Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1985
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Gerardo Jiminez HURTADO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATEWIDE HOME LOAN COMPANY, etc., a California corporation, Transtate Title Company, et al, a California corporation, Shirley Morgenstern, Allen B. Polin, Jose Jiminez, and Does I through X, inclusive, Defendants and Respondents. D001344, Civ. 31608.

Page 712

213 Cal.Rptr. 712

167 Cal.App.3d 1019

Gerardo Jiminez HURTADO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATEWIDE HOME LOAN COMPANY, etc., a California corporation, Transtate Title Company, et al, a California corporation, Shirley Morgenstern, Allen B. Polin, Jose Jiminez, and Does I through X, inclusive, Defendants and Respondents.

D001344, Civ. 31608.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

May 6, 1985.

Review Denied Aug. 29, 1985.

Robert W. Bornhoft and Bornhoft, Broughton & Berkenstadt, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.

Marc Philip Wane, Steven C. Smith and Rich & Ezer, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

On October 3, 1979, Gerardo Jiminez Hurtado sued for injunctive relief and damages based on defendants' fraud in inducing him to enter into a secured loan transaction. The action remained essentially dormant from March 8, 1981 until December 8, 1983 when defendants successfully moved to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure section 583, subdivision (a). ¹ This appeal ensued. We reverse.

I

The abundant precedent generated by section 583(a) is indicative of the competing policy considerations inherent in the application of the statute. Those cases which approve the dismissal of an action stress the benefits to be gained by the timely resolution of litigation and the breadth of the court's discretion. (See, e.g., Innovest, Inc. v. Bruckner (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 594, 599, 176 Cal.Rptr. 90; Corlett v. Gordon (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1016, 165 Cal.Rptr. 524.) Cases holding to the contrary emphasize the need to have disputes resolved on their merits and the limitation on the court's discretionary power. (See, e.g., Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566, 86 Cal.Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193; United Farm Workers National Union v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 225, 232-233, 150 Cal.Rptr. 761; City of Los Angeles v. Gleneagle Dev. Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 543, 563, 133 Cal.Rptr. 212.)

In addition to the different policy considerations which impact appellate decisions, apparent conflicting authorities can also be reconciled by the different procedural postures of cases on appeal. Those cases affirming the denial of a dismissal motion tend to approve the court's exercise of discretion. (E.g., Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564, 86 Cal.Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193.) Cases disapproving a dismissal point out the discretion of the trial court is no greater than that of the appellate court. (E.g., United Farm Workers, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 233, 150 Cal.Rptr. 761.)

Thus in practical terms, the trial court caught in the policy squeeze between two separate lines of cases is in the difficult position of determining, perhaps even guessing, which precedent will be applied on appeal. The chief progenitor of this judicial guessing game is the familiar "abuse of discretion" standard, which has been repeatedly held to control appellate review of trial court actions under section 583(a). (See, e.g., Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 558, 194 Cal.Rptr. 773, 669 P.2d 9; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 416, 134 Cal.Rptr. 402, 556 P.2d 764; Weeks v. Roberts (1968) 68 Cal.2d 802, 806, 69 Cal.Rptr. 305, 442 P.2d 361.) It is a standard, however, which is so amorphous as to mean everything and nothing at the same time and be virtually useless as an analytic tool. In somewhat picturesque terms, the "abuse of discretion" standard has been described as

"the noise made by an appellate court while delivering a figurative blow to the It is our concern with the implications of these observations which has motivated us to write the discussion which follows. Appellate decisions should furnish firm, clearly defined, objective guidelines for trial court application. When it appears we are doing otherwise, as Professor Rosenberg indicates has happened under the "abuse of discretion" rubric, an analytic check on ourselves and an explanation to the trial court is in order.

                trial judge's solar plexus.  It is a way of saying to the trial judge, 'This one's on you.'   The term has no meaning or idea content that I have ever been able to discern.  It is just a way of recording the delivery of a punch to the judicial midriff."  (Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion (1975) 79 F.R.D. 173, 180, (hereafter cited as Review of Discretion ).)
                

In attempting to give substantive meaning to the abuse of discretion standard, focusing on the term "abuse" is of little help because it is a relativistic term; it depends for its meaning on an understanding of the parameters of the trial court's "discretion" in any given case. Without knowing those parameters, there is no rational way to determine whether the parameters were exceeded or, in other words, whether the court's discretion was abused.

Focusing instead on the concept of "discretion," that term in one sense refers generally to the power to decide. But every court--both trial and appellate--has "discretion" in that sense. Whether the source of the power to decide is constitutional or statutory, the essence of the judicial function is decision making. "Discretion" in the sense of the "abuse of discretion" standard refers instead to the relationship between the trial and appellate decision-making processes and, more particularly, to the amount of deference which appellate courts accord to trial court determinations. Discretion in this sense--that is, trial court discretion--is not a sacrosanct concept. Harsh as it may sound, the nature of the relationship between superior and inferior courts dictates that trial courts have discretion only to the extent appellate courts perceive a reason to defer. The breadth of trial court discretion is a function of the degree to which appellate courts exercise deference.

Understanding the concept of discretion, however, does little to aid application of the abuse of discretion standard to any particular legal issue. The problem is illustrated by a review of published California cases filed during the first three months of this year, revealing more than 50 cases in which the appellate court was asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court actions in these cases span the variegated landscape of the law: denying a request for a preliminary injunction (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695); denying a criminal defendant's request for a continuance to obtain private counsel (People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 789, 210 Cal.Rptr. 193, 693 P.2d 778); granting a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens (Rehm v. Aero Engines, Inc. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 715, 723, 210 Cal.Rptr. 594); determining relevance for the purposes of a discovery motion (National Steel Products Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 476, 492, 210 Cal.Rptr. 535); sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend (Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 609, fn. 4, 210 Cal.Rptr. 578); and granting a motion for summary judgment (Rubio v. Swiridoff (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 400, 403, 211 Cal.Rptr. 338).

It is perhaps unnecessary to add that as the nature of these cases vary, so too does the degree of discretion which can be exercised by the trial court without "abuse." As both Professor Rosenberg and Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have recognized, the chief vice of the "abuse of discretion" standard lies in its propensity to obscure the basis for an appellate court's ruling. Appellate courts rarely articulate the degree of deference they are according to a trial court ruling Our judicial system which provides for appellate review of trial court rulings presumes generally that where a trial and appellate court disagree, the appellate court's view will prevail. Such a systemic presumption clearly "does not reflect a view that an appellate judge is inherently more able than a trial judge." (Friendly, op. cit. supra, 31 Emory L.J. at p. 757.) Rather, there are structural reasons for preferring appellate court decisions as a general rule. Counsel generally have more time for thoughtful reflection on legal issues when a case is on appeal rather than in the more pressured confines of the trial court. Not only are counsel in a position to present more refined issues, but the appellate court itself has more time and resources for research and discussion. Also of considerable significance is the collegial and pluralistic nature of the appellate court. One member of the panel may possess special expertise or insight on a problem not shared by the other members of panel, the trial judge or counsel. Moreover, the discussion and debate among judges which attends the creation of an appellate opinion illuminates the relevant issues such that the panel's collective decision is often superior to what would have been the product of any single panel member. In the same way as cross-examination is the crucible within which the truth of testimony is tested (e.g., United States v. Oliver (2d Cir.1980) 626 F.2d 254, 262), the challenge of thoughtful debate is perhaps the best test for the soundness of legal rules. (See generally Friendly, op. cit. supra, 31 Emory L.J. at p. 757.)

                and even less frequently analyze the reasons for according more or less deference.  (See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above (1971) 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635, 667 (hereafter cited as Judicial Discretion );  Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion (1982) 31 Emory L.J. 747, 784.)   Professor Rosenberg explains, "To tame the concept [of discretion] requires no less than to force ourselves to say why it is accorded or withheld, and to say so in a manner that provides assurance for today's case and some guidance for tomorrow's."  (Review of Discretion, op. cit. supra, 79

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