In Interest of Arisha KS, No. 2845.

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtPER CURIAM
Citation501 S.E.2d 128,331 S.C. 288
Docket NumberNo. 2845.
Decision Date11 May 1998
PartiesIn the Interest of ARISHA K.S., a minor under the age of seventeen, Appellant.

331 S.C. 288
501 S.E.2d 128

In the Interest of ARISHA K.S., a minor under the age of seventeen, Appellant

No. 2845.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted March 6, 1998.

Decided May 11, 1998.


331 S.C. 289
Assistant Appellant Defender Robert M. Pachak, of the SC Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Columbia; and Solicitor Joseph J. Watson, Greenville, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Arisha K.S. (Arisha) pleaded guilty to two charges for second degree lynching and one charge for strong armed robbery, and was sentenced to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) until released by the authority of the Juvenile Parole Board. We affirm.1

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel for Arisha attached to the final brief a petition to be relieved as counsel, stating that he had reviewed the record and concluded Arisha's appeal lacks merit. Although we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel's petition, we respond to the argument which Arisha's counsel raised in the appellate brief.

FACTS

The State filed two petitions against Arisha, a thirteen-year-old juvenile, for acts which she allegedly committed at a

331 S.C. 290
middle school. The first petition is based upon charges of second degree lynching and disturbing a school. The second petition included another charge of second degree lynching and strong armed robbery. In exchange for a plea of guilty to two counts of lynching second degree and strong armed robbery, the State agreed to dismiss the charge of disturbing a school and recommended a local evaluation

During the adjudicatory hearing, the trial judge questioned Arisha about her plea. The following exchange occurred:

Court: Do you understand what's happening here today Arisha: Yes, ma'am. Court: You have any questions for your attorney or the Court regarding what is happening here today? Arisha: No ma'am. Court: Your attorney has indicated that you will admit to these charges. Is that true? Arisha: Yes, ma'am. Court: Has your attorney done everything you've asked him to do or expected him to do in your representation? Arisha: Yes, ma'am. Court: Are you satisfied with his services? Arisha: Yes, ma'am. Court: Has anybody promised you anything to get you to admit to these charges? Arisha: Yes, ma'am. Court: What have they promised you? Arisha: A local evaluation. Court: Is that all that they've promised you? Arisha: Yes, ma'am. Court: Are you under the influence of any drugs, or alcohol or anything that could impair your judgment here today? Arisha: No, ma'am. Court: Do you understand by admitting to this charge that you're giving up your right to a trial? Arisha: Yes, ma'am.

Immediately after this inquiry, the trial court requested the solicitor present the factual basis for the charges against

331 S.C. 291
Arisha. As to the first charge of lynching second degree, the solicitor described the crime as follows:
... [T]hat occurred on October 3rd, 1995, at Sevier Middle School, the victim being one Yvette Voirel.... At that time she was sitting with her brother on the curb and the bus loading zone when the school bus pulled up with a load of individuals on it, and [Arisha] was one of them. She got off the bus with several other individuals. Some words were exchanged and a fight ensued, and the victim was Yvette.

Following this statement, the solicitor offered the following facts to support the second charge of lynching second degree and strong armed robbery:

... [T]hose occurred on October 29th, 1995 the victim being one Katrina ... Shell.... At that time, this individual, [Arisha], and another held down the victim and took $5 from her. That's all.

Without objection from Arisha's counsel, the trial court accepted the plea, adjudicated Arisha a delinquent, and approved a local evaluation.

At the dispositional hearing, DJJ recommended commitment to its facility, rather than probation basing its recommendation on Arisha's most recent school discipline referral of February 4, 1996. On the other hand, Arisha's counsel opposed the recommendation and asked for leniency stating that Arisha "ha[d] no prior adjudications of delinquency" and the "best thing for her would be ... probation." Arisha's Girl Scout leader informed the court that since her expulsion from school, Arisha had regularly participated in a community program sponsored by the City of Greenville.

After considering these recommendations, the trial court sentenced Arisha to DJJ until released by the Juvenile Parole Board.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.

Arisha's counsel argues her guilty plea failed to comply with the mandates of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Counsel further argues a juvenile must be advised of three constitutional rights before the court may declare the juvenile's plea was knowingly entered. Those rights include the right to a trial, the right to confront

331 S.C. 292
his accuser, and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

Federal and state courts have long recognized the principle that a plea of guilty must be intelligently and voluntarily entered to be valid. In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court, added the requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant, who pleaded guilty, entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). The Boykin Court essentially made the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which commands an enumeration of the specific federal constitutional rights that are waived upon a guilty plea, applicable to the states. See also Id.; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-472, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1173-1174, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (concluding "prejudice inheres in a failure to...

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20 practice notes
  • Hill v. Ozmint, No. 03-1.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • August 5, 2003
    ...the denial of a motion for a trial continuance will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Hill, 501 S.E.2d at 128. In his Petition, Hill again contends that the trial judge violated the Sixth Amendment in denying his continuance motion. The district cou......
  • Singh v. Singh, Appellate Case No. 2015-000434
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • December 18, 2019
    ...(S.C. Ct. App. June 24, 2015) (recognizing a student's procedural due process rights in a school transfer proceeding); In re Arisha K.S. , 331 S.C. 288, 293, 501 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing a child's due process rights in a juvenile proceeding).Longstanding tradition of thi......
  • James v. Lister, No. 2843.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • May 11, 1998
    ...with the overwhelming evidence of permanency, to establish a basis for the expert to calculate the present cost of future supplies. 331 S.C. 288 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. ANDERSON and HUFF, JJ., concur. -------- Notes: 1. Section 33-55-210 was amen......
  • In re Jason T., No. 3164.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • May 22, 2000
    ...L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (holding the due process protections requiring notice of the alleged charges extends to juveniles); In re Arisha K.S., 331 S.C. 288, 293, 501 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct.App.1998) ("[A] child in a juvenile proceeding has a right to fundamental due process and thus, our courts mus......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
20 cases
  • Hill v. Ozmint, No. 03-1.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • August 5, 2003
    ...the denial of a motion for a trial continuance will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Hill, 501 S.E.2d at 128. In his Petition, Hill again contends that the trial judge violated the Sixth Amendment in denying his continuance motion. The district cou......
  • Singh v. Singh, Appellate Case No. 2015-000434
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • December 18, 2019
    ...(S.C. Ct. App. June 24, 2015) (recognizing a student's procedural due process rights in a school transfer proceeding); In re Arisha K.S. , 331 S.C. 288, 293, 501 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing a child's due process rights in a juvenile proceeding).Longstanding tradition of thi......
  • James v. Lister, No. 2843.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • May 11, 1998
    ...with the overwhelming evidence of permanency, to establish a basis for the expert to calculate the present cost of future supplies. 331 S.C. 288 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. ANDERSON and HUFF, JJ., concur. -------- Notes: 1. Section 33-55-210 was amen......
  • In re Jason T., No. 3164.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • May 22, 2000
    ...L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (holding the due process protections requiring notice of the alleged charges extends to juveniles); In re Arisha K.S., 331 S.C. 288, 293, 501 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct.App.1998) ("[A] child in a juvenile proceeding has a right to fundamental due process and thus, our courts mus......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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