Hopper v. Okla. Cnty.

Decision Date01 September 1914
Docket NumberCase Number: 5687
Citation43 Okla. 288,143 P. 4,1914 OK 404
PartiesHOPPER et al. v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. TAXATION--Equalization--Appeal. Chapter 87, Sess. Laws 1910, and chapter 152, Sess. Laws 1910-11, creating a board of equalization with power to equalize assessments and to adjust individual assessments, such board is a quasi judicial body, and an appeal will lie from the decision of such board to the district court.

2. SAME--Validity of Statute. Chapter 152, Sess. Laws 1910-11, is not unconstitutional under article 4, sec. 1, of the Constitution and article 7, sec. 1, of the Constitution.

3. SAME--Statutes--Adequacy of Remedy. Chapter 87, Sess. Laws 1910, and chapter 152, Sess. Laws 1910-11, construed together, provide an adequate and certain remedy by appeal.

Wright & Blinn, for plaintiffs in error.

D. K. Pope, County Atty., and H. Y. Thompson, Asst. Co. Atty., for defendant in error.

LOOFBOURROW, J.

¶1 Plaintiffs in error complained to the county equalization board of Oklahoma county that the valuation placed upon certain lots in Oklahoma county was more than the fair cash value of said lots on January 1, 1912; from the action of the county equalization board plaintiffs in error appealed to the district court; the district court heard the evidence, found that the valuation of the property was excessive, and entered judgment reducing the assessment on the property set forth in the appeal on July 16, 1913; on August 25, 1913, defendant in error filed a motion to set aside said judgment for the following reasons:

"First. That under the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma the Legislature cannot authorize an appeal from the county assessor or the county board of equalization. Second. That if under the Constitution such an appeal can be allowed, then the present law is void for uncertainty."

¶2 The motion was sustained, and the judgment in favor of plaintiffs in error set aside. From this order plaintiffs in error appeal, and it is agreed by the parties to this appeal that there are but two questions involved in this case, which were those involved in the motion as above indicated. It is contended that, since article 4, sec. 1, of the Constitution of Oklahoma provides:

"The powers of the government of the state of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The legislative, executive, and judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others" --and that since taxation comes within the powers of the legislative department, no part of that function of government may be exercised by the judicial department. In support of this proposition, counsel cite, among other cases, Silven v. Board of County Commissioners, 76 Kan. 687, 92P. 604, 13 L.R.A. (N. S.) 716, 14 Ann. Cas. 163, wherein the Supreme Court of Kansas held that an act of the Legislature providing for appeals from the action of the assessor to the board of equalization and from the board of equalization to the district court was unconstitutional for the reason that the assessment of property for purposes of taxation is not a judicial function. However, the strict rule applied in the Kansas case is not followed by a great many courts, and the contrary doctrine has been repeatedly recognized by this court. See London et al. v. Day, 38 Okla. 428, 133 P. 181, a case involving the identical proposition, in which opinion the following Oklahoma cases are cited: Williams v. Garfield Exchange Bank, 38 Okla. 539, 134 P. 863; Rumph, Treas., v. Joines, 38 Okla. 30, 131 P. 1095; In re McNeal, 35 Okla. 17, 128 P. 285; In re Western Union Telegraph Co., 29 Okla. 483, 118 P. 376; Board Com'rs of Kingfisher Co. v. Guarantee State Bank et al., 27 Okla. 736, 117 P. 216; Asher State Bank v. Board of Com'rs of Pottawatomie Co., 31 Okla. 145, 120 P. 634--in which the validity of such statute is recognized. And the court said:
"In addition, however, plaintiff assails the constitutionality of the act of the Legislature under which the foregoing opinions have been rendered. Chapter 87, Laws 1910. We have examined the contentions made in this regard, but deem them to be without merit."

¶3 Section 1, article 7, Const. Okla. provides:

"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, a Supreme Court, district courts, county courts, courts of justices of the peace, municipal courts, and such other courts, commissions or boards, inferior to the Supreme Court, as may be established by law."

¶4 While by section 1, of article 3, of the Kansas Constitution the judicial power of the state is vested solely in the courts, no authority being given the Legislature to clothe commissions or boards with judicial power. For authorities holding that a court may review or correct assessments, see Ward v. Beale, 91 Ky. 60, 14 S.W. 967; Spencer v. Ensign, 55 Minn. 278, 56 N.W. 1006; Merrick v. District Court, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N.W. 625; State v. North Plainfield Township, 43 N.J.L. 349; Wheeling B. & T. R. Co. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S.E. 551; C. & S. Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S.E. 1002; State v. South Penn. Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S.E. 688; Edes v. Boardman, 58 N.H. 580. And in the following cases the constitutionality of an act authorizing appeals to courts where the owner feels aggrieved at the valuation placed upon his property by the assessor has not been questioned, viz.: Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Newton, 97 Iowa 502, 66 N.W. 784; Royal Mfg. Co. v. Rahway, 75 N.J.L. 416, 67 A. 940; Iron Companies v. Pace, 89 Tenn. 707, 15 S.W. 1077; Louisiana Brewing Co. v. Board of Appraisers, 41 La. Ann. 565, 6 So. 823. In the case of Stanley v. Board of Supervisors, 121 U.S. 535, 7 S. Ct. 1234, 30 L. Ed. 1000, Mr. Justice Field, in the opinion, states:

"In nearly all the states, probably in all of them, provision is made by law for the correction of errors and irregularities of assessors in the assessment of property for the purposes of taxation. This is generally through boards of revision or equalization, as they are often termed, with sometimes a right of appeal from their decision to the courts of law. They are established to carry into effect the general rule of equality and uniformity of taxation required by constitutional or statutory provisions. Absolute equality and uniformity are seldom, if ever, attainable. The diversity of human judgments, and the uncertainty attending all human evidence, preclude the possibility of this attainment. Intelligent men differ as to the value of even the most common objects before them--of animals, houses, and lands in constant use. The most that can be expected from wise legislation is an approximation to this desirable end; and the requirement of equality and uniformity found in the Constitutions of some states is complied with, when designed and manifest departures from the rule are avoided. To these boards of revision, by whatever name they may be called, the citizen must apply for relief against excessive and irregular taxation, where the assessing officers had jurisdiction to assess the property. Their action is judicial in its character. They pass judgment on the value of the property upon personal examination and evidence respecting it. Their action being judicial, their judgments in cases within their jurisdiction are not open to collateral attack. If not corrected by some of the modes pointed out by statute, they are conclusive, whatever
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