury, an actionable assault was committed upon her.
II. It is, however, contended by counsel for appellee that no physical injury was inflicted upon plaintiff, and that, if she suffered damages, it was due to fright alone, for which no recovery can be had. The authorities are not in harmony upon this point, and it has often been held that no recovery will be permitted for damages resulting solely from fright caused by the negligence of another, in the absence of some physical injury. Lee v. City of Burlington, 113 Iowa 356, 85 N.W. 618; Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N.W. 134; Zabron v. Cunard Steamship Co., 151 Iowa 345, 131 N.W. 18; Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.App. 374 (56 N.E. 917); Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401 (51 N.E. 657); Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102 (92 N.E. 1010); Kennell v. Gershonovitz, 84 N.J.L. 577 (87 A. 130); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438 (73 S.E. 211); Cook v. Village of Mohawk, 207 N.Y. 311 (100 N.E. 815). But, as holding to the contrary, see Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala.App. 473 (58 So. 927); St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Murdock, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 249 (116 S.W. 139).
The rule, however, denying liability for injuries resulting from fright caused by negligence, where no physical injury is shown, cannot be invoked where it is shown that the fright was due to a willful act. Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068; Johnson v. Hahn, 168 Iowa 147, 150 N.W. 6; Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023; Pullman Co. v. Cox, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 327 (120 S.W. 1058); Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146 (123 N.W. 625); Green v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69 (73 A. 688); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239 (47 L. R. A. 325, 54 S.W. 944); May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416 (72 S.E. 1059); Lesch v. Great Northern R. Co., 97 Minn. 503 (106 N.W. 955); 1 Sutherland on Damages (4th Ed.) Section 24; Bouillon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo.App. 462 (129 S.W. 401).
In Watson v. Dilts, supra, this court held that plaintiff could recover for damages to her nervous system resulting solely from fright, upon the theory that the injuries suffered were physical in character. In that case the defendant wrongfully and stealthily entered the home of plaintiff, went to the second story for the apparent purpose of committing a felony, entered the room of plaintiff's husband, with...
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