Hull v. State

• Decision Date: 21 May 1892
• Citation: 11 So. 97,29 Fla. 79
• Parties: HULL, Clerk of Circuit Court v. STATE ex rel. ROLLINS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

11 So. 97

29 Fla. 79

HULL, Clerk of Circuit Court v. STATE ex rel. ROLLINS.

Florida Supreme Court

May 21, 1892

Error to circuit court, Duval county; W. B. YOUNG, Judge.

Mandamus proceedings by John F. Rollins against Noble A. Hull, clerk of the circuit court, to compel him to execute and deliver a tax deed. On a judgment for the relator, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The right of a purchaser other than state, or some governmental agency acting as such, at a sale of land for taxes under a statute which provides that the purchaser or his assignee shall have a conveyance of the land unless the land shall be redeemed within one year next succeeding the sale, is a contract right; and a statute, passed subsequent to such sale, which proposes to extend the period allowed by the former act for redeeming the land from the sale, is a violation of the contract, and of no effect as to such purchaser or his assignee.

COUNSEL William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.

William B. Owen, for defendant in error.

OPINION

RANEY, C.J.

The fifty-fourth section of the general revenue act, approved June 13, 1887, (chapter 3681, Laws Fla.,) authorized any person claiming land sold for taxes, or any creditor of any such person, to redeem the land, on the terms and in the manner therein stated, 'within one year next succeeding the sale;' and the fifty-seventh section of the same statute enacted that on the presentation of the certificate of sale to the clerk of the circuit court or his deputy 'after the expiration of time provided by law in this act for the redemption of land sold as aforesaid, unless the same have been redeemed, he shall execute to the purchaser or his heirs or assigns a deed of the land therein described, unless it shall be shown that the taxes for that year have been paid before the sale.'

In the case before us, J. C. Greeley bought at a tax sale made by D P. Smith, as tax collector of Duval county, on the 5th day of August, 1890, the land mentioned in the proceedings, the same having been sold for the collection of unpaid state and county taxes assessed for the year 1889. Smith, as such collector, issued to Greeley the usual certificate of sale bearing date August 5, 1890, and afterwards Greeley assigned the certificate to Rollins, who, on the 10th day of November 1891, presented the certificate to the plaintiff in error clerk of the circuit court of Duval county, and demanded that he should execute and deliver to him a tax deed for the land in accordance with law, he at the time tendering to the clerk his lawful fee for such deed. The clerk refused to issue the deed, and thereupon Rollins applied to the judge of the fourth circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel him to issue it.

The provisions of the seventh and eighth sections of a statute approved June 10, 1891, and entitled 'An act to provide for certifying lands to the comptroller upon which taxes have not been paid, for the redemption thereof, and for the forfeiture and sale of lands not redeemed.' (chapter 4011 of the Statutes,) are the sole defense made by the clerk to the writ of mandamus issued by the judge.

The effect of preceding sections of this statute is that after the 1st day of January, 1892, there should be no sales of lands for either state or county taxes; and that the tax collectors of the several counties should open their books for the collection of taxes on the first Monday in November, 1891, and close them on the first Monday in April, 1892, and do likewise for each succeeding year; and when they shall have closed their books 'as now or herein provided,' it shall not be lawful for them to receive further moneys remaining due for taxes on land. All lands upon which taxes have not been paid are then to be certified to the comptroller and clerks of the circuit court, and the comptroller is required to make publication within one year of all lands so certified to him, except such as may have been redeemed before such publication, or are not subject to taxation. Redemption in the offices of the comptroller and clerks of the circuit court is then provided for, and the state's title to all lands not redeemed at the expiration of two years from such certification becomes absolute, and the lands are to be placed on sale by the state, subject, however, to the right of redemption at any time after the expiration of the two years from the certification, if the land has not been sold by the state.

The seventh and eighth sections are as follows:

'Sec. 7. No deeds, as now provided by law, shall issue upon any tax certificate now outstanding, for two years from the passage of this act; and any person or persons whose lands may have heretofore been sold for taxes, and to which tax deeds shall not have been issued at the time of the passage of this act, shall, at any time within two years from the passage of this act, have the right to redeem said lands by taking the steps now provided by law for the redemption of lands from tax sales.

'Sec. 8. Tax deeds to all lands upon which tax certificates may be now outstanding, and which shall not have been redeemed, as provided in section 7, shall, at the expiration of two years from the passage of this act, issue as provided by law at the time of the passage of this act.'

The ninth section provides for the grading and pricing of all lands to which the state may acquire title under the act; and the tenth section for the sale of the same, and the deed of conveyance of those sold. The eleventh section repeals all laws and parts of laws in so far as they may be in conflict with the act; and the twelfth section is that the act 'shall be construed in connection with the general revenue law;' such a statute (chapter 4010) having been passed at the same session of the legislature, and approved on the same day.

The question presented for our decision is the validity of the act of 1891, (chapter 4011,) in so far as it proposes to extend the time for redemption of the purchase made by Greeley at the tax sale of August 5, 1890. It is contended by the relator that the statute is, both as to himself and to Greeley, unconstitutional and void for the reason that it violates the contract of the sale.

The rights of Greeley and his assignee are contractual, and not as in Board v. Skinkle, 140 U.S. 334, 11 S.Ct. 790, a matter of mere public regulation or policy, nor a mere matter of law. Greeley's rights arose in a contract of bargain and sale. The land was offered for sale by the state, through its official agent, the tax collector of Duval county, under a statute, the validity of which is not impeached; and a compliance with whose essential provisions as to assessment and sale is not questioned, even if it be that the appellant could raise both or either of such questions in this proceeding. The land was offered for sale under the terms and conditions prescribed by the act of 1887, (chapter 3681,) and one of these was that the purchaser should have a deed of conveyance of the land unless the same should be redeemed within one year next succeeding the sale by making the payments prescribed. Greeley, on this offer being made at public outcry, bid for the land, and his bid was accepted, and, he having paid the amount required by law, the formal certificate, evidencing the sale to him, and stating that he would be entitled to a deed if the land should not be redeemed within a year, was issued to him. The entry into the agreement was the act of the parties. The state offered the land for sale, Greeley voluntarily made a lawful bid, and the bid was accepted, and then complied with. It was a contract between the state and Greeley, and its terms were embodied in the law then in force. State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 15 N.W. 375. The terms of the contract, in so far as the rights of the purchaser, and the duties or obligations of the state, are concerned, are to be found in the law authorizing the sale, or under which it was made. 'But,' says Judge TANEY, speaking for the supreme court of the United States in Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 315, 'the mortgage given to secure the debt was made in Illinois for real property situated in that state, and the rights which the mortgagee acquired in the premises depended upon the laws of that state. In other words, the existing laws of Illinois created and defined the legal and equitable obligations of the mortgage contract.' And in Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369, the decision was that the law in existence at the time a mortgage was executed and delivered was a part of the contract. The obligation of a contract consists, observes the supreme court of the United States, in its binding force upon the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in existence when it is made. These are necessarily referred to in all contracts, and form a part of them as a measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either than that which the terms of the contract indicate according to their settled legal meaning. When it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608. In the case of the sale of land for taxes, which can be authorized only by the state, and to which the right of redemption is a customary, if not inseparable, feature, defining, if not limiting, the rights of the purchaser, and continuing those of the defaulting owner, it is to the law existing at the time of the sale that one reasonably must, and to it only that one naturally...