Horn v. County of Ventura

• Decision Date: 09 July 1979
• Citation: 24 Cal.3d 605,156 Cal.Rptr. 718,596 P.2d 1134
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 596 P.2d 1134 Merlin W. HORN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF VENTURA, Defendant and Respondent; Frederick W. OSBORNE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. L.A. 30959.

Page 718

156 Cal.Rptr. 718

24 Cal.3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134

Merlin W. HORN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF VENTURA, Defendant and Respondent Frederick W. OSBORNE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

L.A. 30959.

Supreme Court of California.

July 9, 1979.

As Modified Aug. 29, 1979.

James R. Leavy, Oxnard, for plaintiff and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., and E. Robert Wright, Deputy Atty. Gen., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Dorothy L. Schechter, County Counsel, Ventura, and R. Thomas Harris, Asst. County Counsel, Ventura, for defendant and respondent.

Marshall, Lowthorp, Richards & Hibbs and Charles J. Conway, Jr., Oxnard, for real party in interest and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

In this mandamus action, we consider whether approval by defendant county of a tentative subdivision map is an "adjudicatory" function which, under principles of due process, requires that both appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard be given to persons whose property interests may be significantly affected. We will hold that such approval is "adjudicatory," and that rights to prior notice and hearing are accordingly invoked. We will further conclude that the county's general procedures for public notice of environmental decisions were constitutionally inadequate to apprise concerned landowners of governmental actions affecting their property interests. We also reject a contention that plaintiff lacks standing to assert these issues because he purchased the subject property after planning department approval of the map, and will reverse the trial court judgment dismissing the petition for writ of mandate.

The petition reflects the following chronology: On August 14, 1975, real party in interest Osborne applied to the planning department of defendant County of Ventura for its approval of a proposed division of his property into four lots. (Because only four parcels were involved, the project was directly subject only to the county's subdivision ordinance, and not to the Subdivision Map Act. (See former Bus. & Prof.Code, § 11500 et seq., now Gov.Code, § 66410 et seq.)) The planning department subsequently caused to be prepared a "negative declaration" under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub.Resources Code, § 21064), which declaration recited that the proposed subdivision would not have a significant effect on the environment. Thereafter, the department approved a tentative map upon the condition that Osborne install sewers for the lots. No notice was given to adjoining property owners prior to this action.

On December 3, 1975, subsequent to departmental approval of the tentative map, but before final approval by the board of supervisors (board), plaintiff purchased a parcel of land adjacent to the proposed subdivision. Meanwhile, Osborne had appealed to the board because of the imposition of the sewer condition, and a hearing thereon was set for December 9, 1975. Plaintiff, having learned by chance of the departmental approval, appeared at the hearing, advised the board that no notice and opportunity for hearing had yet been given to affected property owners, and asked that the board refer the proposal back to the planning agency for a noticed public hearing and further study of the project's environmental effects. The board refused to consider any issue other than that relating to the sewers. The appeal was continued until December 23, when plaintiff again requested that the board grant a public hearing on the original subdivision proposal. This request was denied and the subdivision was approved by the board with a modified condition as to the sewers.

The petition alleges that certain of Osborne's lots are topographically unsuited for residential construction, that the design of the subdivision will hinder access to plaintiff's property thereby creating substantial traffic and parking congestion, and that the county's environmental assessment of the project is inadequate. Urging that the county exceeded its jurisdiction by approving the subdivision without affording constitutionally adequate notice and hearing procedures to affected landowners, the petition prays for a judgment setting aside defendant's approval.

Defendant and real party demurred generally. They argued that the petition failed to allege an exhaustion of administrative remedies, that subdivision approvals are "legislative" rather than "adjudicatory" in nature not requiring any notice and hearing for affected property owners, and that the defendant's procedures for public review of environmental decisions provided all constitutionally necessary protections. The general demurrers were sustained without leave to amend and this appeal followed.

Defendant renews before us its threshold argument that plaintiff could have raised all of his objections to the proposed subdivision through the county's environmental review process, and that his failure to do so is fatal to his claim. The argument ignores the essence of plaintiff's complaint, which is that these very procedures were constitutionally inadequate. One need not exhaust inadequate remedies in order to challenge their sufficiency. (E. g., Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 342-343, 124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609; Endler v. Schutzbank (1968)68 Cal.2d 162, 168, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 436 P.2d 297; Rosenfield v. Malcolm (1967) 65 Cal.2d 559, 566, 55 Cal.Rptr. 505, 421 P.2d 697; Roth v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 679, 688, 126 Cal.Rptr. 163.)

Moreover, plaintiff Did exhaust the only available administrative means to invoke his asserted right to full notice and hearing. He twice appeared before the county's governing body, the final arbiter of subdivision proposals, reciting the lack of adequate notice to affected property owners and requesting further study of the proposed subdivision by the planning commission after notice and hearing had been provided. These entreaties were rejected.

Under these circumstances, plaintiff is not barred because of a failure to pursue administrative remedies. Accordingly, we consider whether a notice and hearing are required, and, if so, whether the procedures available in the case before us meet such requirements.

1. A Notice and Opportunity for Hearing are Constitutionally Compelled

Plaintiff's principal argument is that because the approval of subdivisions constitutes "quasi-adjudicatory" acts of local government those persons affected by such land use decisions are therefore constitutionally entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the rendition of final decisions. In response, both defendant and real party characterize the actions as "quasi-legislative," prescribing no prior notice and hearing. As will appear, we agree with plaintiff.

Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest. (E. g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. (1975) 419 U.S. 601, 605-606, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751; Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 572-576, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725; Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 576-577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Boddie v. Connecticut (1971)401 U.S. 371, 379, 89 S.Ct. 2138, 23 L.Ed.2d 763; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 339, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349; Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 206-207, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774; Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 448, 458, 121 Cal.Rptr. 585, 535 P.2d 713; Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 541, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13.)

It is equally well settled, however, that only those governmental decisions which are Adjudicative in nature are subject to procedural due process principles. Legislative action is not burdened by such requirements. (Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865; Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 538, 549, 225 P.2d 905; e. g., Beck v. City Council of Beverly Hills (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 112, 115 106 Cal.Rptr. 163; California Grape etc. League v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 692, 708-709, 74 Cal.Rptr. 313.) The rationale of the "legislative-adjudicatory" distinction was well expressed many years ago by Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado (1915) 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372: "Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." (P. 445, 36 S.Ct. p. 142.)

We adopted similar reasoning recently in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205, 118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570, in which we concluded that the enactment of a general zoning ordinance by a city's voters under the initiative process, being "legislative" in character, required no prior notice and hearing, even though it might well be anticipated that the ordinance would deprive persons of significant property interests. (P. 211, 118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570.) In so holding, we distinguished "adjudicatory" matters in which "the government's action affecting an individual (is) determined by facts peculiar to the individual case" from "legislative" decisions which involve the adoption of a "broad, generally applicable rule of conduct on the basis of general public policy." (Pp. 212-213, 118 Cal.Rptr. p. 150, 529 P.2d p. 574; see also United States v....