In re Application of French

• Decision Date: 17 June 1926
• Docket Number: 27042
• Parties: In re Application of C. E. French for Writ of Habeas Corpus
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

285 S.W. 513

315 Mo. 75

In re Application of C. E. French for Writ of Habeas Corpus

No. 27042

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 17, 1926

Prisoner remanded.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and W. F. Frank Assistant Attorney-General, for petitioner.

The sole point in this case is the proper construction of Section 11679, Laws of Missouri, 1925, page 230. This statute is expressed in language so plain that it admits of but one meaning and leaves no room for construction. (1) Rules for the interpretation of statutes will not be applied when the language of the statute is plain. Grier v. Railway Co., 286 Mo. 534; State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 294 Mo. 115. The question giving rise to this case is whether or not the Commissioner of Finance can be compelled to reveal the information he obtains in the course of examination of a bank when called upon to do so as a witness in the trial of a civil case in a court of justice. It seems clear from the language used that the Legislature did not intend that such information should be used in the trial of a civil case. It prohibits the Commissioner from giving such information except in the trial of a criminal case or in a criminal proceedings. The word "criminal" does not appear before the word "trial" in the law as it existed in 1923, the then Commissioner of Finance was subpoenaed as a witness in a civil case. Millspaugh v. Kesterson, 270 S.W. 110. The Legislature in 1925, with knowledge of the fact that the statute of 1923 did not contain the word "criminal" before the words "trial in a court of justice," and with knowledge of the fact that this court in Millspaugh v Kesterson construed the 1923 statute and held, in effect that the word "criminal" did not apply to the words "trial in a court of justice," and that the exception in the statute covered both civil and criminal cases, amended the statute of 1923 by adding the word "criminal" before the words "trial in a court of justice." It cannot be successfully argued that the statute in its present form is unreasonable or unfair in that it permits the use of information contained in the records of the Finance Department as evidence in a criminal case, but denies their use in a civil case when valuable property rights are at stake, for the reason that such matters are no concern of the courts. Such an argument might, with propriety, be addressed to the Legislature. (2) It cannot be said that the statute in question violates Section 30 of Article II of the Constitution of the State in that it deprives litigants in civil cases of their property without due process of law, for the reason that every citizen of the State who becomes a litigant in a civil case is denied the use of the records of the Finance Department as evidence in his case. In other words all citizens similarly situated receive exactly the same treatment. Due process of law is a matter of statutory regulation. City of St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 17.

Elmer O. Jones and Dupuy G. Warrick for respondent.

(1) Sec. 11679, R. S. 1919, as amended by Laws 1923, page 222, and as amended by the Laws 1925, page 230, is in conflict with Article IV, Section 53, Subdivision 26, of the Constitution of Missouri, which provides: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law . . . granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity." In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125; Lige v. Railroad Co., 275 Mo. 249; State ex rel. v. Railroad Co., 246 Mo. 512; Moler v. Whisman, 243 Mo. 571; 12 C. J. 1196, 1183. This statute in terms provides that the Commissioner of Finance may disclose merely, upon request, to Federal Reserve banks, the examiners of such corporations, and to clearing house associations, all facts or information which may come to him in the course of his official duties touching the affairs of any state bank under his control, but denies to all banks which are not members of a clearing house and to all individual citizens of Missouri the right to obtain like information, even by use of the lawful process of courts of record. Manifestly this is an arbitrary and unreasonable classification and is therefore discriminatory and constitutes a grant of special and exclusive rights and privileges to these corporations and associations, contrary to the explicit said provisions of the Constitution. State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517; State v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680. (2) This statute violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. (a) Permitting the disclosure of information to a particular class of corporations and denying like privileges to every other citizen, is a manifest denial of the equal protection of the laws. 12 C. J. 1144, 1147, 1149, 1196; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60; In re Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; Com. v. Inter. Harv. Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W. 703; American Tobacco Co. v. William, 115 S.W. 755; State v. Railroad Co., 246 Mo. 512. (b) This statute violates the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory denial of evidence to individual citizens, and to all corporations not members of clearing houses in Missouri, which amounts to a virtual denial of the right to a full and free hearing in a court of justice. 12 C. J. 1206; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 55 L.Ed. 191; In re Op. of Justices, 208 Mass. 619, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 771; State v. Griffin, 154 N.C. 611; Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio, St. 15, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906; Columbia Valley Tr. Co. v. Smith, 56 Ore. 6, 107 P. 465; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125; Taylor v. Anderson, 137 P. 1183; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020. (c) "Due Process" has always been construed by every court in the land to mean equality before the law and an equal right and opportunity to preserve and protect one's property, in courts of justice. This statute arbitrarily discriminates between individual citizens and corporations, including banking corporations which are not members of clearing houses in Missouri, on the one hand, and Federal Reserve banks and banks belonging to clearing houses in Missouri, on the other hand, by giving to the latter free access to the records of the State Banking Department for the protection of their property rights, but denying to the former access to the same records. State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 394; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125, 51 L. R. A. 176; San Francisco Board of Education v. Alliance Ins. Co., 159 F. 994; 12 C. J. 1185; People v. Sholem, 238 Ill. 203; 12 C. J. 1190; Story on Const. Lim., sec. 1935; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 34 L.Ed. 816. (3) This statute violates the express provisions of Article II, Section 10, Constitution of Missouri. By denying to the individual citizen and to non-banking corporations and banking corporations which are not members of clearing houses in Missouri, the right to compel the production of records of this important state department, this statute, if valid, would operate as a denial of justice, and a denial of "a certain remedy . . . for every injury to . . . property," as guaranteed by this provision of the Constitution. Cement Co. v. Gas Co., 255 Mo. 1; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125.

OPINION

White, J.

The petitioner filed his application in this court asserting that he is restrained of his liberty by Marion Shoop, Sheriff of Adair County, and the pretext of such restraint is this: A civil suit was pending in the Circuit Court of Adair County in the case of Florence Hunter Funk, plaintiff, v. C. H. Charlton et al., defendants, and was being tried March 10, 1926. The petitioner, French, Commissioner of Finance of the State of Missouri, was served with subpoena to appear before said court and testify in said case. He was sworn, and while testifying as a witness he was asked to produce in evidence the written reports in his possession made by the state bank examiners on the Union Bank of Novinger, Missouri, for the years 1918, 1919, 1920. He also was asked to produce all written reports made by said Union Bank of Novinger, or its officers, to the Department of Finance, touching the condition of said bank and its affairs during the years 1918, 1919 and 1920. The petitioner refused to produce said evidence, whereupon the circuit court adjudged him in contempt, and ordered that he be confined in the county jail of Adair County until he should signify his willingness to produce the evidence.

The petitioner further says that the statute of the State of Missouri, Section 11679, Revised Statutes 1919, as amended by the laws of 1925, require him to keep secret all information obtained by him in the examination of banks, except when called as a witness in a criminal proceeding or trial, subjecting him to a fine for a misdemeanor and forfeiture of office for giving such information.

Attached to the petition is a transcript of the judgment and commitment, and the evidence taken at the time. This evidence shows French was Commissioner of Finance of the State of Missouri; that he had in his possession all the original reports of examinations of the Bank of Novinger for the years 1918, 1919 and 1920, prepared by the Deputy Commissioners of Finance; all the original written reports of the Bank of Novinger, or its officers and directors, touching the condition of the bank and its affairs for the years 1918, 1919 and 1920; carbon copies of all correspondence of the bank with the office of the Commissioner of Finance during those years. When asked to produce those records he refused to do so, and was committed for contempt, as stated in his petition.

Upon the filing of the petition this court issued its writ March 15, 1926, commanding the sheriff to produce the body of French, together with the time...