IES Utilities Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue and Finance

• Decision Date: 20 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-1987,94-1987
• Citation: 545 N.W.2d 536
• Parties: IES UTILITIES INC., Midwest Power Systems, Inc., Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, and Interstate Power Company, Appellants, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND FINANCE, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 536

545 N.W.2d 536

IES UTILITIES INC., Midwest Power Systems, Inc., Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, and Interstate Power Company, Appellants, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND FINANCE, Appellee.

No. 94-1987.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 20, 1996.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1996.

Linda S. Weindruch and Rebecca Boyd Parrott of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Harry M. Griger, Special Assistant Attorney General, and James D. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

The controlling issue here is whether the district court correctly sustained defendant Iowa Department of Revenue's (DOR) motion to dismiss plaintiff utilities' petition for declaratory judgment in this agency action case for failing to exhaust all adequate administrative remedies. Due to lack of district court jurisdiction over the original action filed by the utilities, we affirm.

I. Background facts and proceedings. Plaintiff utilities brought an original petition in district court for declaratory judgment under Iowa rule of civil procedure 261 and a motion for a temporary injunction against defendant DOR. The petition for declaratory judgment alleged, in substance, that the DOR in an agency action failed to follow statutory rulemaking procedures concerning implementation of certain accounting methodologies employed by DOR for valuing plaintiffs' property throughout the state. See Iowa Code § 17A.4(1), (3) (1995). Utilities requested, in part, that the district court enjoin DOR from using the challenged accounting methodologies when valuing their property for tax purposes. Plaintiffs alleged they had not exhausted their administrative remedies at the DOR or agency level.

In their petition, plaintiffs attempted to establish jurisdiction of the district court for this original action on two grounds: (1) our holding in Lundy v. Iowa Department of Human Services, 376 N.W.2d 893, 894 (Iowa 1985), and (2) the potential of economic harm to themselves in the event they are required to pay property taxes assessed under the challenged accounting methodologies. See Salsbury Lab. v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 837 (Iowa 1979).

DOR filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff utilities' petition for declaratory judgment alleging lack of district court subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 104(a). In its motion, DOR argued the court had no jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition because the utilities, concerning an agency action, failed to exhaust all adequate administrative remedies available under chapters 17A and 429 of the Iowa Code before bringing a petition in district court. Even though DOR's motion to dismiss phrased its argument in terms of lack of "subject matter jurisdiction," the present case concerns whether the district court has "jurisdiction" or "authority" to entertain plaintiff utilities' declaratory judgment action based on the particular procedural status of the case, not whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain declaratory judgment actions in general. See City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Ass'n, 360 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Iowa 1985); cf. Linn County Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 545 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1996) (in certiorari action challenging district court action, court had "jurisdiction of the case" when it entered orders granting inmate work release privileges outside the county); Anderson v. W. Hodgeman & Sons, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 418, 420-21, 421 n. 2 (Iowa 1994) (in judicial review of industrial commissioner decision, compliance with statutory prerequisites is required to establish district court "jurisdiction" over the particular matter); Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989) (in appeal of district court dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction over two age discrimination lawsuits, court lacked "authority" in the particular situation to resolve the disputes).

The district court dismissed plaintiffs' petition for declaratory judgment and motion for a temporary injunction because, among other reasons, utilities failed to exhaust all adequate administrative remedies prior to proceeding to district court. Utilities appeal from this ruling.

II. Standard and scope of review. Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. Because we are reviewing a district court ruling sustaining a motion to dismiss, we view plaintiff utilities' allegations in their petition for declaratory judgment in a light most favorable to them, resolve doubts in their favor, and will uphold the ruling only if the utilities cannot establish jurisdiction under any state of facts provable under the allegations in the petition. See Lundy, 376 N.W.2d at 894.

Accordingly, the proper record for our review is limited to the averments contained within plaintiff utilities' petition for declaratory judgment and judgments therefrom. See Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 833.

III. The Iowa administrative procedure act and the exhaustion requirement. The carefully crafted framework of Iowa Code chapter 17A, the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (APA), requires litigants affected by the actions of state agencies to follow the rules as a prerequisite to obtaining proper access to the district court for judicial review. This voyage has been time and time again referred to as the "exhaustion" requirement set forth in section 17A.19(1). Exhaustion has several purposes, including honoring agency expertise, handling matters within an agency and not in the courts, and preserving precious judicial resources. See Pro Farmer Grain, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Agric. & Land Stewardship, 427 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1988). The very purpose of an administrative agency, such as DOR, is to expertly perform various functions in a general area of the law for the benefit of the general public (the taxpayers that fund the operation of all administrative agencies). See City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 730-32 (emphasizing the benefits of resolving specialized disputes first at the agency level, as opposed to in district court); see also Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1995).

The APA generally allows, as an exclusive form of relief, judicial review from an agency action to district court whether the action is rulemaking, a contested case, or "other agency action." See Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 276 (Iowa 1983). Exhaustion of adequate administrative remedies is generally required prior to permitting a party to seek relief via judicial review in district court. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(1); City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 731. Normally, the district court sits as an appellate court in judicial review of a final agency action. The doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute, however. In the following limited situations, we have allowed a litigant to bypass the exhaustion requirement:

(1) plaintiff challenges, by way of judicial review under Iowa Code section 17A.19, an agency action as in violation of the rulemaking procedures set forth under the APA, see Lundy, 376 N.W.2d at 894;

(2) plaintiff claims an adequate administrative remedy does not exist for the claimed wrong, see Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Iowa 1975), or stated otherwise, plaintiff will suffer "irreparable injury of substantial dimension" if not allowed access to district court prior to exhausting all administrative remedies, see Salsbury Lab., 276 N.W.2d at 837; or

(3) plaintiff claims the applicable statute does not expressly or implicitly require that all adequate administrative remedies be exhausted prior to bringing an action in district court, see Rowen, 230 N.W.2d at 909.

Plaintiffs pled and readily admit they have not exhausted their administrative remedies prior to filing their petition for declaratory judgment in district court. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 261. Plaintiffs rely mainly on Lundy, cited in (1) above, to avoid having to exhaust all adequate administrative remedies that plaintiffs admit exist in this case, such as taxpayer remedies under Iowa Code chapter 429 and administrative remedies under Iowa Code section 17A.19. Plaintiffs here do not rely on the exception cited in (3).

IV. Application of the Lundy and Salsbury exhaustion exceptions to the facts of the present case. The plaintiff utilities must satisfy either the Lundy or Salsbury exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in order for the district court to have jurisdiction over their petition for declaratory judgment and to avoid going through the normal chapter 17A and judicial review of final agency action steps. We conclude they have not met this burden.

The present action was commenced when plaintiff utilities filed a petition for declaratory judgment in district court pursuant to rule of civil procedure 261. This was an original action. Plaintiffs did not first exhaust taxpayer remedies available under Iowa Code chapter 429 and, within that chapter, did not file a petition for judicial review pursuant to the APA. See Iowa Code §§ 17A.19, 429.3.

Plaintiffs' petition states that certain accounting methodologies were used by DOR in determining valuations of plaintiffs' property without previously following rulemaking procedures set out in Iowa Code section 17A.4. Thus, plaintiffs contend that valuations and tentative tax assessments imposed by DOR on plaintiffs' property using these methodologies were invalid.

In their petition, plaintiff utilities alleged they had received 1994 tentative assessment notices from DOR. Plaintiffs' next procedural steps within the agency would be to request informal conferences with DOR, see Iowa Admin.Code r. 701-7.11 (1995), receive their final assessments, see Iowa Code §§ 428.29, 429.1, and then appeal the final assessments to the state board of tax review. See id. § 429.2. At all agency...