Huntington v. Samaritan Hosp.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 49862-8,49862-8
• Citation: 680 P.2d 58,101 Wn.2d 466
• Parties: Daniel E. HUNTINGTON, as Personal Representative of the Minor Children of Jack Bright: Terrald Bright, Tammy Bright, Darrel Bright and Juanita Bright, Petitioner, v. SAMARITAN HOSPITAL, a corporation; V.W. Klobucher, Jr., M.D. and Jane Doe Klobucher, husband and wife; Doctor's Clinic, Inc., P.S., a corporation; and Jane Doe, R.N., Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 466

101 Wn.2d 466

680 P.2d 58

Daniel E. HUNTINGTON, as Personal Representative of the Minor Children of Jack Bright: Terrald Bright Tammy Bright, Darrel Bright and Juanita Bright, Petitioner, v. SAMARITAN HOSPITAL, a corporation; V.W. Klobucher, Jr M.D. and Jane Doe Klobucher, husband and wife Doctor's Clinic, Inc., P.S., a corporation; and Jane Doe R.N., Respondents.

No. 49862-8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

April 19, 1984.

Richter, Wimberley, Ericson & Woods, P.S., F.G. Fancher, Spokane, for petitioner.

Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, William Symmes, William F. Etter, Spokane, for respondent Klobucher, et al.

Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S., James Danielson, Doug Takasugi, Wenatchee, for respondent Samaritan Hosp.

STAFFORD, Justice.

Petitioner Daniel Huntington, acting as personal representative of the children of Jack Bright, brought this wrongful death action against respondents Samaritan Hospital, Dr. V.W. Klobucher, and Doctors' Clinic, Inc. The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, ruling the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Huntington v. Samaritan Hospital, 35 Wash.App. 357, 666 P.2d 405 (1983). We likewise affirm and hold that in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the minority of the statutory beneficiaries.

On September 28, 1976, Jack Bright was taken to Samaritan Hospital by his ex-wife, Janice, and three friends. He had attempted suicide. Mr. Bright was given medication and, approximately 1 1/2 hours later, he was released into the custody of his companions. They took Mr. Bright to his apartment, where they planned to remain with him. Unfortunately, when he was left alone for a brief period of time, Mr. Bright committed suicide. His survivors include four dependent minor children.

On January 7, 1977, Janice Bright was appointed personal representative of Jack Bright's estate. She filed a survival action against a person involved in an automobile accident with Mr. Bright in 1975. The survival action was settled. On January 4, 1979, Janice Bright filed her final report and petition for distribution.

On November 17, 1980, Daniel Huntington filed this wrongful death action, acting as personal representative of Jack Bright's four children. Mr. Huntington alleged respondents were negligent in their treatment of Jack Bright.

The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding the statute of limitations is not tolled during the minority of the statutory beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals, Division Three, affirmed. We granted discretionary review and affirm.

As the Court of Appeals correctly found, Mr. Huntington has no authority to bring this action because he has not been appointed personal representative of Mr. Bright's estate pursuant to RCW 11.28.120. Nevertheless, because proper appointment of a personal representative could be obtained, we address the statute of limitations issue in the interest of judicial economy.

The wrongful death statute, RCW 4.20.010, provides: "When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another his personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death ..." "Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children of the person whose death shall have been so caused." (Italics ours.) RCW 4.20.020.

In general, a wrongful death action must be commenced within 3 years of the date of death. RCW 4.16.080; Dodson v. Continental Can Co., 159 Wash. 589, 294 P. 265 (1930). Petitioner argues that RCW 4.16.350, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, should apply to the instant suit. We need not decide which statute is applicable, however, as under either statute the action is barred unless the limitation period is tolled by the minority of the statutory beneficiaries.

The tolling statute, RCW 4.16.190, provides, in relevant part:

If a person entitled to bring an action ... be at the time the cause of action accrued ... under the age of eighteen ... the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of action.

(Italics ours.) Petitioner argues that although the personal representative is the only person who statutorily can bring a wrongful death action, the children are the real parties in interest and accordingly, the statute of limitations should be tolled during their minority. We do not agree.

Prior to 1917, a wrongful death action could be brought by the decedent's "heirs or personal representatives." Rem. 1915 Code § 183. In 1917, the Legislature amended the statute to its present form, providing that a wrongful death action may be maintained only by the decedent's personal representative. Laws of 1917, ch. 123, § 1, p. 495. Since the amendment of the wrongful death statute, we have uniformly held only the personal representative may bring a wrongful death action. Wood v. Dunlop, 83 Wash.2d 719, 723-24, 521 P.2d 1177 (1974); Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash.2d 319, 378 P.2d 413 (1963); Maciejczak v. Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P.2d 31 (1936). The tolling statute, RCW 4.16.190, thus becomes operative only if the personal representative, the "person entitled to bring an action", is disabled. Consequently, the statute of limitations is not tolled by the minority of the statutory beneficiaries.

Our holding is in accord with the rule in several jurisdictions with wrongful death statutes similar to our own in that only the personal representative can bring the action. ¹ E.g. Beverage v. Harvey, 602 F.2d 657 (4th Cir.1979) (Virginia law); DeLoach v. Emergency Med. Group, 155 Ga.App. 866, 274 S.E.2d 38 (1980); Group Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Gatlin, 463 A.2d 700 (D.C.App.1983); see generally, Annot. Minority of Surviving Children as Tolling Limitation Period in State Wrongful Death Action, 85 A.L.R.3d 162 (1978). While a few jurisdictions have reached a contrary result on public policy grounds, e.g. Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1979), such a result can be reached in the instant case only by rewriting a clear statute. Wrongful death actions are strictly statutory. Wood v. Dunlop, supra at 723, 521 P.2d 1177. The formulation of a new policy with regard to this statutory cause of action is the responsibility of the Legislature, not a task for this court.

The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DIMMICK and PEARSON, JJ., concur.

ROSELLINI, Justice (dissenting).

The majority finds that the right to maintain a wrongful death action is not tolled during the minority of the statutory beneficiaries. This holding effectively denies the children of the deceased their vested rights to the benefits of such cause of action in the event of neglect or inadvertence by the personal representative.

The majority finds that the clear language of the applicable statutes mandate this Holding. The majority reasons that when the Legislature amended the wrongful death statute in 1917 to provide that only the personal representative may maintain the action, RCW 4.20.010, the legislation also required that the minority tolling provisions of RCW 4.16.190 be available only to the personal representative, the person entitled to bring an action.

The statute is not so clear as the majority suggests. RCW 4.20.020 provides that a wrongful death action shall be for the benefit of the wife and children. The object of the wrongful death statute is to provide a remedy whereby the family of a deceased, who might have naturally expected maintenance or assistance from the deceased had he lived, may recover compensation from the wrongdoer commensurate with the loss sustained. Upchurch v. Hubbard, 29 Wash.2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947). The intended purpose of granting the personal representative the right to maintain the wrongful death action is to procedurally allow for orderly prosecution of wrongful death suits by avoiding multiplicity of actions and assuring that all the statutory beneficiaries recover their respective interests in any benefits of the action.

The wrongful death statute, being remedial in nature, must be liberally construed in order to accomplish this intended purpose. Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash.2d 319, 324, 378 P.2d 413 (1963); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash.2d 419, 275 P.2d 723 (1954). Although the statute provides that the personal representative may maintain an action, this court has held that the personal representative is merely a statutory agent or trustee acting in favor of the statutory beneficiaries. Gray, at 327, 378 P.2d 413; Wood v. Dunlop, 83 Wash.2d 719, 724, 521 P.2d 1177 (1974). The beneficiaries are the real parties in interest and have a vested right to the benefits of the cause of action. Wood, at 724, 521 P.2d 1177.

Due to the statutory right granting the personal representative the sole right to maintain the action, it was originally felt that the personal representative had the total say over the settlement of a wrongful death action. Hansen v. Stimson Mill Co., 195 Wash. 621, 81 P.2d 855 (1938). However, in Wood, we overruled Hansen and held that the personal representative cannot settle and release a wrongful death action on behalf of a minor beneficiary without court approval and the appointment of a guardian. The court reasoned that although the action was statutory and that the statute provided that the personal representative must bring the action, the personal representative is simply the nominal party to the action. Because of the remedial nature of the statute and the minor's vested interest in the benefits of an action, the court recognized the need to protect the welfare of the minor beneficiaries.

Requiring court approval and appointment of a guardian for the child will help protect the minor's "vested" interest in the benefits of the claim in two ways. First,...