Holston v. Sports Authority, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.1:98CV3678JEC.,CIV.A.1:98CV3678JEC.
• Citation: 136 F.Supp.2d 1319
• Parties: Schawanda HOLSTON, Plaintiff, v. THE SPORTS AUTHORITY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Page 1319

136 F.Supp.2d 1319

Schawanda HOLSTON, Plaintiff, v. THE SPORTS AUTHORITY, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A.1:98CV3678JEC.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

September 29, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Laura Clair Horlock, Pankey Coffman & Horlock, Larry Allen Pankey, Pankey Coffman & Horlock, Decatur, GA, for Plaintiff.

David L. Gordon, Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman, Christopher Todd Van Dyke, Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

CARNES, District Judge.

The above-captioned employment discrimination action is before the Court on defendant's Objections [22] to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [21], which recommended granting in part and denying in part defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [12]. The Magistrate Judge recommended that defendant's motion be granted as to plaintiff's state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent retention, but recommended that it be denied as to plaintiff's claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set forth below, concludes that defendant's Objections [22] should be SUSTAINED.

The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's recommendation as to plaintiff's state law claims. The Court REJECTS the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, however, as to plaintiff's claims of race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981 and retaliation under Title VII. Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted as to these claims as well. Thus, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [21] is ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN PART and defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment [12] is hereby GRANTED in its entirety.

FACTS

Neither party has objected to the Magistrate Judge's findings of fact, and the Court finds them to be accurate. Therefore, the Court adopts the findings of fact as set out in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. In sum, plaintiff, an African-American woman, alleges that she was discharged from her employment with defendant The Sports Authority, Inc. ("TSA") on July 1, 1998, because of her race and because she had previously filed an internal complaint of race discrimination. Defendant contends that it terminated plaintiff's employment because she abruptly left the workplace in the middle of her shift without permission and without adequately informing her supervisor. Plaintiff argues that she has presented evidence that defendant has treated similarly situated non-minority employees more favorably than it treated her, and that defendant's proffered reason for firing her is a mere pretext for unlawful race discrimination and retaliation.

Although the Court has adopted the findings of fact set out in the Report and Recommendation, a brief summary of the relevant facts is as follows: plaintiff, a black female, was employed by TSA as an outbound shipping associate ("OSA") from October, 1997, through July 1, 1998. Plaintiff's duties as an OSA involved packing products such as sporting goods and apparel into boxes for shipping to TSA's retail stores, and during her shift, she was stationed along a conveyor belt transporting the plastic bins filled with products that were to be packed into the appropriate boxes. Her immediate supervisor was Gayle Wolfson, a white woman, who reported to Rodney Littlejohn, a black man, who at all relevant times was the shipping manager for TSA at the Regional Distribution Center where plaintiff worked. In mid-May, 1998, plaintiff submitted a written complaint to defendant regarding Wolfson's failure to promote plaintiff to a "lead" position; plaintiff alleges that she wrote in that complaint that Wolfson favored white employees over black employees¹. Plaintiff's complaint was forwarded to Littlejohn, and he met with plaintiff to discuss her allegations. He told her that he would look into the matter. Littlejohn contends that, although plaintiff did complain about not being promoted to a lead position, she did not contend that she felt Wolfson was discriminating against her because of her race.

On June 30, 1998, plaintiff began her shift as usual at 7:30 a.m., but by mid-morning, she began to suffer from intense vaginal itching related to a recurrent yeast infection. Plaintiff wanted to leave work to see her doctor, and contends that she searched for Wolfson, but could not find her. Accordingly, she left a note for Wolfson on her desk that stated: "Gayle, I'm too hot! Had to leave. Schawanda." Plaintiff did not include more specific details about her medical condition because Wolfson's desk was in an open area and plaintiff wanted to keep her condition private. Plaintiff alleges that on her way out of the building, she saw Tracee Hines, a black woman who was another supervisor, explained to Hines that she needed to see her doctor, and told Hines that she could not find Wolfson, but had left her a note telling her that she had to leave early. According to plaintiff, Hines responded that she would tell Wolfson that plaintiff had to leave early. Plaintiff then clocked out at around 11:00 a.m. (Tracee Hines, who was not deposed by plaintiff, has submitted an affidavit that indicates that plaintiff neither revealed any reason why she was leaving early nor requested Hines's permission to leave. (Hines Aff., Def's Motion For Summary Judgment [12], Ex. 4), ¶¶ 4-5)).²

When Wolfson found plaintiff's note, she brought it immediately to Littlejohn's office, and found Littlejohn talking on the telephone. Wolfson wrote on the back of plaintiff's note: "She clocked out at 11:00 a.m." and left the note with Littlejohn. She and Littlejohn did not discuss the matter further at that time, but Littlejohn subsequently interviewed all the lead persons and supervisors in plaintiff's work area to determine whether plaintiff had notified any of them that she was leaving work early. It is undisputed that every lead person and supervisor, including Hines,³ to whom Littlejohn spoke told him that plaintiff had not notified them that she was leaving work early.

Based on his investigation into the matter, Littlejohn concluded that plaintiff had abandoned her job without authorization and he notified the operations manager. Together, they called the company's Human Resources department to discuss the situation. Littlejohn then decided to terminate plaintiff's employment. The following day, July 1, 1998, plaintiff reported to work at her regular time, and Wolfson escorted her to Littlejohn's office, where Littlejohn informed her that her employment was being terminated for job abandonment. Plaintiff contends that she informed Littlejohn at that time that she had received permission from Hines to leave early, but Littlejohn denies that plaintiff so informed him.⁴

Plaintiff claims that her discharge was the result of discrimination against her because of her race and retaliation against her because of her internal complaint about Wolfson's failure to promote her to a lead position.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A fact's materiality is determined by the controlling substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Summary judgment is not properly viewed as a device that the trial court may in its discretion, implement in lieu of a trial on the merits. Instead, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, as a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).

The movant bears the initial responsibility of asserting the basis for his motion. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, the movant is not required to negate every element of his opponent's claim. The movant may discharge his burden by merely "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After the movant has carried his burden, the non-moving party is then required to "go beyond the pleadings" and present competent evidence designating "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. While the court is to view all evidence and factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988), "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

II. Plaintiff's Race Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff has asserted a claim under both Title VII and Section 1981 for race discrimination. She...