In re Anderson

• Decision Date: 04 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 91385–4.,91385–4.
• Citation: 185 Wash.2d 79,368 P.3d 162
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of the DETENTION OF John Charles ANDERSON.

185 Wash.2d 79

368 P.3d 162

In the Matter of the DETENTION OF John Charles ANDERSON.

No. 91385–4.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Sept. 17, 2015.

Decided Feb. 4, 2016.

Marie Jean Trombley, Attorney at Law, Graham, WA, for Petitioner.

Malcolm Ross, Attorney General of Washington, Criminal Justice–Sexually Violent Pred. Unit Atty. General, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

YU

, J.

¶ 1 Petitioner John Charles Anderson returns to this court a second time asking that we reverse his civil commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW. Specifically, he asks whether juvenile adjudication for a sexually violent offense is a predicate "convict[ion]" under the applicable statutory provision, RCW 71.09.030(1)(e)

. We hold it is. We also reject his other challenges and therefore affirm his civil commitment.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 1988, when Anderson was 17 years old, he pleaded guilty in juvenile court to statutory rape in the first degree. The victim was two and a half years old. Anderson was sentenced to 100 weeks in a juvenile rehabilitation facility. Anderson has since disclosed numerous uncharged juvenile sex offenses predating his guilty plea, including other rapes.

¶ 3 When Anderson's juvenile sentence was about to expire in 1990, the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed and he was transferred to Western State Hospital (WSH) for an evaluation. Before the evaluation period ended, Anderson voluntarily sought civil commitment. Anderson remained at WSH as a voluntary patient for approximately 10 years. In 1998, Anderson requested to be transferred to a less restrictive area of WSH. This less restrictive area was intended for residents who "were managing their own lives and had the wherewithal to take care of themselves," and residents who were transferred to the less restrictive area were often later released into the community. 9 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (May 9, 2013) at 690. However, the psychosexual evaluator determined that Anderson "was really not controlling his sexual impulses to the degree that he claimed he had been," and recommended against transferring him to the less restrictive area. Id. at 699.

¶ 4 In February 2000, Anderson announced his intention to end his voluntary commitment and the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW. Anderson was transferred to the Special Commitment Center (SCC) during the pendency of the State's petition in March 2001.

¶ 5 The State's petition alleged that Anderson was "a person who at any time previously has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total confinement and has committed a recent overt act."¹ RCW 71.09.030(1)(e)

.²

The predicate conviction the State relied on was Anderson's 1988 juvenile court adjudication for first degree statutory rape, and the "recent overt acts" it relied on were sexual contacts Anderson had with four other patients while at WSH. Three of those patients had been diagnosed with developmental disabilities, and the fourth had been diagnosed with severe borderline personality disorder

. In 2004, after a bench trial, the trial court found Anderson was an SVP.

¶ 6 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint Anderson's requested expert witness. In re Det. of Anderson, 134 Wash.App. 309, 321, 139 P.3d 396 (2006)

. This court agreed. In re Det. of Anderson, 166 Wash.2d 543, 551, 211 P.3d 994 (2009) ( Anderson I ). However, the majority of this court rejected Anderson's argument that his sexual contacts with other WSH patients could not be recent overt acts as a matter of law, and therefore remanded for retrial. We specifically stated that the State's expert testimony regarding Anderson's sexual contacts at WSH "support a reasonable apprehension of sexually violent harm, and therefore by definition, Anderson's sexual activities could constitute overt acts." Id. at 550, 211 P.3d 994.

¶ 7 On remand, Anderson moved to dismiss, contending that his juvenile adjudication was not a conviction, and thus he could not be subject to an SVP petition under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e)

. He also contended that his sexual contacts with other patients at WSH were not recent overt acts as a matter of law. The trial court denied Anderson's motion to dismiss, and Anderson was retried by a jury. The jury concluded that Anderson is an SVP, and the trial court entered an order committing him to the SCC. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. In re Det. of Anderson, noted at 185 Wash.App. 1036, 2015 WL 422973 (2015), review granted, 183 Wash.2d 1007, 352 P.3d 187 (2015).

ISSUES

¶ 8 A. Is a juvenile adjudication for a sexually violent offense a predicate conviction for a sexually violent offense in the context of RCW 71.09.030(1)(e)

?

¶ 9 B. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that it is the law of this case that Anderson's sexual contacts at WSH could be overt acts?

¶ 10 C. Did the State produce sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson is an SVP?

ANALYSIS

A. Juvenile adjudications for sexually violent offenses are predicate convictions in the context of RCW 71.09.030(1)(e)

¶ 11 Anderson argues that he cannot be subject to a petition brought under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e)

, which applies to "a person who at any time previously has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total confinement and has committed a recent overt act."³ (Emphasis added). We hold that a juvenile adjudication for a sexually violent offense is a predicate conviction for purposes of RCW 71.09.030(1)(e).

¶ 12 We resolve questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Det. of Martin, 163 Wash.2d 501, 506, 182 P.3d 951 (2008)

. Our goal is " ‘to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature.’ " Id. (quoting Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991) ).

¶ 13 "Technically speaking, juveniles are not ‘convicted’ of crimes, but rather ‘adjudicated’ to have committed offenses." In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d 80, 87, 847 P.2d 455 (1993)

. However, we have long recognized that "the Legislature's use of ‘conviction’ in statutes to refer to juveniles appears to be endemic." Id.; see also State v. Michaelson, 124 Wash.2d 364, 367, 878 P.2d 1206 (1994)

. Indeed, even statutes and court rules specifically applicable to juveniles sometimes use the word conviction to refer to juvenile adjudications. See, e.g., RCW 13.40.077 (recommended prosecutorial standards for juvenile court), .215(5) (school placement for "a convicted juvenile sex offender" who has been released from custody), .480 (release of student records regarding juvenile offenders); RCW 13.50.260(4)

(sealing juvenile court records); JuCR 7.12(c)–(d) (criminal history of juvenile offenders). Therefore, when considering whether a statutory reference to convictions includes juvenile adjudications, we cannot rely on the word alone—we consider the particular statutory context and purposes to determine what the legislature intended. Michaelson, 124 Wash.2d at 367, 878 P.2d 1206 ; Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d at 87–88, 847 P.2d 455.

¶ 14 Anderson's argument rests primarily on RCW 71.09.030(1)

, which lists the five classes of individuals who may be subject to SVP petitions. Martin, 163 Wash.2d at 507, 182 P.3d 951. The statute lists an individual who "has been convicted of a sexually violent offense" separately from an individual "found to have committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile." RCW 71.09.030(1)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). Based on this difference, Anderson contends that the legislature did not intend for juvenile adjudications to be predicate convictions in the context of RCW 71.09.030(1)(e).

¶ 15 Looking to the statutory scheme as a whole, chapter 71.09 RCW specifically mentions sexually violent offenses committed as a juvenile twice. RCW 71.09.025(1)(a)(ii)

, .030(1)(b). As originally passed, those statutes plainly listed juvenile adjudications separately to make it clear that chapter 71.09 RCW applied equally to juvenile adjudications and adult convictions for sexually violent offenses.⁴

See LAWS OF 1992, ch. 45, § 3(1)(a)(i)-(ii); LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, § 1003(1)-(2); In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 54, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) ("By using the word ‘offense’, the Legislature indicated an intent to include prior juvenile adjudications within the scope of permissible proof at sex predator proceedings."). And there is no indication that when the legislature amended RCW 71.09.030(1) by adding a provision for recent overt acts, it intended to create a newfound distinction between convictions and juvenile adjudications in the context of chapter 71.09 RCW. It simply brought the statute into compliance with the due process principles articulated in young, 122 wash.2d at 39–42, 857 P.2d 989

.

¶ 16 Notably, the current statutory scheme includes several key provisions that do not differentiate between juvenile adjudications and adult convictions, but nevertheless clearly apply to both. For instance, RCW 71.09.030(2)

lists the entities that are authorized to file SVP petitions. Martin, 163 Wash.2d at 516, 182 P.3d 951. Authorized entities include the prosecuting attorney of any county where "[t]he person has been charged or convicted with a sexually violent offense" or "[a] recent overt act occurred." RCW 71.09.030(2)(a)(i)–(ii). Conspicuously absent is any mention of the prosecuting attorney of a county where the person has been found to have committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile. Similarly, RCW 71.09.020(18) defines an SVP in part as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence." Nowhere does this definition mention a person found to have committed a sexually violent offense as a juvenile. The argument that juvenile adjudications cannot be convictions for purposes of...