Huggins v. Precision Concrete Forming, 8327SC1274

• Decision Date: 02 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 8327SC1274,8327SC1274
• Citation: 70 N.C.App. 571,320 S.E.2d 416
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of Tony R. HUGGINS, Appellant, v. PRECISION CONCRETE FORMING and Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Appellees.

Page 416

320 S.E.2d 416

70 N.C.App. 571

In the Matter of Tony R. HUGGINS, Appellant, v. PRECISION CONCRETE FORMING and Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Appellees.

No. 8327SC1274.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 2, 1984.

Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, Inc. by Pamela A. Hunter, Gastonia, for claimant, appellant.

Donald R. Teeter, Staff Atty., Raleigh, for the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, appellee.

HEDRICK, Judge.

The standard of review by which we are guided in examining the action of the Employment Security Commission is set out in N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 96-15(i) (Cum.Supp.1983): "In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if there is evidence to support them and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law." In In re Baptist Children's Homes v. Employment Security Comm., 56 N.C.App. 781, 290 S.E.2d 402 (1982), this Court said:

The scope of judicial review of appeals from decisions of the Employment Security Commission is a determination of whether the facts found by the Commission are supported by competent evidence and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law.

Id. at 783, 290 S.E.2d at 403.

In his first two assignments of error, claimant challenges the Commission's conclusion that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. Mr. Huggins contends that all the evidence shows that his resignation was attributable to his employer's failure to provide "regular, timely compensation for travel," with the "resulting burden of the costs of transportation" being placed on claimant. Claimant contends that, even if we do not hold the Commission's decision to be erroneous as a matter of law, this Court should remand the matter for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.

N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 96-14(1) provides that an individual shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits if the individual is unemployed "because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer." "Good cause" has been defined by our Supreme Court in a related context as a cause which "would be deemed by reasonable men and women valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work." In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 635, 161 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1968). This Court has said a cause is "attributable to the employer" under the statute if it is "produced, caused, created or as a result of actions by the employer." In re Vinson, 42 N.C.App. 28, 31, 255 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1979). The claimant has the burden of proving he is not disqualified from receiving benefits. In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544 (1941).

The sole point of contention between the parties at the hearing before the Commission was simply whether the claimant voluntarily left work for good cause attributable to the employer. On appeal, the claimant contends the Commission did not make sufficient findings of fact to resolve this critical question. The entire controversy between the parties arose out of the claimant's having to travel out of town in connection with his employment. The evidence adduced at the hearing was and is confusing and contradictory as to just what arrangements Mr. Huggins had with his employer with respect to out-of-town travel expenses and overnight lodging. The evidence tends to show that the...