ILC Data Device Corp. v. County of Suffolk

• Decision Date: 27 December 1989
• Citation: 146 Misc.2d 462,550 N.Y.S.2d 993
• Parties: , 1990 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 28,803 ILC DATA DEVICE CORP., Lumex, Inc., Micra Corp., Applied Digital Data Systems Inc., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Defendant. .A.S., Part XII
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 993

550 N.Y.S.2d 993

146 Misc.2d 462, 1990 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 28,803

ILC DATA DEVICE CORP., Lumex, Inc., Micra Corp., Applied Digital Data Systems Inc., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Suffolk County I.A.S., Part XII.

Dec. 27, 1989.

Gary N. Sazer, Jericho, for plaintiffs.

E. Thomas Boyle, Hauppauge, for defendant.

JOHN COPERTINO, Justice.

On May 10, 1988, the Suffolk County Legislature adopted Local Law 21, entitled "A local law providing employee protection against video display terminals." As set forth in Section 1, the County Legislature determined that "although some employers and manufacturers have recognized and implemented minimum safeguards in equipment and workstation design and work routine in order to better protect the health and wellbeing of employees who operate video display terminals on a regular basis, the vast majority of terminal operators remain, as yet, unprotected." The County Legislature then stated its intent to protect such workers by requiring employers, defined as those operating twenty (20) or more terminals within the borders of Suffolk County (Section 2[c], to implement what Section 1 describes as "widely recognized ... safeguards ..."

In furtherance of this stated goal, Local Law 21 (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "VDT law") requires annual vision examinations and any necessary eyewear at employers' expense (Section 3A) and establishes workstation standards, which include the types of chairs, tables, lighting and electronic equipment to be used by the affected employees (Section 3B). The law also mandates work breaks (Section 3C) and employee education and training (Section 3D). It also sets forth the rights of employees (Section 4) and provides for enforcement by the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Department of Health Services (Section 6), who is authorized to issue appropriate rules and regulations (Section 8). The legislation calls for the establishment of a Review Board to make recommendations to the County Legislature and County Executive with regard to workstation standards (Section 7).

In short, for those employers and employees who are covered Local Law 21 purports to be a comprehensive approach to a relatively recent but nonetheless widespread phenomenon, the video display workstation. On July 22, 1988, about one week after Local Law 21 became effective over the veto of County Executive Patrick Halpin, plaintiffs commenced an action to have the law declared invalid. All plaintiffs are alleged to be corporations fitting the Section 2 definition of "Employer," and thus are subject to the legislation.

By decision dated October 5, 1988 this Court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant County of Suffolk ("County") from enforcing Section 3A of the law, with which employers had to comply by October 11, 1988 pursuant to Sections 10 and 11. Several weeks later defendant County moved to dismiss the complaint; by decision dated January 21, 1989, this Court denied the motion. Issue was then joined by defendant's service of an answer.

Pending are dispositive motions which call upon the Court to decide whether Local Law 21 should be upheld as a valid exercise of a local government's power, or struck down for one of the several reasons advanced by plaintiffs in their complaint. Defendant County moves for summary judgment dismissing each of the three causes of action. Plaintiffs have cross moved for a partial summary judgment on the first and second causes; however, use of the term "partial," though accurate in the procedural sense, is somewhat misleading in that granting the cross motion means striking down the statute in its entirety. ¹

For the reasons set forth below, the Court has concluded that though the legislation is well-intentioned and ultimately may be proved an important first step in bringing the worker health concerns addressed in the law to the attention of the public, the Suffolk County Legislature lacked the authority to enact Local Law 21. Consequently, judgment must be had for plaintiffs on their first cause of action and the law declared invalid ab initio.

This matter concerns the nature and extent of the power delegated to municipalities by the State, and certain well-established concepts bear repetition. A county is a municipal corporation (County Law § 3), and as such is a political subdivision of the State, created by the Legislature for the exercise of such governmental powers as may be entrusted to it (City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937). The municipal corporation's very existence remains subject to the State's will. In the absence of express restrictions placed by the Constitution upon the exercise of its legislative powers, the State Legislature may create or destroy, combine or divide, and enlarge or restrict the State's subdivisions (City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836; Town of Hornellsville v. City of Hornell, 38 A.D.2d 312, 328 N.Y.S.2d 941; County Law § 50). Thus, and although certain powers may be shared by the State and the municipal corporation, the State Legislature remains paramount(Matter of Marcus v. Baron, 57 N.Y.2d 862, 456 N.Y.S.2d 39, 442 N.E.2d 437, revg. 84 A.D.2d 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587 on dissenting opn. of Justice Hopkins).

It is perfectly true that the New York State Constitution gives every local government the authority to adopt and amend local laws on certain enumerated subjects, but such grants of power are to be viewed in light of these principles.

The County points to Article IX § 2, which in pertinent part reads as follows:

(c) In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or in any other law, ... (ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such a local government:

(10) The government, protection order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein.

This general grant of authority is restated in Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1):

(ii) every local government ... shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general law, relating to the following subjects ...

a. A county, city, town or village:

(12) The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein ...

However, in § 11 of that same law the Legislature places certain restrictions on a municipal corporation's authority to adopt local laws, as the Constitution permits the Legislature to do in Article IX § 2(c). In relevant part, these provisions are as follows:

§ 11. Restrictions on the adoption of local laws

1. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, the legislative body shall not be deemed authorized by this chapter to adopt a local law which supersedes a state statute, if such local law:

f. Applies to or affects any provision of ... the labor law ... or the workmen's compensation law ² ...

Of course, §§ 10 and 11 must be read together. No part of either must be construed in such a fashion which would render one or the other meaningless or superfluous (Grich v. Wood & Hyde Leather Co., Inc. 74 A.D.2d 183, 427 N.Y.S.2d 96), nor should any construction serve to nullify either section (Delaware County Electric Cooperative, Inc., v. Power Authority of the State of New York 96 A.D.2d 154, 468 N.Y.S.2d 233, affd. 62 N.Y.2d 877, 478 N.Y.S.2d 865, 467 N.E.2d 529). The State Legislature will be presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose (Albano v. Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526, 369 N.Y.S.2d 655, 330 N.E.2d 615). The County's interpretation of its powers under State law runs counter to these well-established precepts of statutory interpretation. Specifically, the County implies that § 11(1)(f) has no vitality separate and apart from § 10.

The County argues that the VDT law is "not inconsistent with any general law" and so is a legitimate exercise of local legislative power. It cites the silence of the State Legislature on the subject of VDTs in the workplace, and concludes that "Local Law 21 relates to an unregulated area ... supplements the existing statutory safeguards afforded to employees in the workplace" and does not "expressly conflict" with State mandates (Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 10, 14, 15). The County goes on to describe what it views as relevant sections of the Labor Law which, of course, make no mention of VDTs. In like fashion, the defendant claims that Local Law 21 is not in derogation of the Workers' Compensation Law because, inter alia, the former is "preventative in nature," whereas the latter treats of injuries arising in the course of employment. The County's position is in a very real sense summarized by its citation to authority holding that a local law may be deemed inconsistent where there exists an express conflict between State and local law or where the local law operates to impose additional restrictions on rights under state law (New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 505 N.E.2d 915; People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 57 N.Y.2d 371, 456 N.Y.S.2d 711, 442 N.E.2d 1222).

The fatal weakness in this position is that it does not address the specific restrictions found in Municipal Home Rule Law § 11(1)(f). Even were this Court able to conclude that Local Law 21 is not inconsistent with the Constitution and general law, initially the Court must decide if the County Legislature had the power to legislate in the area at all....