HOWELL LUMBER CO., INC. v. City of Tuscaloosa
| Decision Date | 28 March 1997 |
| Citation | 757 So.2d 1173 |
| Parties | HOWELL LUMBER COMPANY, INC. v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA. City of Tuscaloosa v. Howell Lumber Company, Inc. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
W. Cameron Parsons of Parsons & Sutton, Tuscaloosa, for appellant/cross appellee Howell Lumber Company, Inc.
Timothy H. Nunnally, asst. city atty., City of Tuscaloosa, for appellee/cross appellant City of Tuscaloosa.
Howell Lumber Company, Inc., appeals from a judgment of the Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court declaring, among other things, that pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-51-91, the City of Tuscaloosa has the power to assess and collect license taxes from businesses located outside its corporate limits but within its three-mile "police jurisdiction," a term used to refer to a three-mile zone adjacent to the corporate limits of cities having 6,000 or more inhabitants. See Ala.Code 1975, § 11-40-10. The City cross-appeals that portion of the trial court's judgment directing a refund of "excess" license taxes paid by Howell Lumber during 1992, 1993, and 1994.
This appeal concerns the construction of Act No. 86-427, Ala. Acts 1986, and of § 11-51-91, Ala.Code 1975, as it appeared in the Code both before and after the passage of Act No. 86-427. Before its amendment in 1986, § 11-51-91 read, in pertinent part:
"Any city or town within the state of Alabama may fix and collect licenses for any business, trade or profession done within the police jurisdiction of such city or town but outside the corporate limits thereof; provided, that the amount of such licenses shall not be more than one-half the amount charged and collected as a license for like business, trade or profession done within the corporate limits of such city or town, fees and penalties excluded...."
Act No. 86-427 is entitled "An act [t]o amend Section 11-51-91, Code of Alabama, 1975, so as to clarify the meaning of said Section; to require a liberal construction of the meaning of said section." Act No. 86-427 is composed of three sections, one of which amends § 11-51-91 by its terms (emphasis added here to newly added language):
The second section of Act No. 86-427 reads as follows:
The first count of Howell Lumber's original complaint in the trial court stated that its principal place of business was within the Carroll's Creek Fire District, outside the City's corporate limits but inside its police jurisdiction; that it had paid a business license tax to the City in 1992 and 1993 under protest; and that it sought a declaration of its rights and responsibilities under Ala.Code 1975, § 11-51-91, and Act No. 86-427. In other counts brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Howell Lumber sought (1) a declaration that the City's collection of license taxes was an unconstitutional denial of due process and equal protection, (2) an injunction against further imposition of the tax, (3) a refund of the taxes paid, and (4) attorney fees and costs. The City answered the complaint, and later counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that it is not required to respond to any police or fire calls within fire districts located inside its police jurisdiction.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of the applicability of § 11-51-91 to Howell Lumber. Howell Lumber took the position that § 2 of Act No. 86-427 was valid and enforceable, and prevented the City from assessing license taxes against Howell Lumber. The City disputed this position, arguing that if § 2 prohibited the imposition of business license taxes, it would create an irrational distinction between areas located within a fire district and those areas located outside such a district.
The trial court entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the City. In its five-page judgment, the trial court opined that if § 2 of Act No. 86-427 were deemed to exempt from licensing those businesses within municipal police jurisdictions that are also located in fire districts, then it would exceed the scope of the Act's title; the trial court thus elected to construe § 2 as mandating the application of a version of § 11-51-91 unamended by § 1 of the Act. The trial court also concluded that based upon our supreme court's construction of § 11-51-91 in State Dep't of Revenue v. Reynolds Metals Co., 541 So.2d 524 (Ala.1988), Act No. 86-427 did not substantially affect the City's power to collect license taxes from businesses inside its police jurisdiction. The trial court entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that it could assess a license tax upon Howell Lumber within the constraints of Reynolds Metals.
As a result of the partial summary judgment, later proceedings in the case focused upon the reasonableness of the license tax actually imposed by the City upon Howell Lumber. The trial court allowed Howell Lumber to amend its complaint to seek refunds of the license taxes it had paid to the City for 1994 and 1995 under Ala.Code 1975, § 40-10-164, and attorney fees under § 40-10-165. After the parties briefed the remaining issues, the trial court held a final hearing, at which it received ore tenus evidence. The trial court entered a judgment declaring that Howell Lumber was entitled to a refund of $4,944.99 representing certain "excess" license taxes paid to the City, but the trial court denied relief as to Howell Lumber's federal civil rights claims and as to the City's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment. The trial court also reserved ruling upon whether Howell Lumber could recover attorney fees and expenses under § 40-10-165, Ala.Code 1975. Both parties filed motions under Rule 59, Ala.R.Civ.P., within 30 days of this judgment; in addition, Howell Lumber moved to amend its complaint to seek relief on behalf of a class under Rule 23(b)(2), Ala.R.Civ.P. After considering these motions, the trial court entered an amended judgment reducing the amount due to be refunded, denying Howell Lumber's request for attorney fees, and denying the motion to amend the complaint to assert class claims. Both Howell Lumber and the City appeal.
Howell Lumber contends that the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) in construing Act No. 86-427 so as to allow license taxation throughout the City's police jurisdiction, including within the Carroll's Creek Fire District; (2) in denying Howell Lumber's claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and associated attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the allegedly wrongful collection of the license tax; (3) in denying Howell Lumber's claim for attorney fees under § 40-10-165, Ala.Code 1975; and (4) in denying Howell Lumber's motion to amend its complaint to state class claims. These allegations of error will be addressed in turn.
We first consider Howell Lumber's contention that the trial court erred in construing § 2 of Act No. 86-427. Howell Lumber argues that § 2, instead of mandating the application to it of the unamended version of § 11-51-91, Ala.Code 1975, actually prevents the collection from it of municipal license fees under § 11-51-91. In other words, Howell Lumber argues that § 2, which reads "[t]his Act shall not apply to business[es] or homes [lying] within a fire district," should be read "§ 11-51-91 shall not apply to businesses or homes lying within a fire district". The City, for its part, argues that the trial court properly construed § 2, and that Howell Lumber's interpretation would create an arbitrary and irrational classification of businesses within police jurisdictions, dividing them between those businesses within a fire district and those outside such a district.
We are thus called upon to construe Act No. 86-427, and specifically § 2 thereof, to ascertain whether the Legislature intended to exclude Howell Lumber, a business located within a fire district and also within the City's police jurisdiction, from the City's license tax. Initially, we note that the first rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature be given effect. Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So.2d 1365, 1376 (Ala.1994). In construing a statute, courts are not confined by a literal reading of the statutory words, but will reject such a reading when, after considering the law as a whole, in light of its history and the purposes to be accomplished, they determine that an exact and literal interpretation would not carry out the legislative intent. Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2, 7, 155 So. 590, 593 (1934); City of Birmingham v. Hendrix, 257 Ala. 300, 311-12, 58 So.2d 626, 638 (1952). Indeed, our supreme court has stated:
"The [inartful] manner in which many of our statutes are framed,...
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