Horejsi by Anton v. Anderson, 10608

• Decision Date: 27 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. 10608,10608
• Citation: 353 N.W.2d 316
• Parties: John Wesely HOREJSI, an infant, by his Guardian ad Litem, William ANTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brenda ANDERSON, James Anderson and Bernadette Anderson, Defendants, and Wallace F. Horejsi and Karen Horejsi, Defendants and Appellees. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 316

353 N.W.2d 316

John Wesely HOREJSI, an infant, by his Guardian ad Litem, William ANTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brenda ANDERSON, James Anderson and Bernadette Anderson, Defendants, and Wallace F. Horejsi and Karen Horejsi, Defendants and Appellees.

Civ. No. 10608.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

July 27, 1984.

Kuchera, Stenehjem & Wills, Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Thomas John Kuchera, Grand Forks.

O'Grady, Morley & Morley, Grand Forks, for defendants and appellees; argued by Michael J. Morley, Grand Forks.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff John Wesely Horejsi, through his guardian ad litem, appeals from the summary judgment dismissing that part of his cause of action against his parents, Wallace and Karen Horejsi, which was based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. We affirm.

During the summer of 1979, Brenda Anderson, an eleven-year-old girl, was regularly employed by the Horejsis to care for John during the day while they were at work. On July 2, 1979, Brenda administered a severe beating to John, then less than one year old, resulting in severe and permanent injuries to the infant.

John's grandfather, William Anton, was appointed guardian ad litem for purposes of bringing an action on John's behalf against Brenda Anderson, her parents, and Wallace and Karen Horejsi. The complaint alleged separate counts of negligence against Brenda Anderson and John's parents, and respondeat superior liability against Brenda's parents and John's parents.

After extensive negotiations, John's claim against Brenda Anderson and her parents was settled. The Andersons received a full and final release discharging them from all further claims arising out of the incident. The settlement and release were approved by the court.

John's parents subsequently moved for summary judgment on the respondeat superior count, claiming that release of their employee (Brenda) released them from liability as employers. The district court granted partial summary judgment, ¹ and John appeals.

The sole question presented on appeal is whether or not the release of a servant also releases the master from respondeat superior liability. Although this issue has been frequently litigated in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 24 A.L.R. 4th 547 (1983), it is one of first impression in our Court.

Although the majority rule in the United States favors discharge of the master upon release of the servant, see 53 Am.Jur.2d Master and Servant Sec. 408 (1970), John argues that the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act by our State, codified as Chapter 32-38, N.D.C.C., requires an opposite result. John points to Section 32-38-04, N.D.C.C., in support of this contention. A majority of those states, which have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and subsequently addressed this issue, have held that a release of the servant does not release the master. See Harris v. Aluminum Co. of America, 550 F.Supp. 1024, 1030 (W.D.Va.1982) (applying Virginia law); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 930 (Alaska 1977); Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265, 1268-1269 (1973); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565, 225 A.2d 666, 667 (1967). John's parents urge us to follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which concluded, in Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656-657 (Tenn.1976), that the Uniform Act does not apply to the derivative or vicarious liability of masters or principals.

Although we agree with John that the provisions of the Uniform Act, as codified in Chapter 32-38, N.D.C.C., apply to a master-servant situation, we conclude that cases from other jurisdictions are inapposite because pertinent sections of the North Dakota act have been impliedly repealed by the subsequent legislative adoption of comparative negligence. See Section 9-10-07, N.D.C.C.; Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 121 (N.D.1979).

In Bartels, supra, addressing the obvious conflicts between Chapter 32-38 and our comparative negligence statute, Section 9-10-07, N.D.C.C., we held that the legislature's adoption of comparative negligence had impliedly repealed certain provisions in Chapter 32-38. More specifically, we held that Section 32-38-04(1) had been impliedly amended to provide:

32-38-04. Release or covenant not to sue.--When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:

1. It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of the relative degree of fault (percentage of negligence) attributable to the released joint tort-feasors.

Section 32-38-02(2), N.D.C.C., which was not affected by our holding in Bartels, provides:

"32-38-02. Pro rata shares.--In determining the pro rata shares of tort-feasors in the entire liability:

* * *

* * *

2. If equity requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share."

The Commissioners' Comment to this section states in part:

"[I]t [the section] invokes the rule of equity which requires class liability, including the common liability arising from vicarious relationships, to be treated as a single share. For instance the liability of a master and servant for the wrong of the servant should in fairness be treated as a single share."

Construing Sections 32-38-02 and 32-38-04 together, we hold that release of a servant for his wrongful conduct also releases the master from vicarious liability. Pursuant to Section 32-38-04(1), release of the servant reduces the claim against other non-released tort-feasors to the extent of the relative degree of fault (percentage of negligence) attributable to the released wrongdoer servant. The "percentage of negligence" attributable to the conduct of the servant constitutes the entire "single share" of liability attributable jointly to the master and servant. Thus, when the plaintiff releases the servant he gives up his right to recover, from either the master or servant, damages caused by the servant's negligence. Because this percentage of negligence represents the "single share" of liability covered by the common liability of the master and servant, the master is necessarily released from vicarious liability for the released servant's misconduct.

John asserts that allowing the master to be released under these circumstances will discourage settlements and lead to increased litigation, because plaintiffs will be unwilling to settle with a servant if the master's vicarious liability is automatically discharged as well. While there is some merit to John's argument, we believe that the result he would have us reach would have an even greater tendency to discourage settlements.

If we were to hold that the vicarious liability of John's parents was not discharged by the release, the end result may be that Brenda would be liable to them for indemnity. A party is entitled to indemnity when he has only a derivative or vicarious liability for damage caused by the one sought to be charged. Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472, 480 ...