Humphrey v. City of Headland
| Decision Date | 02 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:12-cv-366-WHA |
| Parties | VELMA JEAN HUMPHREY and ROBERT LOWE, individually and as personal representative of the ESTATE OF O'PATRICK HUMPHREY and on behalf of O'Patrick Humphrey's SURVIVORS and the BENEFICIARIES of O'Patrick Humphrey's ESTATE, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF HEADLAND, THE CITY OF HEADLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICE CHIEF MARK JONES, OFFICER TONY SMITH, and OFFICER TONY FRANKS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
(WO)
This case is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 7), filed on May 15, 2012 by Defendants City of Headland ("City"), City of Headland Police Department ("Police Department"), Police Chief Mark Jones ("Jones"), Officer Tony Smith ("Smith"), and Officer Tony Franks ("Franks"). The Plaintiffs, Velma Jean Humphrey and Robert Lowe (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) on April 23, 2012, individually and on behalf of O'Patrick Humphrey's Estate. The Complaint raises the following: Count I - a Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Smith and Franks; Count II -a Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment excessiveforce and cruel and unusual punishment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against City, Police Department, and Jones, both individually and in his official capacity; and Count III - a state law Wrongful Death claim as defined in Alabama Code § 6-5-410 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against City, Police Department and Jones, both individually and in his official capacity.
The Defendants now move for dismissal of the claims against them and raise various grounds in support of their contention. The Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 11) on June 5, 2012, and the Defendants filed a Reply to the Plaintiffs' Response on June 14, 2012. (Doc. # 15).
The court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). In analyzing the sufficiency of pleading, the court is guided by a two-prong approach: one, the court is not bound to accept conclusory statements of the elements of a cause of action and, two, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Id. (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but instead the complaint must contain"only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555.
The factual allegations from the Plaintiffs' Complaint are as follows:
On January 31, 2012, Velma Jean Humphrey called 911 and informed the operator that her son, O'Patrick Humphrey ("Humphrey"), needed treatment because he suffered from schizophrenia and was not under the influence of his medication. Paramedics were sent to the scene and began treating Humphrey. While the paramedics were trying to treat Humphrey, he became combative and ran from the paramedics. Because of Humphrey's behavior, the local City of Headland Police were called to the scene.
The first officer to arrive was Officer Franks. When he arrived on the scene, he discharged his firearm at Humphrey. The shot grazed Humphrey. Next, Officer Smith arrived on the scene. Smith asked Franks if Humphrey was armed, and Franks failed to respond to Smith.
Humphrey had been absent from the scene since Franks shot at him. However, after Smith arrived on the scene, Humphrey rounded the corner of a nearby residence and beganapproaching Smith. He walked towards Smith while waving his arms in the air. While Humphrey was walking towards Smith, Smith fired his weapon which struck Humphrey in the groin. This shot proved to be fatal.
Although the Defendants filed a detailed brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs have failed to respond to all but two of the Defendants' arguments. In the Defendants' Reply Brief, the Defendants contend that the court should treat the claims which were not addressed by the Plaintiffs' in their Response Brief as abandoned. For the reasons explained below, the court will do so.
Federal courts in this circuit, as well as in others, have found that a party's failure to respond to or to oppose arguments raised in a pending motion may result in an abandonment of those issues. See, e.g., Hooper v. City of Montgomery, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (); Kirkland v. Cnty. Comm'n of Elmore Cnty., Ala., No. 2:08cv86-MEF, 2009 WL 596538 (M.D. Ala. March 6, 2009) (same); Black v. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2006) (). Similarly, "[i]t is not for the court to manufacture arguments on Plaintiff's behalf." Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2000); cf. Resolution Trust Corp. V. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)("There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.").
Therefore, the court will only address the two issues that the Plaintiffs actually responded to in their brief: from Count I, the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim brought against Defendant Smith in his individual capacity pursuant to § 1983, and, from Count II, the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim brought against the City pursuant to § 1983. The remainder of Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED.
Defendant Smith moves the court to dismiss the remaining excessive force claim against him under a theory of qualified immunity.
Because Smith has asserted qualified immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must determine if the Plaintiffs' complaint has sufficiently alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Williams v. Alabama State University, 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1997). "Whether the . . . complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established right is a question of law." Id. (citing Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Qualified immunity is a protection designed to allow government officials to avoid the expense and disruption of trial. Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991). As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether the public official was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority at the time the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. See Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988). Once it is established that a defendant was actingwithin his discretionary authority, the court must determine whether "[t]aken in a light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). "[I]f a constitutional right would have been violated under the plaintiff's version of the facts," the court must then determine "whether the right was clearly established." Wood v. Kesler 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003).
Requiring that a constitutional right be clearly established means that liability only attaches if "[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997). In other words, a defendant is entitled to "fair warning" that his conduct deprived his victim of a constitutional right. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
In Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350-53 (11th Cir. 2002), the Eleventh Circuit articulated three ways in which individual state defendants can receive "fair notice" that their conduct violates clearly established law. First, the words of a federal statute or constitutional provision may be specific enough "to establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to overcome qualified immunity, even in the total absence of case law." Id. at 1350 (emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit considers a case falling into this category an "obvious clarity case." Id. at 1350.
Second, if the conduct at issue is not so egregious as to violate the Constitution or a federal statue on its face, the court must turn its attention to case law that espouses "broad statements of principle . . . that are not tied to particularized facts." Id. at 1351. In these types of cases, courts will declare "X Conduct" unconstitutional regardless of the specific factualsituation. Id. "[P]ut differently, the precise facts surrounding 'X Conduct' are immaterial to the violation," thus these decisions can "clearly establish law applicable in the future to different sets of detailed facts." Id.
Third, courts must look to cases that tie a particular type of conduct to the specific facts of the case. Id. With these cases, courts must examine case law stating that "Y Conduct" is unconstitutional in "Z circumstances."2 Id. If...
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