In re Abhishek I.
| Citation | 255 Md.App. 464,282 A.3d 318 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 904, September Term, 2021 |
| Parties | IN RE Expungement Petition of ABHISHEK I. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Submitted by: Nancy S. Forster (Forster & LeCompte, on the brief), Towson, MD, for Appellant.
Submitted by: Benjamin A. Harris (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Graeff, Shaw, Irma S. Raker (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.*
In this appeal, Abhishek I., appellant, challenges the ruling of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County denying his petition for expungement of his 2008 theft conviction. He presents a single question for this Court's review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:
Did the circuit court err in denying appellant's petition for expungement?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
In August 2008, appellant pleaded guilty to theft of property with a value under $500. The court sentenced him to one year of incarceration, suspended, with one year of supervised probation.
Several months after he was sentenced, appellant was charged with violating the conditions of his probation to obey all laws and not illegally possess any controlled dangerous substance.1 In March 2010, appellant pleaded guilty to that violation. The court sentenced appellant to four days’ incarceration, and it closed probation "unsatisfactorily."
On December 3, 2020, appellant filed a petition for expungement of the 2008 theft conviction. The State filed a response, arguing that, because appellant's probation had been closed unsatisfactorily, the conviction was ineligible for expungement.
Following a hearing on August 6, 2021, the court denied appellant's petition. It stated that, for appellant to be entitled to expungement, he had to "satisfy" his sentence, "including probation," which meant that he needed to complete his probation without violating it, which appellant did not do.
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that appellant was not entitled to expungement of his conviction.
This timely appeal followed.
Appellant filed a petition for expungement pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. Art. ("CP") § 10-110(a)(1)(x) , which addresses eligibility for expungement of a theft conviction. CP § 10-110(c)(1) provides, as follows:
[A] petition for expungement under this section may not be filed earlier than 10 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his petition for expungement on the ground that he had not satisfied his sentence. The State contends that the court properly denied appellant's petition for expungement. Noting that appellant violated his probation, which resulted in his case being closed "unsatisfactorily," the State asserts that appellant did not "satisf[y]" his sentence. It argues that, because he concluded his probation "unsatisfactorily," the 10-year clock did not, and could not, begin, and "he is not entitled to the statutory remedy of expungement."
Whether a person is entitled to expungement is a question of law, which we review de novo . See In re Expungement of Vincent S. , 255 Md.App. 163, 169-70, 278 A.3d 770, Nos. 607 & 608, Sept. Term, 2021, (filed July 5, 2022); In re Expungement of Dione W. , 243 Md. App. 1, 3, 219 A.3d 63 (2019). A court has no discretion to deny expungement if a person is statutorily entitled to it. Vincent S. , 255 Md.App. at 169-70, 278 A.3d 770; Dione W. , 243 Md. App. at 3, 219 A.3d 63.
Before addressing appellant's contention, we briefly address, as relevant to this appeal, the statutory scheme for expungement, i.e., the removal of a court record or a police record "from public inspection." CP § 10-101(e) (defining "expungement"). In 1975, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 482, which was codified at Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §§ 735 – 741 . Vincent S. , 255 Md.App. at 175-76, 278 A.3d 770. Section 737(a)(1)–(5) provided that a person charged with a crime was eligible for expungement in cases that did not result in a judgment of conviction, i.e., acquittal, dismissal, entry of a nolle prosequi , placement on the stet docket, or probation before judgment. The Court of Appeals explained that the expungement procedure was designed "to help protect individuals seeking employment or admission to an educational institution, by entitling them to expungement of unproven charges, so that those individuals could avoid being unfairly judged during their application processes."
Stoddard v. State , 395 Md. 653, 664, 911 A.2d 1245 (2006). A petition for expungement was permitted no earlier than three years from the judgment, with an exception if the person executed a waiver of any tort claim arising from the charge. See Art. 27, § 737(c).
In 1982, the General Assembly expanded the scope of expungement, permitting expungement in the situation where a person was convicted of only one criminal act, which was not a violent crime, and the person was "subsequently granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor." Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 737(a)(7) . The time limitation for expungement under this provision was different; it could not be filed "earlier than 5 years nor later than 10 years after the pardon was signed by the Governor." Art. 27, § 737(c).
In 2008, the General Assembly further expanded the scope of convictions that could be expunged, including "minor nuisance crimes such as panhandling, drinking an alcoholic beverage in a public place, and loitering." Vincent S. , 255 Md.App. at 179, 278 A.3d 770. Accord Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. Art. ("CP") § 10-105(a)(9) . Although some prosecutors and law enforcement agencies objected to the change,2 the proponents of the change expressed the view that extending eligibility for expungement to convictions for nuisance-related crimes would help impoverished people who were attempting to rehabilitate themselves.3 A petition to expunge these convictions could "not be filed within 3 years after the conviction or satisfactory completion of the sentence, including probation, that was imposed for the conviction, whichever is later." CP § 10-105(c)(6) (emphasis added).
In 2016, the General Assembly enacted the Justice Reinvestment Act ("JRA"), 2016 Md. Laws ch. 515, which, among other things, added § 10-110 to the Criminal Procedure Article. CP § 10-110 greatly expanded the list of criminal convictions that potentially were eligible for expungement. See CP § 10-110(a)(1)–(3). Among the many new criminal convictions that were now eligible for expungement was theft. See CP § 10-110(a)(1)(x), (2)(i). For these convictions, there was a longer waiting period; a petition for expungement could not be filed earlier than ten years after the "person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision." CP § 10-110(c)(1) (emphasis added).4
II.
The question presented here is whether appellant's petition for expungement met the requirements of CP § 10-110(c)(1), which, as indicated, provides:
[A] petition for expungement under this section may not be filed earlier than 10 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision.
(Emphasis added.)
The parties disagree on the meaning of the requirement that appellant "satisfy" the sentences imposed, including probation. Appellant contends that he satisfied "the sentence imposed for violating his probation, which was four days." He asserts that "one may satisfy one's probation without completing it as long as the sentence imposed for violating the probation is satisfied." As indicated, the State contends that, because appellant violated his probation, which resulted in his case being closed "unsatisfactorily," appellant did not "satisfy" his sentence of probation.
"When interpreting the language of a Maryland statute, the ‘cardinal rule’ of statutory construction ‘is to determine what the [General Assembly] intended, and, as we have so often said, to do that, we turn first to the words used by the [General Assembly], giving them their ordinary meaning.’ " Howling v. State , 478 Md. 472, 498, 274 A.3d 1124 (2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Dimensions Health Corp. v. Md. Ins. Admin. , 374 Md. 1, 17, 821 A.2d 40 (2003) ). "We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant." Peterson v. State , 467 Md. 713, 727, 226 A.3d 246 (2020) (quoting Bellard v. State , 452 Md. 467, 481, 157 A.3d 272 (2017) ). "We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute's plain language to the isolated section alone." Gerety v. State , 249 Md. App. 484, 498, 246 A.3d 629 (2021) (quoting State v. Bey , 452 Md. 255, 266, 156 A.3d 873 (2017) ). "Instead, ‘the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs.’ " Westley v. State , 251 Md. App. 365, 387, 254 A.3d 106 (2021) (quoting Berry v. Queen , 469 Md. 674, 687, 233 A.3d 42 (2020) ) (cleaned up). "We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute's object and scope." Gerety , 249 Md. App. at 498, 246 A.3d 629 (quoting Bey , 452 Md. at 266, 156 A.3d 873 ). "If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute's...
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